Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.: The Rehabilitation of Addiction Disability Law in Canada by Pronych, Nadia
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
11-12-2020 12:30 PM 
Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.: The Rehabilitation of Addiction 
Disability Law in Canada 
Nadia Pronych, The University of Western Ontario 
Supervisor: Lynk, Michael, The University of Western Ontario 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Laws degree in 
Law 
© Nadia Pronych 2020 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pronych, Nadia, "Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.: The Rehabilitation of Addiction Disability Law in Canada" 
(2020). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 7437. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/7437 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
i 
 
Abstract 
Canadian human rights law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees with 
disabilities and protects employees’ right to workplace accommodation to the point of undue 
hardship. However, the analysis of the case law illustrates that Canadian legal decision 
makers have not consistently applied the fundamental human rights laws and principles to 
cases involving individuals with drug and alcohol addiction disability. Stewart v. Elk Valley 
Coal Corp. provided the Supreme Court of Canada with the opportunity to provide much 
needed clarity and confirm the correct approach to be applied to claims of discrimination and 
accommodation on the basis of drug and alcohol addiction. This decision was fatally flawed 
in its application of the law. Despite this, Elk Valley has provided guidance with respect to 
the principles to be applied in addiction disability cases, resulting in a progressive movement 
towards the broad, liberal human rights approach to drug and alcohol addiction disability. 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
Canadian human rights legislation prohibits employers from discriminating against 
employees on the basis of protected human rights grounds, such as disability, and protects 
employees’ right to workplace accommodation on the basis of their protected characteristic. 
Under Canadian human rights law, drug and alcohol addiction constitutes a form of 
disability, attracting human rights protections.  
As a human right, the right to be accommodated for a disability must be applied broadly and 
exceptions should be interpreted narrowly, in order to uphold the fundamental purpose of 
human rights legislation. The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed that all protected 
human rights grounds are to be treated equally and the same discrimination and duty to 
accommodate analyses apply to all protected grounds. Thus, Canadians suffering from 
addiction are entitled to equal protection under the law as those with any other protected 
human rights characteristic. 
In 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada released the Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. 
decision, which failed to apply well-established human rights laws and principles to the 
termination of an employee with an addiction for violating the employer’s drug policy. This 
thesis provides an extensive survey of the jurisprudence on workplace discrimination and 
accommodation on the basis of addiction disability, over the last 12 years, and examines the 
treatment of this particular human rights ground by legal decision makers across Canada. It 
analyzes whether Canadian legal decision makers have applied and currently apply 
fundamental human rights laws and principles to cases of drug and alcohol addiction to 
reveal any discrepancies between the black letter law and the actual application of the law to 
addiction disability. This research examines whether Elk Valley set a precedent or followed a 
line of decisions on addiction disability that also diverge from well-established human rights 
law and analyzes the implications of Elk Valley on Canadian addiction disability law to 
determine whether Elk Valley is the new legal norm, thereby shifting the direction of 
Canadian human rights law, or a judicial misstep among the landscape of workplace 
disability discrimination and accommodation case law that can be corrected in the coming 
jurisprudence.  
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction: Addiction Disability and the Duty to 
Accommodate 
Canadian human rights law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees 
on the basis of protected grounds,1 such as age, sex, race, sexual orientation, religion and 
disability, and protects employees’ right to workplace accommodation on the basis of a 
protected human rights ground. Every single piece of Canadian human rights legislation 
enshrines disability as a protected human rights ground.2 Jurisprudence establishes the 
acceptance of drug and alcohol addiction as a form of disability and some human rights 
statutes even define disability to specifically include drug and alcohol dependence.3 
Human rights protections extend to drug and alcohol addiction by virtue of the legal 
recognition of addiction as a form of disability. Under Canadian law, the use of drugs or 
alcohol constitutes a disability “where an individual has reached a stage of addiction or 
dependency.”4 Casual or recreational substance use does not reach this threshold and, 
therefore, does not receive human rights protections. 
 
1
 The terms “protected human rights ground” and “prohibited ground of discrimination,” which appear 
throughout this thesis, are used interchangeably. 
2
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 15(1) [Canadian Charter]; Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, 
c H-6, s 3(1) [Canadian HRA]; British Columbia’s Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s 13(1); 
Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5, s 7(1); The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, RSS 1979, 
c S-24.1, s 2(1)(m.01)(vii); Manitoba’s The Human Rights Code, CCSM c H175, s 9(2)(l); Ontario’s 
Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19, s 5(1) [Ontario HRC]; Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms, CQLR 2016, c C-12, s 10 refers to “handicap;” Newfoundland and Labrador’s Human Rights 
Act, SNL 2010, c H-13.1, s 9(1); New Brunswick’s Human Rights Act, RSNB 2011, c 171, s 2.1(h)-(i); 
Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989 c 214, s 5(1) [Nova Scotia HRA]; Prince Edward Island’s 
Human Rights Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12, s 1(1)(d); Nunavut’s Consolidation of Human Rights Act, SNu 
2003, c12, s 7(1) [Nunavut HRA]; Yukon’s Human Rights Act, RSY 2002, c116, s 7(h); and Northwest 
Territories’ Human Rights Act, SNWT 2002, c18, s 5(1).  
3
 Entrop v Imperial Oil Ltd (2000), 50 OR (3d) 18 [Entrop]; Handfield v North Thompson School District 
No 26, [1995] BCCHRD No 4; British Columbia v British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ 
Union, [2007] BCCAAA No 37; Ontario (Disability Support Program) v Tranchemontagne, 2010 ONCA 
593; and Wright v College and Association of Registered Nurses of Alberta (Appeals Committee), 2012 
ABCA 267 [Wright]. Canadian HRA, supra note 2, s 25; Nova Scotia HRA, supra note 2, s 3(1)(vii); and 
Nunavut HRA, supra note 2, s 1. 
4
 Entrop v Imperial Oil Ltd, [1995] 23 CHRR D/196 at para 24, affirmed in Entrop, supra note 3. 
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Of course, an employee’s drug or alcohol addiction can be a legitimate concern for 
employers, especially if the employee is impaired at work. For instance, the impairment 
of an employee’s judgment and ability, especially in a safety sensitive work environment, 
can pose a serious risk of harm and ultimately threaten the employer’s operations. 
Nevertheless, employers have a legal duty to accommodate employees with an addiction 
disability to the point of undue hardship. An employer cannot disadvantage, terminate or 
refuse to employ an individual as a result of their disability, unless it has exhausted 
available accommodative efforts or the decision is based on a bona fide occupational 
requirement, thereby fulfilling its legal obligations.  
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has repeatedly asserted that human rights 
legislation must be given a liberal, contextual and purposive interpretation.5 As a human 
right, the right to be accommodated for a disability must be applied broadly and 
exceptions should be interpreted narrowly, in order to uphold the fundamental purpose of 
human rights legislation.6 The SCC has also affirmed that there is no hierarchy of 
protected human rights grounds and all grounds are to be treated equally.7 Thus, 
Canadians suffering from drug and alcohol addiction are entitled to equal protection 
under the law as individuals with any other protected human rights characteristic.  
1.1 Fact Pattern 
Consider the following case. Mr. S, a plant loader operator in a coalmine with 9 years of 
service, is involved in a workplace incident. While operating the loader, he hit and broke 
the mirror of a stationary truck. Pursuant to the employer’s drug and alcohol policy, 
which enabled it to require an employee to undergo testing following a significant 
workplace incident, the employee’s supervisor directed Mr. S to submit to a urine test. He 
 
5
 Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at 551 [Simpsons-Sears]; 
British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia Government and 
Service Employees’ Union, [1999] 3 SCR 3 at paras 43-44 [Meiorin]; and Quebec (Commission des droits 
de Ia personne et des droits de Iajeunesse) v Bombardier Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 
2015 SCC 39 at para 31 [Bombardier]. 
6
 Commission scolaire régionale de Chambly v Bergevin, [1994] 2 SCR 525 [Bergevin]. 
7
 Gosselin (Tutor of) v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 15. 
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subsequently tested positive for cocaine and was suspended. The employer met with Mr. 
S and, during this meeting, he admitted to using cocaine on his days off and indicated that 
he failed to recognize that he had a drug problem prior to the accident but subsequently 
came to realize he was addicted. The employer’s drug and alcohol policy required 
employees to disclose dependence issues before any substance-related workplace incident 
occurred; under this policy, employees disclosing their substance issue or seeking 
rehabilitative assistance after a workplace incident and positive drug or alcohol test may 
be subject to termination, considering safety concerns and the importance of deterrence. 
Accordingly, the employer decided to terminate Mr. S for violating the policy and 
indicated that it would consider an application for new employment after 6 months and 
reimburse 50% of his rehabilitation program costs. 
The union filed a human rights complaint, alleging that the employer discriminated 
against Mr. S and fired him due to his addiction. The Tribunal concluded that Mr. S was 
not terminated because of his addiction but for breaching the employer’s drug and 
alcohol policy, which required him to disclose his addiction before an accident. The 
Tribunal held that the employee’s addiction disability was not a factor in his termination 
and found no discrimination; the termination, pursuant to the policy, was not imposed 
due to his disability but because of his failure to stop using drugs and failing to disclose 
his addiction to the employer prior to the workplace incident. Furthermore, the Tribunal 
concluded that, imposing a lesser punishment would reduce the deterrent effect of the 
policy and constitute undue hardship on the employer, in light of its safety 
responsibilities. 
The union appealed this decision. The trial judge concluded that the employer terminated 
Mr. S for breaching the workplace policy and not for his drug addiction. The employee’s 
addiction was not a factor in his termination and, thus, the termination was not 
discriminatory. However, the trial judge found that the employer failed to satisfy its duty 
to accommodate to the point of undue hardship, as the employee’s denial led him to think 
that he had nothing to report under the workplace policy; therefore, the no-risk self-
reporting constituted inadequate accommodation.  
 
 
4 
Both the union and employer appealed this decision in part. The Court of Appeal held 
that the termination did not amount to discrimination and concluded that the employer 
accommodated Mr. S to the point of undue hardship. 
Mr. S appealed the decision to the SCC. The majority of the Court found sufficient 
evidence supporting the Tribunal’s conclusion that the employer did not terminate Mr. S 
because of his drug addiction, but for breaching the employer’s drug policy. The majority 
relied on the Tribunal’s findings that denial did not prevent Mr. S from disclosing his 
addiction prior to the accident because he knew he should not take drugs before work, he 
had the ability to decide not to take them and he had the capacity to disclose his drug use. 
The SCC majority accepted the Tribunal’s conclusion that the employee’s addiction was 
not a factor in his termination. The Court found the Tribunal’s decision to be reasonable 
and dismissed the appeal. 
This case is Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.8 Although people suffering from addiction 
disability are entitled to human rights protections under the law, Elk Valley reveals that 
Canadian legal decision makers continue to diverge from the broad, flexible, liberal 
human rights approach and impose a narrower standard in cases of alleged discrimination 
on the basis of addiction disability and accept a low standard of direct objective evidence 
of employers’ undue hardship defense, contrary to human rights jurisprudence and 
principles. Canadian jurisprudence affirms that all human rights are to be treated equally 
and applied broadly, while exceptions must be narrowly interpreted. Nevertheless, the 
SCC accepted the conclusion that Elk Valley Coal Corporation terminated Ian Stewart, 
not because he had an addiction, but because he breached the workplace drug policy, 
despite the fact that his drug addiction impaired his ability to comply with the drug 
policy. The Elk Valley decision clearly departs from fundamental human rights laws and 
principles and reflects a lack of understanding of the realities of addiction. This thesis 
investigates how Canadian legal decision makers apply well-established human rights 
laws and principles in cases of workplace discrimination and accommodation on the basis 
 
8
 2017 SCC 30 [Elk Valley]. 
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of drug and alcohol addiction and examines the implications of the Elk Valley decision on 
subsequent addiction disability case law. 
1.2 Chapter Overview 
1.2.1 Chapter 2: Canadian Human Rights Law 
Chapter 2 establishes the foundational framework of this research by providing an 
overview of Canadian workplace discrimination and accommodation law. The chapter 
outlines human rights legislation and interpretive principles as well as the pivotal prima 
facie discrimination and workplace accommodation analyses.  
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifically protects against 
discrimination on the basis of disability;9 Canada is the first country in the world to 
include such a protection in its constitution. Canadian human rights legislation prohibit 
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of an enumerated 
protected human rights ground and protect employees’ right to workplace 
accommodation. Under Canadian human rights law, every employer has the duty to 
accommodate an employee with a protected characteristic, including a drug or alcohol 
addiction, to the point of undue hardship. 
The SCC has consistently confirmed the quasi-constitutional status of human rights 
legislation10 and established that human rights statutes must be interpreted in a liberal, 
contextual and purposive fashion11 and in light of the Canadian Charter and its values.12 
 
9
 Supra note 2, s 15(1): “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” 
10
 Béliveau St‑Jacques v Fédération des employées et employés de services publics inc, [1996] 2 SCR 345 
at 402, reproduced in Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v 
Montréal (City), 2000 SCC 27 at para 28; de Montigny v Brossard (Succession), 2010 SCC 51 at para 45; 
and Bombardier, supra note 5 at para 30. 
11
 Simpsons-Sears, supra note 5 at 551; Meiorin, supra note 5 at paras 43-44; and Bombardier, supra note 
5 at para 31. 
12
 Cooper v Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 SCR 854 at para 21. 
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Human rights are to be given a broad interpretation and exceptions to these rights must be 
interpreted narrowly.13 
The chapter details the prima facie discrimination test, established by the SCC in Moore 
v. British Columbia (Education),14 to be applied in cases of alleged discrimination. In 
order to establish prima facie discrimination, the employee must demonstrate that they 
have a protected characteristic, experienced an adverse impact and the protected 
characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact.15 Once a prima facie case of 
discrimination has been established, the burden shifts to the employer to justify the 
conduct and, if it cannot be justified, discrimination will be found.16  
The employer must prove that it made every reasonable effort to accommodate the 
employee’s disability, short of undue hardship. Applying the Meiorin test, the legal 
decision maker must determine whether the employer sufficiently justified the impugned 
standard by establishing that it had adopted the standard for a purpose rationally 
connected to the performance of the job and in an honest and good faith belief that it was 
necessary to fulfill the legitimate work-related purpose and that the standard is reasonably 
necessary to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose.17 In order to prove that the 
standard is reasonably necessary, the employer must demonstrate that it is impossible to 
accommodate the individual without undue hardship.18 
The SCC has provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when assessing an 
employer’s duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship: financial cost, 
disruption of a collective agreement, problems with employee morale, interchangeability 
of the workforce and facilities, size of the employer’s operations and safety.19 Recent 
 
13
 Bergevin, supra note 6. 
14
 2012 SCC 61 [Moore]. 
15
 Ibid at para 33. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Meiorin, supra note 5 at para 54. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Central Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 SCR 489 at 521. 
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decisions also indicate the emergence of a seventh factor: legitimate operational 
requirements of a workplace.20 Legal decision makers must assess the employer’s duty to 
accommodate to the point of undue hardship with common sense and flexibility, in light 
of the circumstances of the particular case.21 The amount of hardship required to satisfy 
the employer’s duty to accommodate must be substantial: “More than mere negligible 
effort is required to satisfy the duty to accommodate. The use of the term ‘undue’ infers 
that some hardship is acceptable.”22   
Safety is the most frequently raised undue hardship factor in disability cases, which will 
be evident in the cases examined in this thesis. The law indicates that employers cannot 
make assumptions about disability and safety without conducting an individualized 
assessment of the employee.23 Employers must present convincing evidence to 
substantiate a safety claim because impressionistic or anecdotal evidence regarding the 
magnitude of risk are inadequate. Claims of anticipated hardships on the basis of 
proposed accommodations should not be accepted if based solely on speculative or 
unsubstantiated concern that certain negative consequences might or could follow the 
employee’s accommodation.24 Although safety sensitive and zero-tolerance rules are 
often features of a modern workplace, they cannot be advanced to defeat a workplace 
accommodation if a tolerable range of risk would allow an employee to work 
productively.25  
1.2.2 Chapter 3: Understanding Drug and Alcohol Addiction 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of drug and alcohol addiction, including its prevalence, 
symptoms, diagnostic criteria, potential causes, the impact addiction can have on one’s 
 
20
 Michael Lynk, “Disability and Work: The Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees with 
Disabilities in the Canadian Workplace,” in R Echlin & C Paliare, eds, Law Society of Upper Canada 
Special Lectures 2007: Employment Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) 189 at 211. 
21
 Meiorin, supra note 5 at para 63. 
22
 Central Okanagan School District No 23 v Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970 at 984. 
23
British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 
[1999] 3 SCR 868 [Grismer]. 
24
 Ibid at para 41; Meiorin, supra note 5 at paras 78-79. 
25
 Lynk, supra note 20 at 230-231. 
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employment and medical treatment. The chapter also establishes the theoretical 
frameworks for understanding disability generally and drug and alcohol addiction, in 
particular. 
Chapter 3 outlines the three leading models of disability: the biomedical model, 
economic model and sociopolitical model. The biomedical and economic models 
characterize disability as an individual pathology26 and are informed by notions of pity, 
charity and social segregation.27 The biomedical model focuses on the functional abilities 
and limitations of the individual and the economic model concentrates on their ability to 
perform occupational roles and skills.28 The sociopolitical model, on the other hand, 
characterizes disability as a social pathology29 and stresses the importance of the social 
environment and examines its impact on individuals with disability.30 Unlike the 
biomedical and economic approaches, the sociopolitical model views disability as a 
social construct and espouses a human rights approach.31 
The legal human rights perspective of addiction disability is derived from human rights 
legislation and jurisprudence. Under Canadian human rights law, drug and alcohol 
addictions constitute a disability and are afforded human rights protections. The SCC has 
affirmed that all protected human rights grounds are to be treated equally and subjected to 
the same discrimination and duty to accommodate analyses. Thus, Canadians suffering 
from addiction disability are entitled to equal protection under the law. Employers are 
prohibited from discriminating against individuals on the basis of their drug or alcohol 
addiction and have a legal duty to accommodate these individuals in the workplace to the 
point of undue hardship.  
 
26
 David Hosking, “Critical Disability Theory” (Paper delivered at the 4th Biennial Disability Studies 
Conference, Lancaster University, UK, 2-4 September 2008) at 6-7. 
27
 Lynk, supra note 20 at 191. 
28
 Harlan Hahn, “The Political Implications of Disability Definitions and Data” (1993) 4:2 Journal of 
Disability Policy Studies 41 at 43. 
29
 Hosking, supra note 26 at 6-7. 
30
 Hahn, supra note 28 at 43. 
31
 Lynk, supra note 20 at 191. 
 
 
9 
Traditionally, theories of addiction disability have been divided into the moral model and 
the medical model. The moral model perceives drug and alcohol addiction as “a choice 
characterized by voluntary behavior”32 and ultimately a “moral failure.”33 However, 
neuroscience research in the past two decades has increasingly supported the notion that 
addiction is a chronic brain disease. The medical model describes addiction as “a 
primary, chronic, neurobiologic disease, with genetic, psychosocial, and environmental 
factors influencing its development and manifestations.”34 Addiction typically involves 
craving for the substance, loss of control of the amount or frequency of use, the 
compulsion to use and use despite harmful consequences, including physical, 
psychological, interpersonal, financial and legal problems.35 Addictions are characterized 
by an inability to consistently abstain from using the substance and, like many other 
chronic diseases, often involve cycles of relapse and remission.36 Although the moral 
model of addiction has largely fallen out of favour amongst healthcare professionals, the 
stigma associated with drug and alcohol addiction continues to exist. More recently, the 
biopsychosocial model of addiction has developed to expand on the medical perspective, 
creating a multidimensional paradigm that recognizes the complex biological, 
psychological and social components of addiction. 
1.2.3 Chapters 4-6: Exploring Addiction Disability Jurisprudence 
This thesis provides an extensive survey of the recent jurisprudence on workplace 
discrimination and employers’ duty to accommodate employees struggling with addiction 
disability and examines the treatment of this particular human rights ground by legal 
decision makers across Canada. Adopting the doctrinal method, it analyzes whether 
 
32
 Edmund Henden, Hans Olav Melberg & Ole Jørgen Røgeberg, “Addiction: Choice or Compulsion?” 
(2013) 4:77 Front Psychiatry at 1. 
33
 Hanna Pickard, Serge Ahmed & Bennett Foddy, “Alternative Models of Addiction” (2015) 6:20 Front 
Psychiatry at 1. 
34
 Seddon Savage et al, “Definitions Related to the Medical Use of Opioids: Evolution Towards Universal 
Agreement” (2003) 26:1 Journal of Pain & Symptom Management 655 at 662. 
35
 Marilyn Herie et al, Addiction: An information guide (Toronto: Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, 
2010) at 2. 
36
 American Society of Addiction Medicine, “Definition of Addiction” (2019), online: <https://www.asam. 
org/resources/definition-of-addiction>. 
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Canadian legal decision makers have applied and currently apply fundamental human 
rights laws and principles to cases of drug and alcohol addiction to reveal any 
discrepancies between the black letter law and the actual application of the law to 
addiction disability. Specifically, this research examines whether Elk Valley sets a 
precedent or, rather, follows a line of decisions on addiction disability that also appear to 
diverge from well-established human rights law and analyzes the implications of the 
recent SCC decision. This thesis seeks to determine whether Elk Valley is the new legal 
norm, thereby shifting the direction of Canadian human rights law, or a judicial misstep 
among the landscape of workplace disability discrimination and accommodation case law 
that can be corrected in the coming jurisprudence.  
To uncover and illustrate patterns in the jurisprudence, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
chronologically examine various cases across Canada on workplace discrimination and 
accommodation on the basis of drug and alcohol addiction, from 2008 to present. As a 
matter of practicality, this thesis does not review all the relevant decisions released in the 
past 12 years. I deliberately selected arbitration, tribunal and court cases, across different 
jurisdictions, decided in favor and against the employee seeking accommodation for their 
addiction to illustrate the different legal approaches applied to addiction disability in the 
years prior to and following the release of the 2017 Elk Valley decision. The selected 
cases are representative of the Canadian jurisprudence on addiction disability during 
these time periods. 
The question of whether the Elk Valley decision is a judicial misstep is determined by 
analyzing the decision in light of the fundamental, well-established human rights laws 
and principles described in Chapter 2 that are meant to be applied to all human rights 
grounds. Examining the cases released in the wake of the SCC’s decision in Elk Valley 
illustrates the current direction of the addiction disability law landscape.  
1.2.3.1 Chapter 4: Pre-Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. 
In order to establish the legal context necessary to understand Elk Valley, Chapter 4 of the 
thesis analyzes the addiction case law preceding the SCC decision. In Canadian labour 
law, there have historically been two competing schools of thought on how to approach 
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workplace misconduct arising from drug and alcohol addiction: the disciplinary approach 
and the human rights approach. The traditional disciplinary approach, which is rooted in 
the long-standing arbitral approach to culpable misconduct, assesses whether the 
employer had just cause to discipline or terminate the employee and whether the 
disciplinary action was excessive in the circumstances. Under this approach, the 
employee’s addiction is merely considered a mitigating factor in determining the 
appropriate discipline, and not a trigger for the application of the discrimination analysis 
and duty to accommodate. The human rights approach, on the other hand, originated from 
human rights legislation and the statutory grant of power incorporated in labour relations 
legislation, enabling arbitrators to interpret and apply human rights statutes.37 Applying 
the human rights approach, the arbitrator seeks to determine whether the employee’s 
misconduct is connected to their addiction disability and, if a compelling connection can 
be established, the analysis centers on whether the employer fulfilled its duty to 
accommodate the employee to the point of undue hardship.  
The hybrid disciplinary approach developed as a middle ground between the disciplinary 
and human rights approaches, integrating the traditional disciplinary analysis with 
accommodation principles, and gained popularity in the context of addiction disability. 
Under this approach, the legal decision maker applies a disciplinary or just cause analysis 
to the voluntary, culpable aspects of the employee’s misconduct and applies the human 
rights analysis to the involuntary, non-culpable components causally connected to the 
disability.38 
Chapter 4 analyzes eight cases from 2008 to 2016, prior to the release of the SCC’s 
decision in Elk Valley: British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v. British Columbia 
Government and Service Employees’ Union,39 New Flyer Industries Ltd. v. National 
Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-
 
37
 For example, section 48(12)(j) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Sched A. 
38
 Brian Etherington, “Recent Developments in the Duty to Accommodate Disabilities” in Allen Ponak, 
Jeffrey Sack & Brian Burkett, eds, Labour Arbitration Yearbook 2012-2013 (Second Series) (Toronto: 
Lancaster House, 2012) 403 at 406. 
39
 2008 BCCA 357.  
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Canada), Local 3003,40 Wright v. College and Association of Registered Nurses of 
Alberta (Appeals Committee),41 Seaspan ULC v. International Longshore & Warehouse 
Union, Local 400,42 Canadian National Railway v. Teamsters Canada Rail 
Conference,43  Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Saskatchewan Gaming Corp.,44 
Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre45 and McNulty v. 
Canada Revenue Agency.46 These cases illustrate the divergent approaches that have 
commonly been applied to addiction cases by legal decision makers across Canada—
ranging from the broad, liberal human rights approach, reflecting an understanding and 
appreciation of the features and challenges of addiction disability, to the narrow, stringent 
approach, concerned with choice, control and causal connections—and provide the legal 
background for analyzing and understanding the Elk Valley decision. 
1.2.3.2 Chapter 5: Analysis of Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. 
Elk Valley is the first addiction disability accommodation case to be heard by the SCC. It 
provided the Court with the opportunity to address the apparent inconsistencies in the 
legal approach applied to addiction disability cases and offer much needed clarification. 
Chapter 5 takes an in-depth look at the case of Elk Valley. It summarizes and examines 
the previous decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta 
and Court of Appeal of Alberta and the SCC decision, with a particular emphasis on the 
latter, including the majority, partial dissent and dissenting decisions of the Court. The 
chapter analyzes the legal reasoning adopted in these decisions from a human rights 
perspective and with a sociopolitical understanding of addiction, grounded in human 
rights principles, legislation and jurisprudence and illustrates how the decisions depart 
 
40
 [2010] MGAD No 43. 
41
 Wright, supra note 3. 
42
 [2014] BCCAAA No 108. 
43
 [2015] 122 CLAS 319.  
44
 [2015] SLAA No 27. 
45
 [2016] OLAA No 361. 
46
 2016 PSLREB 105. 
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from these fundamental human rights laws and principles and reflect a lack of 
understanding of the realities of addiction. 
In Elk Valley, the SCC affirmed the prima facie discrimination test articulated in Moore 
and concluded that no additional requirements are to imported into the analysis. The SCC 
asserted that, in order to establish prima facie discrimination, the protected human rights 
ground must merely be a factor in the adverse impact. Nevertheless, the majority of the 
Court found sufficient evidence supporting the Tribunal’s decision that Stewart was not 
terminated for his addiction, but for breaching the drug policy, and concluded that it was 
reasonable for the Tribunal to find no prima facie discrimination. In finding that Mr. 
Stewart’s termination was not discriminatory, based on the superficial distinction that Elk 
Valley terminated him for breaching the employer’s drug policy, and not for his addiction 
disability, the majority demonstrated faulty legal reasoning and departed from 
fundamental human rights laws and principles as well as the modern scientific 
understanding of addiction. 
1.2.3.3 Chapter 6: Post-Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. 
Now, three years later, many decisions have been decided in the wake of the 2017 Elk 
Valley decision. Chapter 6 explores the addiction disability jurisprudence following the 
SCC’s decision in Elk Valley to examine the implications of the decision and the 
development of new patterns in Canadian addiction disability law. This chapter analyzes 
five cases that have been decided in the post-Elk Valley era: Toronto District School 
Board v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 4400,47 Humber River Hospital v. 
Ontario Nurses’ Association,48 Regional Municipality of Waterloo (Sunnyside Home) v. 
Ontario Nurses’ Association,49 Canadian Pacific Railway v. Teamsters Canada Rail 
Conference50 and Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Cambridge Memorial Hospital.51 These 
 
47
 [2018] OLAA No 119. 
48
 [2018] OLAA No 416. 
49
 [2019] OLAA No 16. 
50
 [2019] 139 CLAS 27. 
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decisions reveal new trends in the jurisprudence and the future direction of addiction 
disability law in Canada. 
A review of these cases suggests that the Elk Valley decision has changed the landscape 
of addiction law. The decisions illustrate a shift towards a broad, liberal human rights 
approach to addiction disability. Relying on the SCC’s decision in Elk Valley, arbitrators 
and judges have rejected the notion that there must be more than a mere connection 
between the addiction and adverse impact and the imposition of additional factors and 
considerations in the prima facie discrimination analysis. In the post-Elk Valley era, legal 
decision makers have required employers to provide objective evidence of their 
accommodation efforts and alleged undue hardship, even in the context of safety-
sensitive workplaces. The legal decisions in the wake of Elk Valley have adhered to the 
well-established human rights approach to discrimination and workplace accommodation 
and signify a change in the landscape of addiction disability case law.  
1.3 Terminology  
The terms substance use disorder, substance abuse and substance dependence are 
commonly used in association with addiction and are adopted by sources cited in this 
thesis. These different diagnostic terms reflect the changing approach to understanding 
and diagnosing addiction. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
previously categorized substance use issues into two diagnoses: substance abuse and 
substance dependence. This distinction “was based on the concept of abuse as a mild or 
early phase and dependence as the more severe manifestation.”52 The current edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders combines the previously 
separate diagnostic categories of substance abuse and substance dependence into a single 
 
 
51
 2019 ONSC 3951. 
52
 American Psychiatric Association, “Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders” (2013), online: < https: 
//www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-fact-sheets> at 1. 
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disorder called substance use disorder.53 The broad diagnosis of substance use disorder 
refers to a problematic pattern of drug or alcohol use that results in clinically and 
functionally significant impairment, such as social, physical, psychological and 
interpersonal problems. The severity of the disorder is measured on a continuum, ranging 
from mild to severe.  
Over the years, various terms have been used to describe the different stages and severity 
of addiction. Although “addiction” is not applied as a diagnostic term in the DSM-5, it is 
commonly used to describe severe substance use problems. The term addiction indicates 
“the most severe, chronic stage of substance-use disorder, in which there is a substantial 
loss of self-control, as indicated by compulsive drug taking despite the desire to stop 
taking the drug. In the DSM-5, the term addiction is synonymous with the classification 
of severe substance-use disorder.”54 Although the DSM-5 does not refer to addiction as a 
specific diagnosis, the term is still regularly used amongst the medical community and 
commonly adopted in legal decisions. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, I will continue 
to use the term addiction. However, when a source refers to another term, I will adopt the 
terminology used in the cited material in order to avoid the misinterpretation of the 
findings, as the meaning of these terms may vary slightly.  
1.4 Thesis Objectives 
Canadians suffering from addiction are entitled to equal protection under the law as 
individuals with any other protected human rights characteristic. Legal decision makers 
are to treat all protected human rights grounds equally and apply the same legal tests to 
all protected grounds. However, cases like Elk Valley illustrate that legal decision makers 
diverge from the well-established liberal, broad human rights approach and subject 
discrimination and accommodation claims on the basis of addiction to a higher standard, 
thus making it relatively difficult for the employee to have a successful case.  
 
53
 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed 
(Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013) [DSM-5]. 
54
 Nora Volkow, George Koob & Thomas McLellan, “Neurobiologic Advances from the Brain Disease 
Model of Addiction” (2016) 374:4 New England Journal of Medicine 363 at 364. 
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Human rights law and principles are essentially ineffective if they are not being applied 
consistently. The inconsistency between the stated law and the application of the law to 
this particularly vulnerable group is a significant injustice that warrants critical attention. 
Addressing this issue is the first step to remedying the systemic injustice perpetuated by 
legal decision makers. The objective is to identify and raise awareness of the disparity 
between the prescribed law and the actual application of the law in cases involving 
vulnerable individuals with addiction to spark a conversation about practical solutions to 
minimize this discrepancy and remedy the apparent differential treatment of addiction 
disability by the legal system. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Canadian Workplace Discrimination and 
Accommodation Law 
Canadian human rights legislation prohibits employers from discriminating against 
employees on the basis of enumerated protected grounds, such as age, religion, race, 
sexual orientation and disability. Although there are some differences between the 
various statutes, every single piece of Canadian human rights legislation enshrines 
disability as a protected human rights ground.1 Canadian human rights law protects 
against both direct and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs when an 
employer adopts a practice or rule, which on its face, discriminates against a person or a 
group of people on a prohibited ground.2 On the other hand, indirect discrimination, also 
known as adverse effect or constructive discrimination, arises when an employer adopts a 
rule or standard, for genuine business or economic purposes, which is neutral on its face 
and applies equally to all employees, but has a discriminatory effect on an employee or 
group of employees by imposing obligations, penalties or conditions, not imposed on 
other members of the workforce, due to a special characteristic of the employee or 
group.3  
 
1
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 15(1) [Canadian Charter]; Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, 
c H-6, s 3(1) [Canadian HRA]; British Columbia’s Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s 13(1) [BC 
HRC]; Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5, s 7(1) [Alberta HRA]; The Saskatchewan Human 
Rights Code, RSS 1979, c S-24.1, s 2(1)(m.01)(vii) [Saskatchewan HRC]; Manitoba’s The Human Rights 
Code, CCSM c H175, s 9(2)(l) [Manitoba HRC]; Ontario’s Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19, s 5(1) 
[Ontario HRC]; Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR 2016, c C-12, s 10 refers to 
“handicap” [Quebec Charter]; Newfoundland and Labrador’s Human Rights Act, SNL 2010, c H-13.1, s 
9(1) [Newfoundland HRA]; New Brunswick’s Human Rights Act, RSNB 2011, c 171, s 2.1(h)-(i) [NB 
HRA]; Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989 c 214, s 5(1) [NS HRA]; Prince Edward Island’s 
Human Rights Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12, s 1(1)(d) [PEI HRA]; Nunavut’s Consolidation of Human Rights 
Act, SNu 2003, c12, s 7(1) [Nunavut HRA]; Yukon’s Human Rights Act, RSY 2002, c116, s 7(h) [Yukon 
HRA]; and Northwest Territories’ Human Rights Act, SNWT 2002, c18, s 5(1) [NWT HRA] [collectively 
cited as Canadian human rights statutes]. 
2
 Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at 551 [Simpsons-Sears]. 
3
 Ibid. 
 
 
18 
In accordance with Canadians’ right to be free from discrimination, employers have a 
duty to accommodate employees with a protected characteristic, such as a disability, to 
the point of undue hardship. Only some jurisdictions explicitly provide for a duty to 
accommodate in their human rights statute.4 Nevertheless, under Canadian law, every 
employer has the duty to accommodate an employee with a disability to the point of 
undue hardship, regardless of whether the relevant human rights statute specifically refers 
to workplace accommodation.5  
The jurisprudence provides important guiding principles for the application of these 
human rights and obligations, including the Moore and Meiorin tests.6 The Supreme 
Court of Canada (SCC) has confirmed that human rights statutes must be interpreted in a 
liberal, contextual and purposive fashion7 and in light of the Canadian Charter and its 
values.8 Human rights are to be given a broad interpretation. Therefore, as a human right, 
the right to be accommodated for a disability must be applied broadly and exceptions 
should be interpreted narrowly.9 This chapter examines the various pieces of Canadian 
human rights legislation and interpretive human rights principles as well as explores the 
legal analyses for prima facie discrimination and the employer’s duty to accommodate to 
the point of undue hardship.  
 
4
 Ontario HRC, supra note 1, ss 17(1)-(2); Manitoba HRC, supra note 1, ss 9(1), 12; NWT HRA, supra note 
1, s 7(4); Yukon HRA, supra note 1, s 8(1); and Nunavut HRA, supra note 1, s 9(5). 
5
 Central Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 SCR 489 [Central Alberta 
Dairy Pool]; British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia 
Government and Service Employees’ Union, [1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin]; and Stewart v Elk Valley Coal 
Corp, 2017 SCC 30 [Elk Valley]. 
6
 Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 [Moore]. 
7
 Simpsons-Sears, supra note 2 at 551; Meiorin, supra note 5 at paras 43-44; Quebec (Commission des 
droits de Ia personne et des droits de Iajeunesse) v Bombardier Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training 
Center), 2015 SCC 39 at para 31 [Bombardier]. 
8
 Cooper v Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 SCR 854 at para 21 [Cooper]. 
9
 Commission scolaire régionale de Chambly v Bergevin, [1994] 2 SCR 525 [Bergevin]. 
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2.1 Human Rights Legislation and Principles  
2.1.1 Federal Legislation  
The Parliament of Canada has passed several pieces of legislation promoting equality and 
human rights. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is part of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, which forms part of the Constitution of Canada, the supreme law of Canada.10 
The Canadian Charter defines the fundamental rights of the Canadian people, including 
equality rights. The Charter applies to government action; it applies to the actions of the 
Parliament and Government of Canada as well as the legislature and government of each 
province with respect to all matters within its authority.11 The rights and freedoms 
guaranteed in the Canadian Charter are “subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”12  
Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter prohibits discrimination: “Every individual is 
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit 
of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”13 As 
articulated by the SCC, the purpose of section 15 is “to ensure equality in the formulation 
and application of the law” and “[t]he promotion of equality entails the promotion of a 
society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human 
beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.”14 Although the Charter 
does not specifically refer to employment, this broad equality right is still relevant and 
important to workplace accommodation cases. Firstly, under the Canadian Charter, 
 
10
 Government of Canada, “Guide to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (8 June 2020), online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/how-rights-protected/guide-canadian-charter-rights-
freedoms.html>. 
11
 Supra note 1, s 32(1): “This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect 
of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and 
Northwest Territories; and (b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters 
within the authority of the legislature of each province.” 
12
 Ibid, s 1. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at para 15 [Kapp]; citing Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 
SCR 143 at 171 [Andrews]. 
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individuals suffering from addiction are entitled to “equal protection and equal benefit of 
the law” with respect to their human rights.15 Secondly, the jurisprudence establishes that 
human rights statutes are to be interpreted in light of the Charter and its values. 
The Canadian Human Rights Act, on the other hand, prohibits federally regulated 
employers and service providers, including airports, radio and television broadcasters, 
chartered banks, post offices and federal Crown corporations, from discriminating against 
employees.16 Under the Canadian Human Rights Act, “the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual 
orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic 
characteristics, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been 
granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.”17 Section 7 
provides that, “It is a discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly, (a) to refuse to 
employ or continue to employ any individual, or (b) in the course of employment, to 
differentiate adversely in relation to an employee, on a prohibited ground of 
discrimination.”18  
The Canadian Human Rights Act expressly protects against both direct and indirect 
discrimination.19 However, the legislation provides an exception to seemingly 
discriminatory workplace practices; section 15(1)(a) states that a practice is not deemed 
to be discriminatory if  “any refusal, exclusion, expulsion, suspension, limitation, 
specification or preference in relation to any employment is established by an employer 
to be based on a bona fide occupational requirement,”20 meaning a legitimate workplace 
rule. The Act also explicitly provides for the federally regulated employer’s duty to 
accommodate. Section 15(2)(a) states that, “For any practice mentioned in paragraph 
 
15
 Supra note 1, s 15(1). 
16
 Government of Canada, “List of federally regulated industries and workplaces” (12 May 2020), online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/services/jobs/workplace/federally-regulated-industries.html>. 
17
 Supra note 1, s 3(1). 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid, s 15(8). 
20
 Ibid.  
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(1)(a) to be considered to be based on a bona fide occupational requirement… it must be 
established that accommodation of the needs of an individual or a class of individuals 
affected would impose undue hardship on the person who would have to accommodate 
those needs, considering health, safety and cost.”21 Therefore, under this piece of 
legislation, the federally regulated employer must demonstrate that accommodating the 
employee with an addiction disability would impose undue hardship with respect to 
health, safety or cost. 
The Employment Equity Act specifically addresses equality in the workplace and requires 
federally regulated employers—both private sector and certain public sector 
employers22—to engage in proactive employment practices to increase the representation 
of women, people with disabilities, Aboriginal peoples, and visible minorities in the 
workforce. The purpose of the legislation is: 
to achieve equality in the workplace so that no person shall be denied 
employment opportunities or benefits for reasons unrelated to ability and, 
in the fulfilment of that goal, to correct the conditions of disadvantage in 
employment experienced by women, Aboriginal peoples, persons with 
disabilities and members of visible minorities by giving effect to the 
principle that employment equity means more than treating persons in the 
same way but also requires special measures and the accommodation of 
differences.23 
The statute acknowledges the vital role accommodation plays in achieving equality in the 
workplace and expressly enshrines the duty to accommodate. 
The Employment Equity Act provides that every federally regulated employer must 
implement employment equity by identifying and eliminating barriers arising from the 
employer’s systems, policies and practices that are not legally authorized.24 Furthermore, 
employers have a responsibility to institute positive policies and practices and make 
reasonable accommodations to ensure that women, people with disabilities, Aboriginal 
 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 SC 1995, c 44, s 4(1). 
23
 Ibid, s 2. 
24
 Ibid, s 5(a). 
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peoples and visible minorities achieve a degree of representation in each division of the 
employer’s workforce that reflects their general representation in the Canadian 
workforce.25 However, the statute provides for broad exceptions, extending beyond the 
undue hardship defense, and states that:  
The obligation to implement employment equity does not require an 
employer (a) to take a particular measure to implement employment equity 
where the taking of that measure would cause undue hardship to the 
employer; (b) to hire or promote persons who do not meet the essential 
qualifications for the work to be performed; (c) with respect to the public 
sector, to hire or promote persons without basing the hiring or promotion 
on merit in cases where the Public Service Employment Act requires that 
hiring or promotion be based on merit; or (d) to create new positions in its 
workforce.26 
The Employment Equity Act further limits the scope of its application by stating that only 
employees who identify themselves to an employer, or agree to be identified by an 
employer, as an Aboriginal person, a visible minority or a person with a disability are 
protected under the employment equity provisions.27 This piece of legislation falls short 
of providing the human rights protections afforded by the Canadian Charter and 
Canadian Human Rights Act and the human rights jurisprudence. 
2.1.2 Provincial and Territorial Legislation  
Every Canadian province and territory has developed and enacted its own human rights 
legislation, directed at providing individuals with protection against discrimination in 
various spheres of life, including employment. The purpose of these pieces of legislation 
is similar: to recognize the dignity and equal and inalienable rights of every person, 
promote the understanding and mutual respect for the dignity and worth of every person, 
provide equal rights and opportunities to everyone and essentially prevent 
discrimination.28 Although these various human rights statutes are not exactly alike, they 
 
25
 Ibid, s 5(b). 
26
 Ibid, s 6. 
27
 Ibid, s 9(2). 
28
 Canadian human rights statutes, supra note 1, Preamble. 
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provide similar human rights protections with respect to employment. Ontario’s Human 
Rights Code presents a general representation of the protections provided by the 
provinces and territories’ human rights legislation. Important differences between the 
legislation will be noted. 
Each human rights statute states that employers must not discriminate against a person 
based on a protected human rights ground, enumerated in the particular legislation. For 
example, Ontario’s Human Rights Code provides that, “Every person has a right to equal 
treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of race, ancestry, 
place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, gender expression, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or 
disability.”29 Although the protected grounds vary slightly from statute to statute, every 
single piece of human rights legislation includes disability as a protected ground. 
Accordingly, an employer cannot refuse to employ, refuse to continue to employ or 
otherwise discriminate against a person with regard to employment because of their 
disability. 
Some statutes, like Ontario’s Human Rights Code, specifically address indirect 
discrimination while others do not. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
Canadian human rights law protects employees against both direct and indirect 
discrimination. Therefore, all Canadian human rights legislation applies equally to 
instances of direct and indirect discrimination, regardless of whether the particular statute 
expressly addresses indirect discrimination. Ontario’s Human Rights Code specifically 
refers to constructive discrimination, also known as indirect or adverse effect 
discrimination, and provides that a person’s right to be free from discrimination is 
violated “where a requirement, qualification or factor exists that is not discrimination on 
a prohibited ground but that results in the exclusion, restriction or preference of a group 
 
29
 Supra note 1, s 5(1). Section 10(1) of the Code defines equal treatment to mean, “subject to all 
requirements, qualifications and considerations that are not a prohibited ground of discrimination.” 
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of persons who are identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination and of whom the 
person is a member.”30  
Each statute provides for a bona fide occupational requirement exception.31 An employer 
cannot refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ a person because of a protected 
human rights ground unless the refusal is based on a bona fide occupational requirement, 
a legitimate qualification for performing a particular job. If an employer can demonstrate 
that the workplace rule in question establishes a necessary requirement for the proper 
performance of the job, the validity of the rule will be upheld, despite its discriminatory 
effect.32 The SCC developed a test for determining whether a workplace rule constitutes 
a bona fide occupational requirement. In order to establish that the prima facie 
discriminatory standard is a bona fide occupational requirement, the employer must 
demonstrate that (1) it adopted the particular workplace standard for a purpose rationally 
connected to the performance of the job; (2) it adopted the standard in an honest and good 
faith belief that it was necessary for the fulfilment of that legitimate work-related 
purpose; and (3) the standard is reasonably necessary for the attainment of that legitimate 
work-related purpose, meaning it would be impossible to accommodate the employee 
without imposing undue hardship on the employer.33  
 
30
 Ibid, s 11(1). 
31
 Canadian HRA, supra note 1, s 15(1)(a), BC HRC, supra note 1, s 13(4), Alberta HRA, supra note 1, s 
7(3) and NWT HRA, supra note 1, 7(3): “bona fide occupational requirement;” Quebec Charter, supra note 
1, s 20: “required for employment;” Newfoundland HRA, supra note 1, s 14(2): “good faith occupational 
qualification;” NB HRA, supra note 1, s 2.2: “bona fide requirement or qualification;” PEI HRA, supra note 
1, s 6(4): “genuine occupational qualification;” Yukon HRA, supra note 1, s 10(a): “reasonable 
requirements or qualifications for the employment;” Nunavut HRA, supra note 1, s 9(4): “justified 
occupational requirement;” Saskatchewan HRC, supra note 1, s 16(7): “reasonable occupational 
qualification and requirement for employment;” Ontario HRC, supra note 1, s 11(1) and Manitoba HRC, 
supra note 1, s 14(1): “reasonable and bona fide in the circumstances;” and NS HRA, supra note 1, s 
6(f)(ia): “bona fide qualification, bona fide occupational requirement or a reasonable limit.” 
32
 Canadian Human Rights Commission, “Bona Fide Occupational Requirements (BFORs),” online: 
<http://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/historical-perspective/en/browseSubjects/bfors.asp>. 
33
 Meiorin, supra note 5. 
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Some jurisdictions, including Ontario, also explicitly provide for a duty to accommodate 
in their human rights legislation.34 Ontario’s Human Rights Code states that: 
The Tribunal or a court shall not find that a requirement, qualification or 
factor is reasonable and bona fide in the circumstances unless it is satisfied 
that the needs of the group of which the person is a member cannot be 
accommodated without undue hardship on the person responsible for 
accommodating those needs, considering the cost, outside sources of 
funding, if any, and health and safety requirements, if any.35  
The statute prescribes particular undue hardship factors and expressly limits the duty to 
accommodate to the point of undue hardship analysis to considerations of cost, outside 
sources of funding and health and safety requirements. However, most of the provinces 
and territories’ human rights statutes do not make reference to a duty to accommodate, let 
alone specific undue hardship factors,36 thus allowing for more flexibility in the 
accommodation analysis.   
Every employer has the duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship, regardless 
of whether the relevant human rights statute specifically refers to workplace 
accommodation. The Canadian Charter essentially embodies a duty to accommodate to 
the point of undue hardship; even in the absence of a statutory duty to accommodate, no 
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piece of Canadian human rights legislation can be interpreted as precluding this duty.37 
Canadian jurisprudence, which will be discussed in greater detail below, entrenches 
employer’s legal obligation to accommodate employees.  
2.1.3 Interpretive Principles  
The SCC has consistently affirmed the quasi-constitutional status of human rights 
legislation.38 This special status means that human rights statutes prevail over other 
laws.39 In Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink, Chief Justice Lamer, 
commented on the unique nature of human rights legislation in Canada: 
When the subject matter of a law is said to be the comprehensive 
statement of the “human rights” of the people living in that jurisdiction, 
then there is no doubt in my mind that the people of that jurisdiction have 
through their legislature clearly indicated that they consider that law, and 
the values it endeavours to buttress and protect, are, save their 
constitutional laws, more important than all others.40 
Furthermore, in Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., Justice 
McIntyre stated that, “Legislation of this type is of a special nature, not quite 
constitutional but certainly more than the ordinary -- and it is for the courts to seek out its 
purpose and give it effect.”41 Accordingly, the SCC has repeatedly declared that human 
rights legislation must be interpreted in a broad, liberal, contextual and purposive 
manner42 and in light of the Canadian Charter and its values.43 This interpretive 
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approach is consistent with the statutory guidelines provided in the federal Interpretation 
Act, which stipulates that statutes are deemed to be remedial and “shall be given such 
fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its 
objects.”44 
The purposive approach is the fundamental approach to Canadian statutory interpretation: 
“there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in 
their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the 
scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.”45 In Canadian 
National v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), the SCC affirmed that,  
Human rights legislation is intended to give rise, amongst other things, to 
individual rights of vital importance, rights capable of enforcement, in the 
final analysis, in a court of law. I recognize that in the construction of such 
legislation the words of the Act must be given their plain meaning, but it is 
equally important that the rights enunciated be given their full recognition 
and effect.46 
Human rights legislation must be interpreted in a manner that advances the broad policy 
considerations underlying the statute,47 which is essentially the protection of Canadians’ 
equal rights. 
The purposive approach requires analyzing the underlying purpose of the legislation and 
interpreting the statute in light of its objectives and the particular context. As mentioned 
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above, the general purpose of human rights legislation is to safeguard the equal 
opportunity for all Canadians to participate in a wide range of socioeconomic spheres.48 
The Preamble of Ontario’s Human Rights Code states that the purpose of the legislation 
is:  
to recognize the dignity and worth of every person and to provide for 
equal rights and opportunities without discrimination that is contrary to 
law, and having as its aim the creation of a climate of understanding and 
mutual respect for the dignity and worth of each person so that each 
person feels a part of the community and able to contribute fully to the 
development and well-being of the community and the Province.49 
Human rights statutes and the rights enshrined within them, including the employer’s 
duty to accommodate, must be interpreted in light of these statutory objectives. 
Human rights legislation must also be given a broad interpretation. Human rights are to 
be interpreted broadly while statutory exceptions to the exercise of these rights must be 
narrowly construed.50 The provisions that provide defences for discriminatory conduct 
must be interpreted narrowly so as not to frustrate the fundamental purpose of the 
legislation, and to give the fullest possible protection against discrimination.51 Human 
rights legislation “is often the final refuge of the disadvantaged and the 
disenfranchised;”52 these statutes are meant to protect the rights of disenfranchised 
people and provide them with an avenue to rectify the injustice perpetrated against them. 
Therefore, “As the last protection of the most vulnerable members of society, exceptions 
to such legislation should be narrowly construed.”53 General terms and concepts must 
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also be interpreted flexibly, allowing for provisions in the legislation to be adapted to the 
changing social conditions and evolving concepts of human rights.54 
2.1.4 The Meaning of Equality 
Equality does not mean treating everyone the same. Canadian courts have rejected the 
notion of formal equality, in favor of substantive equality.55 Formal equality prescribes 
“equal treatment for those in similar situations and different treatment for those in 
dissimilar situations”—in other words, “treating likes alike.”56 Substantive equality, on 
the other hand, “recognizes that not all differences in treatment are violations of equality 
rights and that differences in treatment are sometimes necessary to achieve true 
equality.”57 The Canadian Charter and the various pieces of Canadian human rights 
legislation are aimed at securing substantive equality.58  
In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, Justice McIntyre illustrated the need for 
and application of substantive equality: 
[I]t may be said that a law which treats all identically and which provides 
equality of treatment between “A” and “B” might well cause inequality for 
“C”, depending on differences in personal characteristics and 
situations.  To approach the ideal of full equality before and under the 
law  -- and in human affairs an approach is all that can be expected  --  the 
main consideration must be the impact of the law on the individual or the 
group concerned.  Recognizing that there will always be an infinite variety 
of personal characteristics, capacities, entitlements and merits among 
those subject to a law, there must be accorded, as nearly as may be 
possible, an equality of benefit and protection and no more of the 
restrictions, penalties or burdens imposed upon one than another.59  
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Substantive equality acknowledges and responds to the differences that particular groups 
of people may experience, including “patterns of disadvantage” that require a proactive 
response.60 Workplace accommodation, espousing the principles of substantive equality, 
aims to counteract some of these disadvantages experienced by individuals with a 
protected human rights characteristic. Workplace policies, standards and practices should 
strive for substantive equality.  
Employers’ duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship should be interpreted in 
view of the objectives of the duty to accommodate: providing Canadians with an equal 
opportunity to employment.61 The law provides for the bona fide occupational 
requirement exception; however, in order to preserve the rights of Canadians with 
disabilities and provide substantive equality, this exception must be applied strictly and 
sparingly. 
2.2 Prima Facie Discrimination Analysis 
An overwhelming amount of labour and employment law jurisprudence involves 
discrimination in the workplace. In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, the SCC 
explained the concept of discrimination: 
Discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or 
not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the 
individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, 
or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or 
which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages 
available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal 
characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association 
with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those 
based on an individual’s merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.62 
As previously mentioned, discrimination can either be direct or indirect.  Although 
unintentional, indirect discrimination still violates human rights legislation if a person 
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with a protected characteristic is subjected to differential and adverse treatment for no 
justifiable reason.63 Under Canadian human rights law, intention is irrelevant to the prima 
facie discrimination analysis and both direct and indirect discrimination are treated the 
same. 
It is important to note that not every distinction amounts to discrimination. 
Discrimination focuses particularly on violations of human dignity—essentially, the 
arbitrariness of the barriers imposed on people, whether intentionally or unknowingly.64 
Employment practices, standards and requirements cannot disadvantage employees by 
“attributing stereotypical or arbitrary characteristics;” the focus should be on employees’ 
actual abilities, not falsely attributed capabilities.65 However, an employer’s conduct 
cannot be impugned solely on the basis that their actions had a negative impact on an 
employee with a protected characteristic. Membership to a protected group does not in 
itself guarantee access to a human rights remedy; there must be a connection between the 
group membership and the arbitrariness of the disadvantageous standard or conduct, 
either on its face or indirectly through its impact, in order to trigger the possibility of a 
human rights remedy.66 The SCC subsequently confirmed the use of this approach in 
Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays.67  
2.2.1 Moore Test 
The SCC established the three-part test for determining the presence of prima facie 
discrimination in Moore v. British Columbia (Education). The Moore test reaffirmed the 
discrimination test first articulated by the SCC in Simpsons-Sears and Central Alberta 
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Dairy Pool.68 In order to find prima facie discrimination, the complainant must 
demonstrate that:  
They have a characteristic protected from discrimination under the Code; 
that they experienced an adverse impact with respect to the service; and 
that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact. Once a 
prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the respondent 
to justify the conduct or practice, within the framework of the exemptions 
available under human rights statutes. If it cannot be justified, 
discrimination will be found to occur.69  
Both the employee and employer have the persuasive burden of establishing their case on 
the balance of probabilities.70 
The Moore test does not mention, let alone require, the employer’s knowledge of the 
employee’s protected characteristic. However, the issue of knowledge has been raised in 
subsequent workplace discrimination cases. In Telecommunications Workers Union v. 
Telus Communications Inc., the Alberta Court of Appeal affirmed that an employee does 
not have to demonstrate that the employer was aware of their disability in order to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination: “Demonstrating an employer’s knowledge 
of an employee’s disability is unnecessary, in a case alleging adverse-effect 
discrimination. By definition, adverse-effect discrimination is the uniform application of 
a seemingly neutral employment policy to all employees, regardless of whether some 
employees have protected characteristics.”71 The Court concluded that the three-part 
Moore test is sufficient to accommodate both cases of indirect and direct discrimination; 
therefore, knowledge should not be included as an additional element of the prima facie 
discrimination test.72  
More recently, in Quebec (Commission des droits de Ia personne et des droits de 
Iajeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), the SCC 
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clarified the prima facie discrimination test. Although the case refers to the Quebec 
human rights statute, it is applicable to other human rights legislation. The SCC stated 
that human rights legislation should generally be interpreted consistently across 
jurisdictions, unless otherwise specified.73 The Court rephrased the test in Moore, 
adopting the terminology in Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and 
stated that, in order to establish prima facie discrimination, a plaintiff must prove the 
following three elements on a balance of probabilities: 1) a “distinction, exclusion or 
preference,” 2) based on a protected ground, 3) which “has the effect of nullifying or 
impairing the right to full and equal recognition and exercise of a human right or 
freedom.”74 Just as in Moore, once the plaintiff establishes prima facie discrimination, the 
burden shifts to the respondent to justify the conduct on the basis of legislative or judicial 
defenses and if they fail to do so, discrimination will be found to have occurred.75 The 
analysis is the same for all grounds of alleged discrimination.76  
The SCC also addressed the issue of causality, which arose in the Elk Valley case. In 
Bombardier, the Court held that, in order to find discrimination, the prohibited ground 
must have contributed to the conduct.77 The plaintiff must simply establish a connection 
between the prohibited ground of discrimination and the distinction, exclusion or 
preference.78 The SCC stated that the terms “connection” and “factor” should be used in 
relation to the discrimination analysis79 and “it is therefore neither appropriate nor 
accurate to use the expression ‘causal connection’ in the discrimination context.”80 
Requiring a causal connection between the protected ground and the adverse treatment 
would impose an inappropriately heavy burden on the plaintiff since human rights 
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legislation and jurisprudence focus on the discriminatory effects of conduct, be it direct 
or indirect, rather than the intention to discriminate.81  
2.3 Workplace Accommodation Analysis  
The duty to accommodate is a fundamental legal obligation that arises from human rights 
legislation as well as SCC decisions and the rulings of human rights tribunals and labour 
arbitrators. The duty to accommodate requires employers to make every reasonable 
effort, short of undue hardship, to accommodate an employee with a protected human 
rights characteristic.82 Once an employee establishes a prima facie case that he or she has 
a disability requiring accommodation, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it 
made every reasonable effort, short of undue hardship, to accommodate the employee’s 
disability.  
The underlying purpose of workplace accommodation is ultimately to provide Canadians 
with an equal opportunity to employment. In most cases, the protected ground requiring 
accommodation constitutes a form of disability.83 Accommodation enables individuals—
who, despite their disability, are still capable of fulfilling the essential duties of an 
occupation—to have the opportunity to achieve and sustain employment. In order to 
maintain the employment relationship, the employee must still productively perform the 
core aspects of the job. However, this has been greatly subsumed by the considerable 
obligations required under the employer’s duty to accommodate.84 To satisfy these legal 
obligations, an employer must “be prepared to make changes to the organization of work, 
to the tools required to perform the particular job, to the assignment of duties for the 
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work position, to the content and application of work policies, and even to the attitudes of 
the workforce.”85  
The duty to accommodate applies to all employers and confers broad and substantial 
obligations on employers as well as unions. The right to workplace accommodation 
extends to all employees, at all stages of the employment relationship⎯before being 
hired to post-termination.86 The accommodation process requires involvement from the 
employer, the employee seeking accommodation and, in the case of a unionized 
workplace, the union.87 All three parties assume legal responsibility for ensuring the 
success of a workplace accommodation request.88 Nonetheless, the primary responsibility 
lies with the employer because it has control over the workplace and employment 
policies and practices. Once an employer receives an accommodation request, it must 
initiate a search for reasonable accommodation.89 The union should cooperate with the 
accommodation process and must not impede the employer’s reasonable efforts to 
accommodate the employee.90 The employee is also expected to participate in the 
accommodation process. When possible, the employee must communicate his or her 
needs to the employer and provide the necessary information and details to facilitate 
accommodation.91 However, the absence of an employee’s disclosure does not eliminate 
the duty to accommodate. This situation often arises in the case of drug and alcohol 
addiction, where the employee does not acknowledge their disability or does not want to 
disclose this private information to the employer. The employer still has an obligation to 
take steps to accommodate the employee, if they knew, or should have reasonably 
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known, about the employee’s disability and the need for accommodation.92 Moreover, 
the employee cannot refuse a reasonable accommodation proposal.93 The right to 
workplace accommodation entitles an employee to a reasonable accommodation, not a 
perfect solution or the accommodation of their choice.94 
Under Canadian law, employers are required to determine whether existing positions can 
be modified for the employee or whether other positions in the workplace might be 
suitable.95 When exploring accommodation options, the employer must undergo an 
investigation process, which involves: 1) determining whether the employee can 
productively fulfill his or her existing job in its present form; 2) if not, determining 
whether the employee can perform the core aspects of the original job in a modified 
form; 3) if not, determining whether the employee can accomplish the duties of another 
job in its present form; and 4) if not, then determining whether the employee can perform 
another job in a modified form.96 Generally speaking, an employer will have fulfilled its 
duty to accommodate if it has thoroughly investigated, and has been genuinely incapable 
to satisfy, all four steps.97 
2.3.1 Meiorin Test 
In Meiorin, the SCC affirmed that the duty to accommodate must be applied in a 
generous and liberal fashion and established a three-step test for determining whether a 
prima facie discriminatory practice or standard constitutes a bona fide occupational 
requirement and is thus justified under human rights law. This test applies to both cases 
of direct and indirect discrimination. When assessing the validity of a challenged 
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standard or practice, the legal decision maker must determine whether the employer 
justified the impugned standard by establishing on the balance of probabilities that: 
1. The employer adopted the challenged standard or practice for a purpose 
rationally connected to the performance of the job; 
2. The employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith 
belief that it was necessary to fulfill the legitimate work-related purpose; and 
3. The standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate work-
related purpose, meaning it would be impossible to accommodate the 
employee without imposing undue hardship upon the employer.98 
The employer should be attuned to “the possibility that there may be different ways to 
perform the job while still accomplishing the employer’s legitimate work-related 
purpose.”99 The SCC provided a list of important questions for employers to ask 
themselves when considering an accommodation request: 
(a) Has the employer investigated alternative approaches that do not have 
a discriminatory effect, such as individual testing against a more 
individually sensitive standard? 
(b) If alternative standards were investigated and found to be capable of 
fulfilling the employer’s purpose, why were they not implemented?  
(c) Is it necessary to have all employees meet the single standard for the 
employer to accomplish its legitimate purpose or could standards 
reflective of group or individual differences and capabilities be 
established?  
(d) Is there a way to do the job that is less discriminatory while still 
accomplishing the employer’s legitimate purpose? 
(e) Is the standard properly designed to ensure that the desired 
qualification is met without placing an undue burden on those to 
whom the standard applies? 
(f) Have other parties who are obliged to assist in the search for possible 
accommodation fulfilled their roles?100 
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These questions require the employer to consider whether modifications or alternative 
approaches could effectively accommodate the employee’s needs. Of course, other 
questions may also be pertinent to this analysis. 
2.3.2 Undue Hardship 
The third step of the Meiorin test—requiring the employer to demonstrate that the 
standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose and 
that it would be impossible to accommodate the employee without imposing undue 
hardship—establishes employers’ duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. In 
Central Alberta Dairy Pool, the SCC developed a non-exhaustive list of factors to 
consider when assessing the duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship: 
financial cost, disruption of a collective agreement, problems with employee morale, 
interchangeability of the workforce and facilities, size of the employer’s operations and 
safety.101 Recent decisions also indicate the emergence of a seventh factor: legitimate 
operational requirements of a workplace.102 Legal decision makers may consider these 
undue hardship factors, barring any limitations provided in the relevant human rights 
legislation. For example, as noted earlier, Ontario’s Human Rights Code specifies that 
only cost, outside sources of funding and health and safety requirements are to be 
considered when assessing the duty to accommodate. The relevant undue hardship factors 
are ultimately balanced with the employee’s right to be free from discrimination. 
The duty to accommodate must be applied broadly while the undue hardship defense 
should be given a narrow interpretation. The SCC jurisprudence provides guiding 
principles for the narrow interpretation of undue hardship factors. Although excessive 
financial cost may constitute a justification to refuse accommodation, “one must be wary 
of putting too low a value on accommodating the disabled.”103 The financial cost must 
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impose a significant impact on the employer in order to constitute an undue hardship.104 
Meiorin and Grismer also establish that a mere statement of excessive cost, without 
supporting evidence, is not generally sufficient to meet the standard of undue hardship.105  
A reasonable accommodation may override the provisions of a collective agreement, 
unless the proposed accommodation would significantly interfere with the rights of other 
employees, such as seniority rights.106 In Renaud, the SCC stated that: 
The employer must establish that actual interference with the rights of 
other employees, which is not trivial but substantial, will result from the 
adoption of the accommodating measures.107  
… 
 
While the provisions of a collective agreement cannot absolve the parties 
from the duty to accommodate, the effect of the agreement is relevant in 
assessing the degree of hardship occasioned by interference with the terms 
thereof. Substantial departure from the normal operation of the conditions 
and terms of employment in the collective agreement may constitute 
undue interference in the operation of the employer’s business.108  
Therefore, the accommodation of one employee cannot interfere with the job interests 
and entitlements of another, as this will likely constitute undue hardship. 
When assessing employee morale, legitimate concerns regarding one’s employment 
rights must be distinguished from concerns premised on stereotypical or discriminatory 
reactions to the employee with a disability.109 Furthermore, the proposed accommodation 
must actually substantially interfere with the rights of the other employees. Employees’ 
objections based on well-grounded concerns that their rights will be impacted must be 
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considered; however, objections based on attitudes that are inconsistent with human 
rights are irrelevant to the analysis of undue hardship.110 
The interchangeability of the workforce and facilities addresses the flexibility of the 
employer’s operations, which is often linked to the size of the organization. This undue 
hardship factor involves determining whether the workforce or facilities are large enough, 
complex enough or adaptable enough to implement a modification without imposing 
undue hardship.111 The SCC acknowledges that it may be easier for a larger operation to 
accommodate an employee than a smaller operation with fewer resources.112 
Safety is the most frequently invoked undue hardship factor in workplace 
accommodation cases.113 It is also often the main defense in addiction disability cases. It 
is important to understand that an employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace cannot 
simply displace the duty to accommodate an employee with an addiction. In Meiorin and 
Grismer, the SCC indicated that zero-tolerance safety rules contravene the duty to 
accommodate. Safety standards must be applied flexibly and employers must accept that 
a moderate level of safety risks may be reasonably necessary to ensure the reasonable and 
successful accommodation of an employee; a workplace safety standard cannot require 
absolute safety or no risk.114 In order to reach the threshold of undue hardship, the safety 
risk must be serious.115 The magnitude of the safety risk and those who bear the safety 
risk are relevant considerations.116  
In Grismer, the SCC provided that employers cannot make assumptions about disability 
and safety without conducting an individualized assessment of the employee in 
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question.117 Employers must present convincing evidence to substantiate a safety claim 
because impressionistic or anecdotal evidence regarding the magnitude of risk are 
inadequate. Furthermore, claims of anticipated hardships on the basis of proposed 
accommodations should not be accepted, if based solely on speculative or unsubstantiated 
concern that certain negative consequences might or could follow the employee’s 
accommodation.118 Although safety sensitive and zero-tolerance rules are significant 
features of a modern workplace, they cannot be advanced to defeat a workplace 
accommodation if a tolerable range of risk would permit an employee to work 
productively.119  
Although it is not yet clearly defined as an undue hardship factor, various arbitration 
decisions have accepted and endorsed the consideration of a workplace’s legitimate 
operational requirements.120 For example, several labour arbitration decisions have 
indicated that an employer, who has attempted to accommodate an employee struggling 
with addiction, will have satisfied its duty to accommodate where the employee has made 
several unsuccessful attempts to return to work and his or her current rehabilitative 
efforts do not appear to be promising.121 This instance of undue hardship does not clearly 
fall within any of the classic Central Alberta Dairy Pool factors and suggests the need for 
alternative considerations. Although it is an inchoate undue hardship factor that has not 
yet received formal endorsement by the SCC, legal decision makers have expressed a 
functional need to assess the employer’s legitimate operational requirements within the 
accommodation analysis.122  
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The employer’s assessment of an employee requiring accommodation must be based on 
credible and objective evidence, not fears, myths or stereotypes. For example, in the case 
of addiction disability, the stigma attached to drug and alcohol addiction should not 
influence the individualized assessment of the employee’s capabilities and ability to 
return to work following treatment. The rigorous application of these protections ensures 
the inclusion of employees with mental illness in the workforce.123 It is, therefore, 
imperative that arbitrators, human rights tribunals and courts uphold this standard.  
The duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship must be assessed with common 
sense and flexibility, in light of the circumstances of the particular case.124 The duty to 
accommodate must be applied broadly, while exceptions—namely, the undue hardship 
defense—should be interpreted narrowly: “Courts, labour arbitrators and human rights 
tribunals are to take a strict approach to exemptions from the duty to accommodate. 
Exemptions are to be permitted only where they are reasonably necessary to the 
achievement of legitimate business-related objectives.”125 Although there is no single 
legal definition of undue hardship, the jurisprudence on workplace accommodation 
clearly indicates that the amount of hardship required to satisfy the employer’s duty to 
accommodate must be substantial: “More than mere negligible effort is required to satisfy 
the duty to accommodate. The use of the term ‘undue’ infers that some hardship is 
acceptable; it is only ‘undue’ hardship that satisfies this test… What constitutes undue 
hardship is a question of fact and will vary with the circumstances of the case.”126 Legal 
decision makers are expected to apply this approach to all accommodation cases, 
regardless of the protected human rights ground at issue. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
The laws and principles described in this chapter form the foundation of Canadian human 
rights law in the realm of employment. The fundamental laws on workplace 
discrimination and the duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship are well 
established and deeply entrenched in Canadian labour and employment law 
jurisprudence.  
The Moore and Meiorin tests, informed and guided by human rights principles, form the 
legal analysis of workplace discrimination and accommodation with respect to all 
protected human rights grounds. Accordingly, these human rights laws and principles 
should be applied in all cases of alleged discrimination and workplace accommodation, 
including cases involving drug and alcohol addiction disability. The legal analyses for 
prima facie discrimination and the duty to accommodate are referred to throughout this 
thesis and represent a benchmark for the addiction cases examined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
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Chapter 3  
3 Understanding Drug and Alcohol Addiction Disability 
Before analyzing the application of workplace accommodation law to cases of drug and 
alcohol addiction, it is important to first understand what an addiction is and the negative 
impact this illness can have on a person. Drug and alcohol addiction affects millions of 
Canadians. It is characterized by a craving for the substance, loss of control of the 
amount or frequency of use, the compulsion to use the substance and continuous use 
despite harmful consequences.1 Canadian human rights law recognizes drug and alcohol 
addiction as a form of disability and, by virtue of this legal recognition, human rights 
protections extend to individuals struggling with addiction. 
This chapter explores the status of drug and alcohol addiction as a form of disability 
under Canadian human rights law, presents the three leading conceptual models of 
disability, in general, and addiction, in particular, and lays the foundational groundwork 
for understanding addiction disability. It examines the prevalence of drug and alcohol 
addiction, the impact addiction can have on employment, diagnostic criteria and 
symptoms of addiction, potential causes, the contentious issue of control with respect to 
addictive behaviours, stigma and medical treatment. 
3.1 Statistics 
3.1.1 Prevalence  
Drug and alcohol addiction afflicts hundreds of millions of people worldwide. 
Approximately 5.1% of the world’s adult population—about 283 million people—suffer 
from alcohol use disorder2 and about 0.7%—over 35 million people—suffer from drug 
 
1
 Marilyn Herie et al, Addiction: An information guide (Toronto: Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, 
2010) at 2. 
2
 World Health Organization, Global status report on alcohol and health 2018 (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 2018) at 72. This statistic is based on individuals that are 15 years of age and older. 
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use disorders.3 Approximately 21.6% of Canadians aged 15 and older—about 6 million 
people—meet the criteria for substance use disorder, meaning drug or alcohol abuse or 
dependence, during their lifetime, with about 18.1% of Canadians meeting the criteria for 
alcohol abuse or dependence.4 In terms of drugs, about 6.8% of Canadians experience 
symptoms of cannabis abuse or dependence in their lifetime and 4% meet the criteria for 
abuse or dependence of other drugs, such as club drugs, cocaine, heroin, solvents and 
prescription drugs.5 Approximately 4.4% of Canadians meet the criteria for a substance 
use disorder in a 12-month period, with about 3.2% meeting the criteria for alcohol abuse 
or dependence, 1.3% experiencing symptoms of cannabis abuse or dependence and 0.7% 
meeting the criteria for abuse or dependence of other drugs.6  
Although these statistics are informative, it is important to acknowledge that this data 
may underestimate the extent of substance use disorders in Canada as the Statistics 
Canada survey only measures select substance use disorders and does not include people 
living on reserves, full-time members of the Canadian Forces or institutionalized 
individuals.7 Furthermore, the stigmatization of drug and alcohol addiction may also 
contribute to the underreporting of substance use problems: “Stigma marks substance use 
problems as shameful and makes people want to hide their addiction.”8 Accordingly, the 
national rate of drug and alcohol addiction is likely higher than the study suggests. 
 
3
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2020, booklet 2, “Drug Use and Health 
Consequences” (Vienna: United Nations, 2020) at 11. 
4
 Caryn Pearson, Teresa Janz & Jennifer Ali, “Health at a Glance: Mental and Substance Use Disorders in 
Canada,” (27 November 2015), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/82-624-x/2013001/article/11855-
eng.htm>. For the purposes of this study, substance abuse was “characterized by a pattern of recurrent use 
where at least one of the following occurs: failure to fulfill major roles at work, school or home, use in 
physically hazardous situations, recurrent alcohol or drug related problems, and continued use despite 
social or interpersonal problems caused or intensified by alcohol or drugs.” Substance dependence was 
defined as the occurrence of at least three of the following within a 12-month period: “increased tolerance, 
withdrawal, increased consumption, unsuccessful efforts to quit, a lot of time lost recovering or using, 
reduced activity, and continued use despite persistent physical or psychological problems caused or 
intensified by alcohol or drugs.” 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Herie, supra note 1 at 7. 
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3.1.2 Impact on Employment 
Addiction can significantly impact a person’s life, including their performance and 
attendance at work. Drug and alcohol addiction exists across all professions and can 
affect employees in any industry and at any job level.9 Considering the symptoms of 
addiction, it is not difficult to imagine the negative impact addiction can have on one’s 
employment. Drug and alcohol addiction is “linked to numerous workplace outcomes, 
including absenteeism, lost productivity, on-the-job accidents and injuries, and workplace 
violence and harassment.”10 Individuals with substance use disorders, compared to those 
without substance issues, are more likely to work part-time jobs and are more than twice 
as likely to be permanently unable to work.11 
The detrimental effects of addiction disability not only permeate the specific workplace 
of the individual struggling with addiction, but also significantly impact the economy as a 
whole. The lost work productivity attributable to drug and alcohol abuse costs the 
Canadian economy over $14 billion per year.12 Appropriate and effective workplace 
accommodation, coupled with rehabilitative support, would likely enable employees to 
return to work sooner and help limit the costs associated with lost productivity. 
3.2 Legal Human Rights Perspective 
Every Canadian human rights statute protects against discrimination on the ground of 
disability. These pieces of legislation provide broad definitions of disability to allow for 
the protection of various physical and mental illnesses and the case law has established 
 
9
 Mental Health Commission of Canada, Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction & Conference 
Board of Canada, Start the Conversation: Problematic Substance Use and the Workplace, (2018) online: 
<https://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/sites/default/files/2018-05/substance_use_ 
brochure_2018_eng.pdf>. 
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 Conference Board of Canada, Problematic Substance use and the Canadian Workplace, (Ottawa: 
Conference Board of Canada, 2016) at 4. 
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 Eric Diotte, Mental Health and Equality Rights: Substance Use Disorders – A Human Rights-Based 
Analysis using the 2012 Canadian Community Health Survey – Mental Health, (Ottawa: Canadian Human 
Rights Commission, 2012) at 10. 
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 Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction, Canadian Substance Use Costs and Harms Report 
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the acceptance of drug and alcohol addiction as a form of disability.13 Accordingly, 
individuals struggling with addiction are afforded human rights protections. Employees 
with a drug or alcohol addiction are entitled to be free from discrimination in the 
workplace and accommodated to the point of undue hardship. 
3.2.1 Legislation 
The various pieces of Canadian human rights legislation define disability differently. 
There are three legislative approaches to defining disability: (1) an explicit and detailed 
definition of disability;14 (2) a brief and stripped-down definition of disability;15 and (3) 
providing no definition of disability at all,16 which allows for maximum flexibility and 
enables legal decision makers to apply a broad and liberal approach to the meaning of 
disability, unfettered by statutory constraints. Nevertheless, regardless of the particular 
approach adopted by the human rights statute, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has 
stated that disability is to be given a broad and encompassing definition, consistent with 
the liberal and purposive approach to interpreting human rights.17  
 
13
 Entrop v Imperial Oil Ltd, [1995] 23 CHRR D/196 [Entrop Board], affirmed in Entrop v Imperial Oil 
Ltd (2000), 50 OR (3d) 18 [Entrop]; Handfield v North Thompson School District No 26, [1995] BCCHRD 
No 4; British Columbia v British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union, [2007] BCCAAA 
No 37; Ontario (Disability Support Program) v Tranchemontagne, 2010 ONCA 593 [Tranchemontagne]; 
and Wright v College and Association of Registered Nurses of Alberta (Appeals Committee), 2012 ABCA 
267 [Wright]. 
14
 Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5, s 44(1) [Alberta HRA]; The Saskatchewan Human 
Rights Code, RSS 1979, c S-24.1, s 2(1)(d.1) [Saskatchewan HRC]; Ontario’s Human Rights Code, RSO 
1990, c H19, s 10(1) [Ontario HRC]; Newfoundland and Labrador’s Human Rights Act, SNL 2010, c H-
13.1, s 2(c) [Newfoundland HRA]; New Brunswick’s Human Rights Act, RSNB 2011, c 171, s 2 [NB HRA]; 
Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989 c 214, s 3(1) [NS HRA]; Prince Edward Island’s Human 
Rights Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12, s 1(c.1) [PEI HRA]; Yukon’s Human Rights Act, RSY 2002, c 116, s 37 
[Yukon HRA]; Northwest Territories’ Human Rights Act, SNWT 2002, c18, s 1(1) [NWT HRA]; and  
Employment Equity Act, SC 1995, c 44, s 3 [EEA]. 
15
 Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 25 [Canadian HRA]; and Nunavut’s Consolidation of 
Human Rights Act, SNu 2003, c12, s 1 [Nunavut HRA]. 
16
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Canadian Charter]; British Columbia’s Human Rights Code, RSBC 
1996, c 210 [BC HRC]; Manitoba’s The Human Rights Code, CCSM c H175 [Manitoba HRC]; and 
Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR 2016, c C-12 [Quebec Charter]. 
17
 Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Montreal (City), 2000 
SCC 27 at paras 46, 48, 71, 76, 81 [City of Montreal]. 
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Although the statutory definition of disability varies between jurisdictions and the 
majority of Canadian human rights statutes do not specifically refer to addiction, drug 
and alcohol addiction are uniformly protected under each piece of human rights 
legislation. The Canadian Human Rights Act and Nova Scotia and Nunavut’s human 
rights statutes define disability to explicitly include drug and alcohol dependence,18 
whereas other statutes do not expressly include drug and alcohol addiction in their 
definition of disability.19 Nevertheless, these definitions are flexible enough to 
encompass addiction. For example, Ontario’s Human Rights Code, which provides a 
more restrictive definition compared to the statutes previously mentioned, designates five 
different categories of disability: 
(a) any degree of physical disability, infirmity, malformation or 
disfigurement that is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness and, 
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes diabetes mellitus, 
epilepsy, a brain injury, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of 
physical co-ordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or 
hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment, or physical reliance 
on a guide dog or other animal or on a wheelchair or other remedial 
appliance or device, 
(b) a condition of mental impairment or a developmental disability, 
(c) a learning disability, or a dysfunction in one or more of the processes 
involved in understanding or using symbols or spoken language, 
(d) a mental disorder, or 
(e) an injury or disability for which benefits were claimed or received 
under the insurance plan established under the Workplace Safety and 
Insurance Act, 1997.20 
The wording “without limiting the generality of the foregoing” creates a broad definition 
of disability and allows for flexibility.21 The categories of mental impairment, mental 
disorder and even physical disability, given the potential physical symptoms associated 
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Yukon HRA, supra note 14. 
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with addiction, can be interpreted as including drug and alcohol addiction. The 
Employment Equity Act and the human rights legislation of Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, the Northwest Territories and the 
Yukon have adopted similar definitions of disability. Each of these definitions address 
both physical and mental impairments and are broad enough to encompass addiction.  
Although not every piece of human rights legislation specifically states that addiction is a 
disability, recent jurisprudence recognizes drug and alcohol addiction as a form of 
disability under human rights law. Thus, human rights protections are extended to drug 
and alcohol addiction, regardless of whether the relevant statute specifically refers to 
addiction. Under Canadian human rights law, drug and alcohol addictions are to be 
treated the same as any other disability or protected human rights ground. Employers are 
prohibited from discriminating against employees on the basis of their addiction and have 
a legal duty to accommodate these individuals to the point of undue hardship.  
3.2.2 Jurisprudence 
In most workplace accommodation cases, the protected characteristic requiring 
accommodation is a form of disability.22 Canadian legal decision makers have long 
recognized the disadvantaged position of individuals with disabilities. In Ontario Nurses’ 
Association v. Mount Sinai Hospital, the Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged that, 
“people with disabilities have historically been undervalued in Canadian society 
generally, and in the area of employment in particular.”23 As a group, people with 
disabilities “suffer from pre-existing disadvantage, vulnerability, stereotyping and 
prejudice.” 24 People who are subject to unfair treatment in society by virtue of personal 
characteristics or circumstances, such as disability, are often not given equal concern, 
 
22
 Michael Lynk, “Disability and Work: The Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees with 
Disabilities in the Canadian Workplace,” in R Echlin & C Paliare, eds, Law Society of Upper Canada 
Special Lectures 2007: Employment Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) 189 at 203. 
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 (2005), 75 OR (3d) 245 at para 25 [Mount Sinai]. 
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respect or consideration.25 Therefore, it is logical to conclude that further differential 
treatment, which could arise from the imposition of ostensibly neutral workplace 
standards and policies, “will contribute to the perpetuation or promotion of their unfair 
social characterization, and will have a more severe impact upon them, since they are 
already vulnerable.”26  
Canadian human rights statutes provide broad definitions of disability to allow for the 
protection of various physical and mental illnesses and the common law has brought 
these statutory provisions to life by developing and expanding the interpretation of 
disability. One of the most notable early addiction cases is Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd., 
where the Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged that substance abuse and dependence 
“are each a handicap”—now referred to as disability—under human rights legislation.27 
This case involved the appeal of a 1995 Ontario Board of Inquiry decision, which appears 
to be the first case in Ontario to consider whether alcoholism constituted a handicap.28 
The Court of Appeal accepted the Board’s conclusion that substance abuse “fits without 
difficulty into the definition of ‘handicap’ under the Code, as an illness or disease 
creating physical disability or mental impairment, and interfering with physical, 
psychological and social functioning,” thus entitling such individuals to human rights 
protections.29 The Court’s finding that drug and alcohol addiction constitutes a disability 
under Canadian human rights legislation has been accepted and confirmed by the 
subsequent jurisprudence. 
The case law establishes that employers have an onerous obligation to ensure that 
employees with drug and alcohol addictions are appropriately accommodated in the 
workplace. The jurisprudence suggests that employer’s accommodation duty remains 
operative, even when the employee failed to disclose their disability, violated a last 
 
25
 Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 at para 63. 
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chance agreement or displayed signs and symptoms of the illness at work.30 As denial 
and relapse are common elements of addiction, employers must tolerate some 
interference with the accommodation process, in order to satisfy the duty to 
accommodate. Furthermore, “While safety sensitive and zero-tolerance rules in the 
workplace are significant features of a modern workplace, they cannot be advanced to 
defeat an accommodation if a tolerable range of risk could be employed that would 
permit an employee with a mental health or addiction disability to productively work.”31 
Post-discharge evidence of active and successful rehabilitation efforts by terminated 
employees with an addiction often persuade labour arbitrators that the employer’s 
accommodation duty has not been exhausted to the point of undue hardship and a 
productive employment relationship remains possible.32  
The accommodation process also requires the participation and cooperation of the 
employee seeking accommodation. Given the nature of addiction disability, this involves 
positive rehabilitative efforts towards recovery. Although denial is a common feature of 
addiction, employees are expected to acknowledge and address the seriousness of their 
condition and manage their addiction.33 Where an employee refuses to take responsibility 
for his or her actions and is consistently unable to effectively manage their addiction, a 
legal decision maker may determine that the employer has fulfilled its duty to 
accommodate, under the circumstances.  
Courts have acknowledged the complexities underlying addiction disability and the 
public perceptions of drug and alcohol addiction. While many disabilities are or appear to 
be beyond an individual’s control, drug and alcohol addictions are perceived to contain 
an element of control or “a quasi-voluntary aspect.”34 In Canada (Attorney General) v. 
PHS Community Services Society, the SCC stated that the ability to make some choices 
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with respect to substance use does not negate the finding that “addiction is a disease in 
which the central feature is impaired control over the use of the addictive substance.”35 
Furthermore, the issue of addiction “attracts a variety of social, political, scientific and 
moral reactions”36 and is associated with “great social stigma.”37 As a result, “People 
with addictions may face unique experiences of marginalization and disadvantage. These 
may be due to extreme stigma, lack of societal understanding, stereotyping and 
criminalization of their addictions.”38 
Although drug and alcohol addictions are legally recognized as disabilities, these 
illnesses continue to be viewed differently from other medical conditions. 
Marginalization, stigmatization and misunderstanding are the unfortunate realities of 
many individuals struggling with addiction. Nevertheless, the negative stereotyping of 
addiction disability has no place in legal decision-making. It is crucial that these negative, 
external factors do not influence the judicial treatment of addiction disability in 
workplace accommodation cases. 
3.3 Models of Disability 
Drug and alcohol addiction are legally recognized as a form of disability, but what is a 
disability and what are the implications of having a disability? Disability has been 
defined in various ways; accordingly, different conceptual models of disability have 
developed over time. This thesis concentrates on three leading formulations of disability: 
the biomedical model, economic model and sociopolitical model. The biomedical and 
economic models characterize disability as an individual pathology, whereas the 
sociopolitical model views disability as a social pathology.39 Both the biomedical and 
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economic models view disability as “individual deformities and limitations, a diminished 
deviation from the idealized bodily norm” and are informed by notions of pity, charity 
and social segregation.40 While the biomedical model focuses on the individual’s 
functional abilities and limitations, the economic model concentrates on their ability to 
perform occupational roles and skills. 41 The sociopolitical model, on the other hand, 
stresses the importance of the social environment and examines its impact on individuals 
with disability.42 Unlike the biomedical and economic approaches, the sociopolitical 
model regards disability as a social construct and espouses a human rights approach.43  
Models of disability shape and inform public policy, laws and regulations, and vice versa. 
These theoretical models influence public attitudes, shape legislation and determine the 
services provided to people with disabilities, all of which can create prejudice and 
discrimination.44 The biomedical and economic models view disability as the deviation 
from a valued norm or standard and consider disability to be undesirable and focus on 
minimizing its prevalence and effects. The adoption of these models gives rise to further 
prejudice, discrimination, marginalization and reduced opportunity for people with 
disabilities.45 As public policy fundamentally shapes both the social structure and built 
environment, laws and regulations play a fundamental role in determining the skills and 
attributes that an individual requires to participate in society.46 The sociopolitical model 
illustrates how the social structure and environment precludes certain individuals from 
participating in society.  
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Admittedly, there is no general social or legal consensus regarding the meaning of 
disability and this uncertainty arguably “causes and contributes to the ongoing conflict 
around policies, programs, laws, and advocacy that are purported to be based on equality 
and human rights.”47 The visible tension in contemporary debates regarding disability 
arises from this lack of consensus and the different theories that shape the collective 
understanding of disablement.48 These formulations of disability can help explain why 
there is a discrepancy in the implementation and provision of rights and equality with 
respect to disability and addiction, in particular. 
3.3.1 Biomedical Model 
For most of the twentieth century, the predominant paradigm for understanding disability 
was the biomedical model, which characterizes disability as “an inherent characteristic of 
a person arising from an objectively identified impairment of the mind or body.”49 
Remnants of this paradigm are still visible today. The biomedical model presumes that 
disability is an individual pathology, resulting from biological characteristics,50 and 
identifies the individual’s medical condition as the source of their disadvantage.51 Under 
this model, disability is defined as a defect, an unfortunate deviation from the norm: 
The most commonly held belief about [this model of] disablement is that it 
involves a defect, deficiency, dysfunction, abnormality, failing, or medical 
“problem” that is located in an individual. We think it is so obvious as to 
be beyond serious dispute that disablement is a characteristic of a defective 
person, someone who is functionally limited or anatomically abnormal, 
diseased, or pathoanatomical, someone who is neither whole nor healthy, 
fit nor flourishing, someone who is biologically inferior or subnormal. The 
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essence of disablement, in this view, is that there are things wrong with 
people with disabilities.52  
Clearly, disability is not a neutral category within the biomedical model; it is a politically 
loaded term and is essentially “used to identify and stigmatize people and behaviours that 
are considered abnormal or morally wrong.”53 Under this model, disability is located 
within the individual and great effort is directed at eliminating the defect and disability.54 
Accordingly, the individual with a disability constitutes the unit of analysis, for both 
research and policy purposes, and the individual’s condition is the primary point of 
intervention.55   
Under the biomedical model, “normal” is the ideal and diagnostic tools and interventions 
seek to cure or minimize the pathology.56 The biomedical model prioritizes the 
prevention, cure, containment, amelioration and palliation of disability.57 Medicine and 
biotechnology are used to treat disability and biological or genetic intervention and 
screening serve as preventative measures.58 Where the elimination or cure of the 
disability is not possible, the objective shifts to improving the condition and providing 
comfort to the individual with a disability, ultimately accepting disadvantage as an 
inevitable outcome for people with disabilities.59 The biomedical model regards disability 
and its associated costs as an anomaly and a social burden and suggests that the social 
inclusion of people with disabilities is a private responsibility, rather than a public one.60 
 
52
 Jerome Bickenbach, Physical Disability and Social Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 
at 61. 
53
 AJ Withers, Disability Politics and Theory (Black Point, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2012) at 
41.  
54
 Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin, “Introduction: Toward a Critical Theory of Dis-Citizenship” in 
Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin, eds, Critical Disability Theory: Essays in Philosophy, Politics, Policy, 
and Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) 1 at 10. 
55
 Rioux & Valentine, supra note 47 at 50. 
56
 Withers, supra note 53 at 31. 
57
 Lynk, supra note 22 at 191. 
58
 Rioux & Valentine, supra note 47 at 49. 
59
 Ibid at 50-51. 
60
 Ibid at 50. 
 
 
56 
The biomedical model does not account for systemic discrimination or the societal 
barriers that impact people with disabilities. As a result of the model’s focus on the 
“individualization, privatization, and medicalization of disability,” it has remained silent 
on the issues of discrimination and social justice61 and “precluded the diagnosis of 
architectural or other environmental barriers in the treatment of permanent 
impairments.”62 The biomedical model is not an interactional model; under this 
paradigm, “the definition, the ‘problem,’ and the treatment of the disability are all 
considered to lie within the individual with the disability.”63 It presumes that both the 
cause of the disability and responsibility for its solution rest with the individual and, 
therefore, “has the authority to relieve society of any responsibility to accord civil rights 
to individuals with disabilities.”64 Rather than addressing and changing the social 
problems that oppress people with disabilities, the biomedical model seeks to change 
these individuals and retain the social structure that enables their oppression.65 The 
ultimate goal of the biomedical model is to eliminate or, at the very least, reduce the 
prevalence of disability—not cure the disadvantage that people with disabilities 
experience.  
3.3.2 Economic Model 
The economic model of disability essentially “reduces the definition of disability to an 
economic dimension”66 and views disability through the narrow lens of economic 
participation and productivity. The model frames disability in terms of the interaction 
between an individual’s impairment and the supply-side conditions of the labour market 
and, accordingly, regards disability as “a limitation to an employee’s repertoire of 
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productive capacities, abilities and skills to adapt to mainstream societal structures.”67 
Much like the biomedical model, the economic model characterizes disability as an 
individual pathology, whereby the ability to work is the desired condition and the 
inability to work is considered deviant.68 The economic model presumes that disability 
limits the amount or type of work an individual is able to perform and renders an 
individual incapable of participating in the labour force and meaningfully contributing to 
the economy.69  
Under the economic model, people with disabilities are viewed “either as past 
contributors to the economic system and thus deserving of assistance or as outside the 
economic system and so meriting only charity.”70 Individuals who are unable to work and 
require public resources are labeled as burdens to society.71 From this perspective, an 
individual’s sense of worth is reduced to their earning capacity. Although different 
factors, including the economic climate, may contribute to an individual’s state of 
unemployment, the economic paradigm views functional limitations and inadequate work 
skills as the primary barriers preventing people with disabilities from engaging in various 
types of work.72 The economic model postulates that an individual’s ability to work is 
primarily dependent on their functional capacities and neglects to appropriately assess the 
prospect of successful workplace accommodation.73 Notions of respect, accommodation 
and civil rights are subordinate to an individual’s ability to work and contribute to the 
economy.74 The individual with a disability is expected to fulfill the existing occupational 
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requirements and minimal consideration is given to the possibility of altering job 
expectations and accommodating the needs and skills of the employee with a disability.75  
The economic model prioritizes economic efficiency and strives to reduce the costs 
associated with unemployment and limited work productivity arising from disability. 
Accordingly, reform under this model focuses on rehabilitation and some modest 
economic integration.76 The economic model views disability as “a deficit in human 
capital that limits labour force participation” and presents strategies for overcoming this 
shortcoming through individual enhancements.77 It does not attempt to modify 
occupational requirements or the environment to facilitate the participation of individuals 
with disabilities in the labour force; rather, the model presumes that, if the individual with 
a disability develops vocational skills, they will be able to adapt to the existing 
environment and participate in the workforce.78  
Furthermore, flowing from the underlying notions of charity and pity, the economic 
model leads to welfare programs for people with disabilities that are unable to work and 
support themselves. Financial assistance may help improve the circumstances of some 
individuals with disabilities but these programs do not change or limit the pre-existing 
barriers that such individuals encounter in society and upon entering the workforce nor 
do they promote equality and independence. Although the conception of disability 
involves an economic component, a purely economic understanding unnecessarily and 
inappropriately simplifies disability, to the exclusion of non-monetary considerations. 
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3.3.3 Sociopolitical Model 
The sociopolitical model of disability emerged in the 1970s and challenged the previous 
paradigms that pathologized disability79 by espousing the view that disability is a 
difference, not an anomaly, arising from the social environment. The model interprets 
variations in human ability as natural, expected events, not as rationales for restricting the 
potential of people with disabilities to contribute to society, and examines the broad 
systemic factors that prevent these individuals from participating in society as equals.80 
Under this model, disability stems, not from the individual’s limitations, but from “the 
failure of the social environment to adjust to the needs of people with different 
abilities.”81 The model “separate[s] ‘disability’ from ‘impairment,’ defining disability as 
the oppression imposed on disabled people as a result of [their] impairments.”82 The 
model contends that:  
(1) disability is a social construct, not the inevitable consequence of 
impairment, (2) disability is best characterised as a complex 
interrelationship between impairment, individual response to impairment, 
and the social environment, and (3) the social disadvantage experienced 
by disabled people is caused by the physical, institutional and attitudinal 
(together, the ‘social’) environment which fails to meet the needs of 
people who do not match the social expectation of ‘normalcy.83  
The sociopolitical model defines disability as “a form of social injustice attributable to 
the stigmatizing attitudes and discriminatory practices in the larger society”84 and 
ultimately traces the source of inhospitable environments to negative social attitudes 
towards people with disabilities. People with disabilities are “subjected to prejudice and 
discrimination on the basis of visible or labeled physical differences” and these social 
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attitudes of the non-disabled majority give rise to the various environmental restraints 
encountered by people with disabilities. 85  
The sociopolitical model criticizes the biomedical and economic models for locating 
disability solely within the affected individual and ignoring society’s role in creating 
unnecessary barriers for people with disabilities.86 By viewing disability as a product of 
the interaction between people and their surroundings, the model shifts the emphasis 
away from the individual’s abilities and limitations to the barriers created by the social, 
cultural, economic, and political environment.87 The sociopolitical approach regards 
disability as a consequence of the existing social structure and suggests that disability can 
be remedied by removing the social barriers88 and enhancing the participation of people 
with disabilities in the community, including the workforce.89  
The SCC has expressly endorsed and adopted the sociopolitical model and this approach 
has since formed the foundation of the human rights framework for understanding and 
the legal treatment of disability. In Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des 
droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City), the SCC acknowledged the importance of “a 
multi-dimensional approach that includes a socio-political dimension:”  
By placing the emphasis on human dignity, respect, and the right to 
equality rather than a simple biomedical condition, this approach 
recognizes that the attitudes of society and its members often contribute to 
the idea or perception of a “handicap”. In fact, a person may have no 
limitations in everyday activities other than those created by prejudice and 
stereotypes.90 
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The SCC accepts that disability results from the interaction between an individual’s 
impairment and the social environment,91 thus adopting the view of disability as a social 
construct. 
Under the sociopolitical model, disability arises from the various societal barriers that 
restrict people with disabilities from participating in economic and social domains. Thus, 
the treatment of disability is achieved through the reformulation of economic, social and 
political policies as well as increased individual control of services and supports.92 From 
this perspective, the elimination of systemic social, economic and physical barriers along 
with the recognition and acceptance of disability as an inherent part of society, rather 
than an aberration, help facilitate prevention.93 In order to effect change, policies must 
target the environment, not just the functional or economic capabilities of people with 
disabilities.94 Under the sociopolitical model of disability, the social structure represents 
the unit of analysis for research and policy-making and the social, environmental, and 
economic structures of society constitute the primary points of intervention.95 The 
sociopolitical model regards the social inclusion of people with disabilities as a public 
responsibility and, accordingly, directs the community to provide the supports and 
assistance required to enable their social, political and economic integration, self-
determination and legal and social rights.96 
3.4 Models of Addiction 
The biomedical, economic and sociopolitical models of disability provide a framework 
for understanding disability in general but do not account for the distinct features inherent 
to drug and alcohol addiction, in particular. Nevertheless, these models have influenced 
and formed the foundation for the development of addiction-specific paradigms. The 
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moral, medical and biopsychosocial models of addiction build upon the broad conceptual 
models of disability to address the unique aspects and complexities of addiction, 
including the issues of choice and control. 
Theories of addiction have traditionally been divided into the moral model and the 
medical model. The moral model, much like the biomedical model of disability, views 
addiction as a personal defect.97 From this perspective, addiction is considered to be “a 
refusal to abide by some ethical or moral code of conduct” and freely chosen behavior 
that is both wrong and irresponsible.98 The moral model of addiction has largely fallen 
out of favour amongst healthcare professionals; however, the stigma associated with drug 
and alcohol addiction continues to exist. The medical model, on the other hand, 
characterizes addiction as a chronic brain disease and acknowledges the influence of 
genetic, psychosocial and environmental factors.99 The model “proposes that addictions 
are a disease like any other disease and are not a symptom or manifestation of any other 
underlying psychological or physical process.”100 The biopsychosocial model of 
addiction builds on the medical perspective to create a multidimensional paradigm that 
recognizes the biological, psychological and social elements of addiction. 
The jurisprudence reflects an oscillation between the moral and medical models of 
addiction. Legal decisions in favor of reinstating and accommodating individuals with an 
addiction invariably adopt the medical model, not the moral perspective, and view 
addiction as a legitimate illness and compulsion. Although the medical model legitimizes 
addiction as a disease, it primarily focuses on biological factors and continues to locate 
disability within the individual. What appears to be missing from the addiction 
jurisprudence is an equivalent of the sociopolitical model of disability that defines 
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addiction as a socially constructed disadvantage. The fields of psychology, social work 
and counseling have embraced the biopsychosocial model of addiction, which resembles 
the sociopolitical model of disability. It neither portrays addiction as a moral failing nor a 
purely biological phenomenon, but rather an interaction between the various dimensions 
of an individual’s biological, social, psychological, spiritual and cultural environment,101 
thereby providing a more comprehensive view of the complex processes underlying 
addiction disability. 
3.4.1 Moral Model 
The moral model of addiction became prevalent in the first half of the twentieth century, 
before the proliferation of the scientific developments enabling the neurobiological study 
of addiction.102 The moral model views addiction as “a choice characterized by voluntary 
behaviour under the control of the addict.”103 The model portrays addiction as a character 
defect—a sign of irresponsibility, impulsiveness or` lack of willpower—and not a 
disease. This characterization associates addiction with weakness and deviance and 
ultimately perpetuates the stigma surrounding the illness. Addiction is seen as a “moral 
failure,” for which individuals are held responsible and judged accordingly.104 Although 
the medical community has generally abandoned the moral model of addiction, this 
perspective, along with its stigmatizing effects, still lingers today. 
With the rise of evidence supporting the view that addiction is a chronic brain disease, the 
medical model of addiction has largely displaced the use of the moral model within the 
scientific community; however, some medical professionals and academics continue to 
support the view that addiction is a voluntary choice, rather than a compulsion fueled by 
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a disease.105 Under the moral model, individuals with addictions are viewed as “selfish 
and hedonistic and personally responsible for creating suffering for themselves and 
others” and, thus, deserve the various health, social, employment and legal problems they 
encounter.106 
The moral model utilizes the notion of volition to distinguish addiction from other 
disabilities and medical conditions: 
[W]hile symptoms of typical diseases such as Alzheimer’s or cancer are 
biologically based and non-voluntary in the sense that they do not develop 
as the result of decision-making processes but are beyond the person’s 
capacity to volitionally influence, this is not so in the case of the repetitive 
drug-oriented behavior of addicts. Although this behavior is the most 
prominent symptom of addiction, its development is clearly affected by 
decisions made and is volitionally influenced. It is flexible, adaptable, and 
involves elements of planning.107 
The moral model suggests that the initial choice to consume drugs or alcohol signifies 
that the development of an addiction is fundamentally a choice and thus disproves the 
notion that addiction is a disease. However, many other chronic illnesses, such as heart 
disease and diabetes, also have risk factors, like obesity and diet, that arguably involve 
similar decision-making processes. Consequently, the notion of choice and control are 
contentious issues that are often raised in addiction disability cases. 
Advocates of the moral model argue that the medical model obscures the element of 
choice108 and suggests that the categorization of addiction as a brain disease “excuse[s] 
personal irresponsibility and criminal acts instead of punishing harmful and often illegal 
behaviors.”109 However, the harmful effects and criminality of drug use does not detract 
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from the scientific evidence that addiction is a chronic brain disease. By placing so much 
emphasis on personal choice, this perspective fails to acknowledge and appreciate the 
inherent complexities underlying drug and alcohol addiction and mistakenly simplifies 
the notion of addiction. The moral model fails to account for the various genetic, 
biological, psychological, sociological and environmental factors that have been linked to 
the development of addiction and this omission ultimately detracts from the accuracy and 
applicability of the model.  
The moral model places the primary focus—and ultimately, blame—on the individual, 
rather than external factors that may trigger the development of an addiction. Framing 
addiction as a character defect perpetuates the misperceptions and social stigma attached 
to this illness. The notion that addiction is a choice and a moral defect continues to 
pervade public perceptions of drug and alcohol addiction. These sentiments are even 
apparent in legal decisions involving individuals with addiction.110 The stigma associated 
with drug and alcohol addiction ultimately perpetuates the gap between neurobiological 
facts and findings and public perceptions of addiction:  
The most beneficent public view of drug addicts is as victims of their 
societal situation. However, the more common view is that drug addicts 
are weak or bad people, unwilling to lead moral lives and to control their 
behavior and gratifications. To the contrary, addiction is actually a 
chronic, relapsing illness, characterized by compulsive drug seeking and 
use… The gulf in implications between the ‘bad person’ view and the 
‘chronic illness sufferer’ view is tremendous. As just one example, there 
are many people who believe that addicted individuals do not even 
deserve treatment. This stigma, and the underlying moralistic tone, is a 
significant overlay on all decisions that relate to drug use and drug 
users.111 
The medical model, on the other hand, aims to reduce the stigma attached to drug and 
alcohol addiction by redirecting the focus from the individual’s deficiencies to the 
neurobiological underpinnings and predispositions of addiction. 
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3.4.2 Medical Model 
Scientific developments in the latter half of the twentieth century enabled the discovery 
and understanding of the neurobiological underpinnings of addiction. As the ability to 
examine neurobiological phenomena improved, the medical model “became scientific 
orthodoxy, increasingly dominating addiction research and informing public 
understandings of addiction”112 and advancements in neuroscience demonstrated the 
need for addiction to be “redefined by what’s going on in the brain.”113 Over the past two 
decades, addiction research has increasingly produced evidence supporting the notion 
that addiction is a brain disease.114 This finding has laid the foundation for the medical 
model of addiction. 
The medical model departs from the moral model and defines addiction as a chronic brain 
disease, caused by neurobiological changes arising from continuous drug or alcohol 
use115 and characterized by compulsive and relapsing substance use “over which the 
addict has little or no control.”116 The medical model shifts the attention from the 
individual to the neurobiological underpinnings of addiction and “challenges deeply 
ingrained values about self-determination and personal responsibility that frame drug use 
as a voluntary, hedonistic act.”117  
3.4.2.1 Role of the Brain in Addiction 
Under the medical model, addiction is characterized as a chronic brain disease. The 
Canadian Society of Addiction Medicine, a national organization of medical 
professionals and scientists in the field of substance use disorders, defines addiction as: 
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A primary, chronic disease, characterized by impaired control over the use 
of a psychoactive substance and/or behaviour. Clinically, the 
manifestations occur along biological, psychological, sociological and 
spiritual dimensions. Common features are change in mood, relief from 
negative emotions, provision of pleasure, pre-occupation with the use of 
substance(s) or ritualistic behaviour(s); and continued use of the 
substance(s) and/or engagement in behaviour(s) despite adverse physical, 
psychological and/or social consequences. Like other chronic diseases, it 
can be progressive, relapsing and fatal.118 
Similarly, the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health—Canada’s largest mental health 
and addiction teaching hospital and one of the world’s leading research centres with 
respect to addiction and mental health—describes addiction as “a primary, chronic, 
neurobiologic disease, with genetic, psychosocial, and environmental factors influencing 
its development and manifestations. It is characterized by behaviors that include one or 
more of the following: impaired control over drug use, compulsive use, continued use 
despite harm, and craving.”119  
The medical model emphasizes the relationship between addiction and brain function to 
promote the understanding of addiction as a brain disease. The overwhelming evidence 
demonstrating the neurobiological changes associated with drug and alcohol addiction 
appears to support the medical model.120 Scientific research has uncovered connections 
between addiction and the regulatory, reward, motivation, memory and related circuitry 
of the brain.121 In particular, addiction has been linked to: 
the desensitization of reward circuits, which dampens the ability to feel 
pleasure and the motivation to pursue everyday activities; the increasing 
strength of conditioned responses and stress reactivity, which results in 
increased cravings for alcohol and other drugs and negative emotions 
when these cravings are not sated; and the weakening of the brain regions 
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involved in executive functions such as decision making, inhibitory 
control, and self-regulation that leads to repeated relapse.122  
The “altered signaling in prefrontal regulatory circuits, paired with changes in the 
circuitry involved in reward and emotional response, creates an imbalance that is crucial 
to both the gradual development of compulsive behavior in the addicted disease state and 
the associated inability to voluntarily reduce drug-taking behavior, despite the potentially 
catastrophic consequences.”123 These changes in brain circuitry may even persist beyond 
detoxification and rehabilitation; the prevalence of repeated relapses and continuous 
cravings reflect the lasting behavioural effects of these brain changes. 124  
3.4.2.2 Symptoms and Diagnostic Criteria 
The behavioural symptoms associated with drug and alcohol addiction can be simply 
described as craving for the substance, loss of control over the amount or frequency of 
use, the compulsion to use and use despite harmful consequences, including physical, 
psychological, interpersonal, financial and legal problems.125 The presence of harmful 
consequences and the loss of control over one’s drug or alcohol use are telling signs of 
problematic substance use.126 The harmful consequences associated with substance use 
can range from mild to severe—experiencing a hangover or being late for work the next 
day to homelessness and acute disease.127 Addictions are characterized by an inability to 
consistently abstain from using the substance and this difficulty may persist in the 
recovery process. Like other chronic diseases, drug and alcohol addiction often involves 
cycles of relapse and remission.128  
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The DSM-5, an “authoritative guide to the diagnosis of mental disorders”129 that is used 
by health professionals across the world, provides a framework for diagnosing substance-
related and addictive disorders. The DSM-5 combines the previously separate categories 
of substance abuse and substance dependence into a single disorder—substance use 
disorder—measured on a continuum ranging from mild to severe.130 The DSM-5 provides 
distinct substance use disorder diagnoses based on nine different classes of substances: 
alcohol; cannabis; hallucinogens; inhalants; opioids; sedatives, hypnotics, and 
anxiolytics; stimulants; tobacco; and other substances.131 The same overarching 
diagnostic criteria apply to the various categories of substance use disorder but some 
symptoms are less salient for certain classes of substances and withdrawal symptoms are 
not specified for hallucinogens or inhalants.132  
The DSM-5 groups the symptoms associated with substance use disorder into four 
categories: impaired control, social impairment, risky use and pharmacological 
indicators, meaning tolerance and withdrawal.133 The DSM-5 defines substance use 
disorder as the occurrence of at least two of the following criteria within a 12-month 
period: 
1. The substance is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period of time 
than intended; 
2. There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful effort to decrease or control use of 
the substance; 
3. A great deal of time is spent on activities to obtain the substance, use the 
substance or recover from its effects; 
4. Craving or a strong desire or urge to use the substance; 
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5. Recurrent use of the substance resulting in a failure to fulfill major obligations 
at work, school or home; 
6. Continued use of the substance despite experiencing persistent or recurrent 
social or interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of its use; 
7. Discontinuation or reduction of participation in important social, occupational, 
or recreational activities because of substance use; 
8. Recurrent use of the substance in situations where it is physically hazardous; 
9. Continued use of the substance despite the individual knowing that they have a 
persistent or recurrent physical or psychological problem that is likely caused 
or exacerbated by the substance; 
10. Tolerance, characterized by either a need for markedly increased amounts of the 
substance to achieve intoxication or the desired effect, or a markedly 
diminished effect when continuing to use the same amount of the substance; or 
11. Experiencing withdrawal symptoms134 or taking the substance or a similar 
substance to relieve or avoid withdrawal.135  
The DSM-5 acknowledges that substance use disorders vary in terms of severity. 
Substance use disorders are classified as mild, moderate, or severe, depending on the 
number of diagnostic criteria met. If an individual meets two or three of the 
aforementioned criteria, they are considered to have a mild substance use disorder; a 
person who meets four or five of the DSM-5 criteria is considered to have a moderate 
substance use disorder and an individual who satisfies six or more criteria has a severe 
case of substance use disorder.136 
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3.4.2.3 Theorizing Causes of Addiction 
The medical model of addiction calls attention to the biological and genetic factors 
previously ignored by the moral model, and emphasizes the scientific evidence revealing 
significant neurobiological changes in individuals that develop addiction.137 People 
generally drink alcohol and use drugs because they “stimulate the brain in ways that ‘feel 
good’” and this immediate rewarding experience induces people to continue using the 
substance.138 Of course, not everyone who uses drugs or alcohol become addicted. 
Approximately 10% of individuals exposed to addictive drugs actually develop severe 
symptoms of addiction.139 Although long-term exposure to drugs and alcohol is 
necessary for the development of addiction, it is not sufficient in itself. Under the medical 
model, addiction is thought to develop in vulnerable individuals when repeated drug or 
alcohol use triggers a biological change, related to the impairment of brain reward 
circuits and physiological stress responses,140 that results in an overwhelming urge to use 
the substance.  
Susceptibility to addiction varies between individuals. Many different genetic, 
environmental, social and developmental factors contribute to a person’s unique 
susceptibility to drug or alcohol use, continuing substance use and experiencing the 
progressive changes in the brain that characterize addiction.141 The medical model 
particularly focuses on the role of genetics in the development of addiction. The model 
acknowledges that some people may inherit a vulnerability to the addictive properties of 
alcohol or drugs: “Some individuals have relatively low predisposition to developing 
addiction with drug exposure and may use drugs repeatedly in a manner that produces 
reward without the development of addiction, whereas others rapidly develop addiction 
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following minimal exposure to rewarding drugs.”142 Nevertheless, many individuals who 
possess a genetic vulnerability do not actually develop an addiction.143 Other factors have 
been found to increase an individual’s vulnerability to addiction, including family history 
of addiction, early exposure to drug use, socially stressful environments with limited 
available support and certain mental illnesses, such as mood disorders, psychoses and 
anxiety disorders.144 
Although biology and genetic predispositions play an important role in the development 
of addiction, the presence of these factors is not determinative: 
Like many other chronic conditions, such as diabetes, cardiovascular 
disease, and asthma, addiction is a multidimensional disease. Although a 
neurobiological predisposition is thought to be important to the evolution 
of addiction, psychological and social factors are also important, 
particularly as they shape patterns of risky drug use in vulnerable 
individuals and sustain drug use over time. In addition, many studies 
suggest that stress may be a critical element in the development of 
addiction in some settings. Psychosocial factors are also important 
influences on recovery from addiction.145 
Drug and alcohol addictions have a biological component but it is clear that various 
factors underlie its development and manifestation.  
3.4.2.4 Notion of Personal Choice and Control in Addiction 
In the early nineteenth century, loss of control came to be recognized as the defining 
feature of the addiction.146 Neuroscientific research has indicated that people with 
addictions lack decision-making capacity.147 Accordingly, the issue of control and the 
 
142
 Savage, supra note 119 at 657. 
143
 Herie, supra note 1 at 8. 
144
 Volkow, Koob & McLellan, supra note 109 at 367.  
145
 Savage, supra note 119 at 657. 
146
 Marilyn Clark, “Conceptualising Addiction: How Useful is the Construct?” (2011) 1:13 International 
Journal of Humanities & Social Science 55 at 56.  
147
 Daniel Buchman, Wayne Skinner & Judy Illes, “Negotiating the Relationship Between Addiction, 
Ethics and Brain Science” (2010) 1:1 AJOB Neuroscience 36. 
 
 
73 
capacity to make decisions still remains a part of the discussion surrounding addiction. 
This is especially evident in workplace accommodation cases involving addiction 
disability. Dr. Raju Hajela, an addiction medicine specialist and former president of the 
Canadian Society of Addiction Medicine, has stated that, “the disease creates distortions 
in thinking, feelings and perceptions, which drive people to behave in ways that are not 
understandable to others around them. Simply put, addiction is not a choice. Addictive 
behaviors are a manifestation of the disease, not a cause.”148 Thus, the argument that 
individuals struggling with drug and alcohol addiction are in full control of their 
substance use is contrary to the very essence of an addiction.  
In light of the medical model, “Describing addiction as a reflection of moral character 
and choice takes us back to an earlier, more ignorant time. Science now shows that 
addiction, including alcoholism, is not a simple phenomenon.”149 Granted, the 
development of an addiction requires the initial decision to consume drugs or alcohol; 
however, this is not a feature unique to addiction. The risk factors associated with many 
different chronic diseases involve behavioural choices. Only a fraction of individuals who 
drink alcohol or use drugs actually become addicted. Similarly, not everyone who is 
overweight, a known risk factor for various health conditions, develops diabetes or heart 
disease, for example. The development of a drug or alcohol addiction stems from 
multiple causes, such as an individual’s particular tolerance to drugs and alcohol, brain 
inhibitory circuits and genetic predispositions, rather than character flaws.150 In this 
sense, as articulated by Dr. Richard Soper, former director of the American Society of 
Addiction Medicine, “Addiction is a disease, just like asthma, diabetes and heart 
disease”151 and should be treated as such. Furthermore, “No one plans to become 
addicted. People may think that they can handle their substance use and that they only use 
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when they want to. But when they want to change the way they use, they may find it’s 
not that simple.”152 Diseases, including addiction, arise from the presence and interaction 
of various risk factors and predispositions, some of which may be completely out of the 
person’s control.  
Many of the central features of addiction undermine the notion that an individual assumes 
control over their addiction and freely makes choices regarding behaviour associated with 
their addiction. Current addiction science indicates that it is not always possible for 
people struggling with addiction to simply “make better choices” with respect to their 
substance use.153 As illustrated above, several of the DSM-5 criteria for substance use 
disorder reflect a lack of control or, at the very least, impaired control over substance use. 
The first DSM-5 criterion provides that the individual “may take the substance in larger 
amounts or over a longer period than was originally intended” and the second criterion 
indicates that they may experience “multiple unsuccessful efforts to decrease or 
discontinue use,”154 thus demonstrating an inability to effectively control or limit their 
use. Furthermore, the ninth DSM-5 criterion provides that individuals with addictions 
may continue to use the substance, despite acknowledging that they have a physical or 
psychological problem likely caused or exacerbated by their substance use. Some 
individuals are aware that their substance use has become problematic, but still continue 
to use despite wanting to stop, while others may not even recognize that their substance 
use is out of control and causing problems. This denial, which is also a common feature 
of addiction, “may simply be a lack of awareness or insight into the situation.”155 
Regardless of whether or not the individual recognizes that they have a problem, the 
inability to control or limit their substance use is a sign of addiction.156  
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A person without substance use issues would likely find it quite easy to go a day without 
drinking alcohol or using drugs. However, this feat can be extremely difficult for 
individuals struggling with drug and alcohol addiction. The Centre for Addiction and 
Mental Health notes that the immediate positive effects of consuming drugs and alcohol 
can make it difficult for a person to limit their substance use.157 People may rely on the 
effects of drugs or alcohol to provide some semblance of short-term relief from difficult 
and stressful life events or painful emotions. After using the substance, the person may 
temporarily feel better, have more confidence and forget about his or her problems, 
whereas the negative consequences associated with the substance may not be obvious or 
acknowledged for an extended period of time.158 When people use alcohol or drugs to 
change or escape the way they feel, the substance use can become a habitual coping 
mechanism that is difficult to break.159 Individuals with an addiction may come to 
genuinely “believe that they cannot function or make it through the day without 
drugs.”160 A person who develops physical dependence may also experience distressing 
symptoms of withdrawal upon attempts to stop using the substance. Continued substance 
use, especially heavy use, can also give rise to neurobiological and physiological changes 
that further perpetuate the addictive behaviors. These changes to the brain may be lasting 
and explain why people continue to crave drugs and alcohol long after they have stopped 
using the substance and commonly experience relapses.161  
3.4.3 Biopsychosocial Model 
Canadian jurisprudence on the duty to accommodate employees with addictions appears 
to either reflect the moralistic perspective or, at best, the medical, brain disease model of 
addiction. Although the medical model has provided a greater understanding of the 
biological and genetic underpinnings of addiction and “legitimizes addiction as a medical 
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condition,” it has been critiqued for promoting neuro-essentialist thinking as well as 
categorical notions of responsibility and free choice and undermining the complexity of 
addiction.162 By concentrating on the neurobiological features and processes that are 
inherently located within the individual, the medical model primarily places the focus 
within the person with an addiction, as opposed to external factors. Reductive, 
neurobiological explanations of addiction preclude a comprehensive understanding of the 
additional influence of psychological, social, cultural and other factors and the various 
complex processes underlying the development of addiction.163 It also “implies simplistic 
categorical ideas of responsibility, namely that addicted individuals are unable to exercise 
any degree of control over their substance use.”164  
As illustrated by the sociopolitical model of disability, social factors play an important 
role in the development and manifestation of disability. However, these factors are not 
thoroughly considered under the moral and medical models of addiction. Although the 
SCC has endorsed the sociopolitical model of disability, the jurisprudence reveals that 
legal decision makers have not adopted this approach, which lays the very foundation of 
the human rights framework, to addiction disability cases. The biopsychosocial model, a 
sociopolitical-like model specific to addiction, has already been adopted and supported in 
the fields of psychology, social work and counseling165 and could be implemented to 
remedy this apparent gap in Canadian human rights law.  
3.4.3.1 Complex Interaction of Multiple Factors 
The biopsychosocial model recognizes the deficiencies in the moral and medical models 
of addiction and acknowledges that, “the etiology of addiction is complex, variable, and 
multifactorial” and involves the interaction between various genetic, biological, 
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psychological, sociocultural and environmental factors.166 The biopsychosocial model of 
addiction looks beyond neurobiology and “places the individual in his or her social 
environment and integrates his or her life narrative.”167 Adopting “a holistic, systems 
approach,” the model identifies the influence and dynamic interaction of the various 
dimensions of the individual’s biological, social, psychological, spiritual and cultural 
environment and appreciates that the particular combinations, interactions and influence 
of each factor will be different for each individual.168 The biopsychosocial model 
acknowledges the complexities underlying the development of addiction and postulates 
that addiction is caused by a combination of these various factors. No single factor causes 
addiction. By recognizing and emphasizing the influence of these once ignored external 
factors, the biopsychosocial model provides an alternative to “a forced choice between 
brain disease and condition of a weak will.”169 
Although the biopsychosocial model asserts that addiction is not a purely neurobiological 
phenomenon, it does not deny the influence of biological and genetic characteristics and 
processes. The model acknowledges that some individuals may be genetically or 
biologically predisposed to developing an addiction. Such a predisposition can arise from 
a combination of genes, changes in brain chemistry or a deficiency in the ability to 
metabolize alcohol or drugs.170 Nevertheless, the presence of a biological predisposition 
is not determinative. In fact, the National Institute on Drug Abuse estimates that genetics 
account for approximately 30% of the cause of an individual’s addiction, while 
environmental factors account for the remaining 70%.171 An individual’s biological 
predisposition can either be triggered or offset by an accumulation of these other factors, 
such as psychological stressors, positive support systems and role models. Thus, it is 
important to acknowledge and examine the influence of non-biological factors.  
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Research suggests that an individual’s social environment and certain personality traits or 
psychological characteristics may predispose or contribute to the development of an 
addiction. Although it is difficult to determine causation—and particularly, whether the 
personality trait preceded the addiction or the addiction led to the personality trait—some 
characteristics are often shared by individuals with addictions, such as anxiety, 
depression, impulsivity, low self-esteem, a low tolerance for frustration or stress, poor 
coping skills and poor interpersonal relationship skills.172 Similarly, an individual’s 
sociocultural environment and relationships play a role in their susceptibility to 
developing an addiction: “Social norms regulate behaviour and may act as informal 
mechanisms of social control. Social groups construct norms that affect individual 
behaviour, prevalence, and substance use patterns. Group membership in which 
substance use is socially acceptable, encouraged, or perhaps coerced is significantly 
associated with patterns of use.”173 Family, peer and community values and attitudes 
toward prosocial activities and alcohol and drug use interact with family, peer and 
community supports and social stressors, such as poverty, family conflict, peer pressure 
and lack of emotional support.174 The biopsychosocial model acknowledges that an 
individual’s predisposition and development of an addiction depends on the interaction of 
various dynamic factors. 
3.4.3.2 Social Construction 
The emphasis traditionally placed on the biological characteristics of an individual fails 
to acknowledge the role of various social, cultural and political factors involved in the 
development of addiction. Much like the sociopolitical model of disability, the 
biopsychosocial model attempts to remedy this gap and emphasizes the social 
components underlying addiction. The biopsychosocial model endorses the examination 
of “society’s role as an antecedent to addiction” and the development of subsequent 
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problems.175 Although addiction involves biological components and processes, it is 
important to recognize that the identification and meaning of addiction disability are 
ultimately “framed by changing social, cultural and political values.”176 Ideas commonly 
held with respect to mental illnesses are “cultural artifacts”—the products of the social 
construction of the particular era—that “shape and mold the community’s generalized 
reality orientation in subtle and unseen ways” and, thus, “reinforce and reproduce the 
constellations of power, wealth, and influence within their respective societies.”177 
Accordingly, addiction disability and the lived experience of individuals with addictions 
must be examined in light of the social context and climate. 
Drug and alcohol addictions undoubtedly pose very real limitations and can severely 
impair an individual’s ability to function and perform day-to-day activities, such as going 
to work. Drug and alcohol addiction generally requires medical intervention, workplace 
accommodation as well as personal efforts to achieve and maintain sobriety. Individuals 
with addictions are also expected to manage their disability and cooperate with prescribed 
treatment in order to retain their job. In addition to these challenges, individuals 
struggling with addiction also encounter the negative perceptions, stereotypes and stigma 
pervasively associated with drug and alcohol addiction. The social perceptions of drug 
and alcohol addiction shape and influence the experience of people with addictions and 
can pose a barrier to their meaningful participation in society, including employment. In 
this sense, addiction and some of the limitations experienced by individuals with 
addictions are socially constructed.  
Despite the recent focus on mental health initiatives and the resulting increased 
awareness and acceptance of mental illness, addiction continues to be stigmatized and 
misunderstood by society. Moralistic sentiments remain deeply embedded in the social 
dialogue surrounding addiction disability. Addiction remains a stigmatizing label and 
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“the loss of control attributed to the state of addiction is considered deviant behaviour 
outside societal norms.”178 Individuals struggling with addiction disability may be 
viewed as morally defective or weak, irresponsible, deviant, dishonest and untrustworthy. 
These misconceptions fuel the stigma and negative stereotypes attached to addiction and 
result in discrimination against individuals with addictions and, consequently, barriers to 
their social inclusion. For instance, the termination of an employee upon the discovery of 
their addiction or the employer’s resistance to accommodate an employee in recovery is a 
result of discrimination, fueled by the negative stereotypes and misconceptions about 
addiction. These socially constructed notions obstruct opportunities to participate in 
society, including acquiring and maintaining employment. The imposition of an 
ostracizing societal attitude toward addiction heightens the adversity and challenges 
experienced by such individuals.179  
3.4.3.3 Notion of Personal Choice and Control in Addiction 
One of the primary critiques of the medical model of addiction is its all-or-nothing 
approach to characterizing an individual’s ability to control their addictive behaviours. 
Although the impairment of decision-making capabilities is an important feature of 
addiction, the medical model’s emphasis on total lack of control is inappropriate and 
inaccurate, as it appears to view control as binary and static. Control should be 
conceptualized on a spectrum; an individual’s ability to exercise self-control can change 
day to day and may even increase and decrease throughout the day. The ability to abstain 
or limit use in certain instances does not eliminate the existence of the addiction disability 
or its role in the adverse impact experienced by the individual, and should not be relied 
upon to negate human rights protections. The subsequent chapters demonstrate how this 
flawed, all-or-nothing approach to understanding personal choice and control has been 
adopted by legal decision makers in addiction disability cases to dismiss the 
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discrimination and accommodation claims of individuals who appear to display some 
restraint with respect to their addictive behaviours. 
The medical model’s reliance on neurobiological factors does not fully resolve the 
dispute regarding the volitional nature of addiction. The biopsychosocial model provides 
a more nuanced approach and strives to “contextualize the individual” in order to provide 
a better understanding of responsibility and control within the particular context of 
addiction.180 The model recognizes the various complex processes underlying decision-
making and “does not portray people as only controlled by the state of their brains.” 181  
Under this perspective, an individual’s “[a]ddictive behaviours are neither viewed as 
controlled or uncontrolled but as difficult to control a matter of degree.”182 The 
biopsychosocial model acknowledges that, “While making a decision is itself a mental 
act, a mental act or event does not cause behaviour alone, but is one part of the complex 
process between neuronal firing and action.” 183 The intention to use drugs or alcohol 
does not in itself cause the individual to use the substance. Other factors are necessarily 
involved: “Action, subjective experience of action, and consequently responsibility for 
action is mediated by many factors, including psychological phenomenon such as an 
individual’s emotional processes.”184  
While the biopsychosocial model acknowledges the issues of control and decision-
making concerning addictive behaviors, it challenges the view that people struggling with 
addiction are completely enslaved by their brain, rendering them incapable of controlling 
their actions at all times. Buchman, et al. describe the various processes underlying 
decision-making in the context of addiction: 
The brain responds to particular social cues that may provide instant 
pleasure, or regulate biological homeostasis, such as relief from 
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withdrawal (Li and Sinha 2008). Brain systems that moderate feeling, 
memory, cognition, and engage the individual with the world influence the 
decision to consume or not consume a drug, or participate in a specific 
behaviour or series of actions. Accordingly, this cybernetic brain-
environment interaction may trigger strong somatic signals such as desire, 
urge and anticipation (Verdejo-Garcia and Bechara 2009). In effect, this 
process may limit autonomy as it allows for “preference reversals” (Levy 
2007a) to occur in situations where an individual would rather not use. 
The degrees in which self-control is exerted, free choice is realized and 
desired outcomes achieved are dependent on these complex interacting 
biopsychosocial systems... Accordingly, the matrix of a person’s socio-
historical context, life narrative, genetics, and relationships with others 
influence intention, decision, and action, and thus shape the brain. 
Autonomy, therefore, is not adequately defined just by the events in the 
brain or the “quality” of the decision being made. As Gillett (2009) 
remarks, “a decision is...not a circumscribed event in neuro-time that 
could be thought of as an output, and an intention is not a causal event 
preceding that output, but both are much more holistically interwoven 
with the lived and experienced fabric of one’s life” (p. 333).185  
A complex combination of various biological, psychosocial and systemic factors, 
including brain processes, somatic mechanisms along with the ethical rules and norms 
that govern society, and the nature of this interaction guide an individual’s behavior and 
may, accordingly, explain why it is so difficult for some individuals to refuse drugs and 
alcohol in the face of increasingly negative consequences.186  
The biopsychosocial model contextualizes the responsibility placed on individuals with 
addictions and recognizes society’s role in facilitating substance use issues.187 From the 
biopsychosocial perspective, the issue of control is contextual, and not categorical. Given 
the spectrum of substance use problems, it is appropriate to also characterize an 
individual’s related decision-making capacity along a spectrum. Therefore, an 
individual’s decision-making capacity is neither completely present nor completely 
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absent, but rather, may be impaired in certain contexts and to varying degrees.188 The 
addiction does not render a person completely incapable of making decisions at all times. 
However, a person’s ability to exercise some self-control in some circumstances does not 
necessarily render the person “in control” of their addictive behaviours or diminish the 
legitimacy of their addiction.  
3.5 Treatment and Recovery 
The workplace accommodation process is inescapably intertwined with the employee’s 
rehabilitative efforts and prognosis. Many accommodation cases centre on whether the 
individual has complied with prescribed treatment and the prognosis of their recovery. 
Thus, it is important to touch on addiction treatment, the prevalence of relapses and the 
general prognosis of the disease. 
Drug and alcohol addiction can be successfully treated and managed, just like other 
chronic diseases.189 Rehabilitative interventions can help people stop using drugs and 
alcohol and resume productive lives. Effective treatment “enables people to counteract 
addiction’s powerful disruptive effects on their brain and behavior and regain control of 
their lives.”190 Studies show that the brain can recover, at least partially, after prolonged 
abstinence.191 The medical model of addiction has cultivated the development of 
behavioural interventions targeting the restoration of brain circuitry impacted by 
addiction, such as strategies to strengthen the salience of healthy rewards and mitigate 
stress reactivity.192  
Research indicates that combining treatment medications, where applicable, with 
behavioural therapy is generally the most effective way to ensure successful 
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rehabilitation.193 Medications, such as methadone, buprenorphine and naltrexone, are 
available for the treatment of opioid drug and alcohol addiction; these medications aid the 
recovery process by reducing withdrawal symptoms and cravings.194 Behavioural 
treatments, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, “help engage people in drug abuse 
treatment, provide incentives for them to remain abstinent, modify their attitudes and 
behaviors related to drug abuse, and increase their life skills to handle stressful 
circumstances and environmental cues that may trigger intense craving for drugs and 
prompt another cycle of compulsive abuse.”195 Of course, there is no one ideal approach 
to treating addiction. Treatment plans must be tailored to the particular individual’s needs 
and circumstances, including the severity of the addiction, their motivation to change and 
the availability of support from family and friends.196 
Addiction treatment services vary in terms of length and intensity. Some are community-
based and others are residential. The various treatment options include withdrawal 
management, counselling, day or residential treatment, recovery homes, support groups, 
like Alcoholics Anonymous, and aftercare, which aims to help people who have already 
completed a treatment program to return to the community and avoid relapse.197 The 
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health acknowledges the value of the different 
approaches and notes their distinctions: 
While all types of treatment services can be effective, a person’s specific 
circumstances influence which approach makes the most sense. People 
using community treatment services live at home and come to an agency 
for services. In general, community services are more willing to work with 
people who continue to use substances while they are in treatment. In 
contrast, people in residential programs live at a treatment facility for a set 
period. These programs typically require abstinence from all 
nonprescribed substances during people’s stay. Treatment approaches and 
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philosophies about addiction do vary within different services and 
agencies.198  
Therefore, although the fundamental goals underpinning addiction treatment services are 
similar, each person’s road to recovery will inevitably be different. 
Due to the chronic nature of addiction, relapses are very common in the recovery process. 
However, relapses do not necessarily mean that treatment has failed. The treatment of 
chronic illnesses often involves changing deeply embedded behaviours. For a person 
recovering from drug or alcohol addiction, returning to substance use does not 
necessarily indicate failed rehabilitation, but rather, suggests that their treatment must be 
reinstated or adjusted.199 Relapses are not unique to drug and alcohol addiction. As a 
matter of fact, the relapse rates for addiction are similar to relapse rates for other chronic 
illnesses, such as diabetes, hypertension and asthma, which, much like addiction, also 
have physiological and behavioural components.200 According to an American study, 
approximately 40% to 60% of people treated for alcohol or drug addiction return to 
substance use within one year of their discharge from treatment.201 Comparably, 
approximately 30% to 50% of adult patients with type 1 diabetes and 50% to 70% of 
adult patients with hypertension or asthma experience the recurrence of symptoms that 
require additional medical care in order to reestablish remission.202 The similar 
recurrence rates across these various chronic illnesses illustrate that relapse is a common 
feature of many different medical conditions and suggests that drug and alcohol addiction 
should be treated like any other chronic illness.203 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the common manifestations of drug and alcohol addiction and 
the various conceptualizations of addiction disability, through the lens of the biomedical, 
economic and sociopolitical models of disability and the moral, medical and 
biopsychosocial models of addiction. These models advance distinct notions of drug and 
alcohol addiction and perceptions of those who struggle with substance use issues. The 
moral model is seriously problematic, as it portrays addiction as a moral defect and a 
voluntary choice, perpetuating the negative public perceptions and stigma associated with 
addiction disability. Although the medical model recognizes important biological factors, 
it is one-dimensional and depicts addiction as a biological abnormality within the 
individual. The biopsychosocial model provides the most suitable and complete 
representation of addiction disability. It neither portrays addiction as a moral flaw nor a 
purely biological condition, but rather an interaction between the various dimensions of 
an individual’s biological, social, psychological, spiritual and cultural environment. The 
biopsychosocial perspective acknowledges the complex processes underlying addiction 
disability and offers a more comprehensive view of the disability than the other two 
models.  
It is clear that drug and alcohol addiction can severely impair an individual’s ability to 
participate in society, particularly maintaining productive employment. Accordingly, an 
employee with an addiction will likely require workplace accommodation during as well 
as after rehabilitation. However, in many cases, the employer fails to fulfill its duty to 
accommodate to the point of undue hardship. The following three chapters illustrate how 
the issues of choice, control, denial and relapse are commonly raised in addiction 
disability cases and add a layer of complexity to the discrimination and accommodation 
analyses. The subsequent chapters examine whether these fundamental laws and human 
rights principles are consistently applied in the addiction disability context. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Pre-Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. Jurisprudence 
In Canadian labour law, there have been three competing schools of thought on how to 
approach workplace misconduct arising from addiction: the disciplinary approach, the 
human rights approach and the hybrid disciplinary approach. The traditional disciplinary 
approach—rooted in the long-standing arbitral approach to culpable misconduct—
determines whether the employer had just cause to discipline or terminate the employee 
and whether the disciplinary action was excessive, in the circumstances. Under this 
approach, the arbitrator acknowledges the applicability of the duty to accommodate but 
generally regards it as a mitigating factor, once the grievor’s culpability has already been 
determined.1 The employee’s addiction disability is merely considered a mitigating factor 
in determining the appropriate discipline, and not a trigger for the application of the 
discrimination analysis and the employer’s duty to accommodate. The human rights 
approach, on the other hand, originated from human rights legislation and the subsequent 
statutory grant of power, incorporated in labour relations legislation, enabling arbitrators 
to interpret and apply human rights statutes.2 The arbitrator seeks to determine whether 
the employee’s misconduct is connected to their underlying addiction disability and, if a 
compelling connection can be established, the analysis focuses on whether the employer 
fulfilled its duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship—not the employee’s 
culpability. The hybrid disciplinary approach—evidenced in British Columbia (Public 
Service Agency) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union,3 which 
is discussed in this chapter—developed as a middle ground between the disciplinary and 
human rights approaches and integrates the traditional disciplinary analysis with 
accommodation principles. Under the hybrid analysis, the legal decision maker applies a 
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Special Lectures 2007: Employment Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) 189 at 232 [Lynk, “Disability and 
Work”]. 
2
 For example, in Ontario, section 48(12)(j) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Sched A, 
provides arbitrators with this power.  
3
 2008 BCCA 357 (Huddart J) [Gooding]. 
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disciplinary or just cause analysis to the voluntary, culpable aspects of the employee’s 
misconduct and a human rights analysis to the involuntary, non-culpable components 
causally connected to the disability.4 
This chapter examines eight cases from 2008 to 2016, prior to the release of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s (SCC) decision in Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.:5 British Columbia 
(Public Service Agency) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees Union, 
New Flyer Industries Ltd. v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and 
General Workers Union of Canada, Local 3003,6 Wright v. College and Association of 
Registered Nurses of Alberta (Appeals Committee),7 Seaspan ULC v. International 
Longshore & Warehouse Union, Local 400,8 Canadian National Railway v. Teamsters 
Canada Rail Conference,9 Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Saskatchewan Gaming 
Corp.,10 Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre11 and 
McNulty v. Canada Revenue Agency.12 This is clearly not an exhaustive list of all the 
addiction cases during this time period; however, these decisions are representative of the 
Canadian case law on addiction at that time. These eight cases across Canada illustrate 
the divergent approaches commonly applied to addiction cases by legal decision makers, 
ranging from the broad, liberal human rights approach, reflecting an understanding and 
appreciation of the features and challenges of addiction disability, and the narrow, 
stringent approach, concerned with choice, control and causal connections.  
 
4
 Brian Etherington, “Recent Developments in the Duty to Accommodate Disabilities” in Allen Ponak, 
Jeffrey Sack & Brian Burkett, eds, Labour Arbitration Yearbook 2012-2013 (Second Series) (Toronto: 
Lancaster House, 2012) 403 at 406. 
5
 2017 SCC 30 [Elk Valley]. 
6
 [2010] MGAD No 43 (Peltz) [New Flyer]. 
7
 2012 ABCA 267 (Slatter J) [Wright]. 
8
 [2014] BCCAAA No 108 (Lanyon) [Seaspan]. 
9
 [2015] 122 CLAS 319 (Silverman) [Canadian National Railway].  
10
 [2015] SLAA No 27 (Comrie) [Saskatchewan Gaming].  
11
 [2016] OLAA No 361 (Jesin) [Sunnybrook]. 
12
 2016 PSLREB 105 (Jaworski) [McNulty]. 
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In each of the eight cases, the employer—or in the case of Wright, the professional 
regulatory body—contended that it had not disciplined the employee for their addiction, 
but rather the employee’s misconduct, which resulted from their addiction—be it 
excessive absenteeism, theft or impairment at work. Of course, the presence of an 
addiction does not fully shield an employee from discipline for serious misconduct; there 
must be a connection between the addiction and prohibited behaviour. The existence and 
strength of such a connection is a point of contention in many addiction cases. 
The first three cases examined in this chapter—Gooding, New Flyer and Wright—were 
released prior to the establishment of the Moore test;13 however, a similar approach to 
prima facie discrimination existed at the time.14 In all eight cases, the first two 
requirements of the prima facie discrimination analysis were not challenged: the 
employee had a drug or alcohol addiction, constituting a disability under the relevant 
human rights legislation, and the employee experienced an adverse impact in the form of 
disciplinary action. The point of contention comes down to the third element of prima 
facie discrimination: establishing a connection between the employee’s addiction and the 
adverse impact. Similarly, where the legal decision maker finds prima facie 
discrimination, the first two elements of the Meiorin test15 are conceded and the analysis 
subsequently centers on the third step of the test: demonstrating the policy or standard is 
reasonably necessary to accomplish its legitimate work-related purpose. 
The SCC developed the Moore and Meiorin tests to standardize the approach for 
analyzing instances of discrimination and the duty to accommodate to the point of undue 
hardship. Although the Moore and Meiorin tests should be applied equally and uniformly 
to all cases of discrimination and accommodation, the following cases demonstrate the 
different approaches applied by Canadian arbitrators, courts and tribunals to addiction 
 
13
 Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 [Moore]. 
14
 Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536 [Simpsons-Sears]; Central 
Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 SCR 489; Health Employers 
Association of British Columbia v British Columbia Nurses' Union, 2006 BCCA 57; and Kemess Mines Ltd 
v International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 115, 2006 BCCA 58. 
15
 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia Government and 
Service Employees’ Union, [1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin]. 
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disability. The jurisprudence reveals that these legal tests have at times been 
misinterpreted and misapplied in the context of addiction. 
Prior to examining the eight addiction disability cases, this chapter briefly summarizes 
the legal concept of standard of review, which is the level of deference given by a court 
when reviewing the decision of a lower court, tribunal or arbitration decision. The laws 
and principles concerning standard of review are pertinent to the appealed decisions 
discussed in this chapter as well as Chapters 5 and 6. 
4.1 Standard of Review 
In Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, the SCC affirmed the two standards of review: the 
standards of correctness and reasonableness.16 Until very recently, determining the 
appropriate standard of review depended on various factors, including (1) the presence or 
absence of a privative clause, typically in the enabling statute of an administrative 
tribunal, stating that its decisions are final and not subject to review, indicating the need 
for deference; (2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by its enabling statute; (3) the 
nature of the issue under consideration, and; (4) the expertise of the decision maker.17 In 
its December 2019 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov 
decision, the SCC affirmed that the standard of review analysis begins with the 
presumption that the standard of reasonableness applies in all cases.18 However, this 
presumption can be rebutted where the legislation indicates that a different standard is to 
apply or where the rule of law requires the standard of correctness to apply—namely, in 
cases that raise constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance to 
the legal system as a whole and questions related to the jurisdictional boundaries between 
administrative bodies.19 
 
16
 2008 SCC 9 at para 34 [Dunsmuir]. 
17
 Ibid at para 65. 
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 2019 SCC 65 at para 10 [Vavilov]. 
19
 Ibid at para 17. 
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4.1.1 Reasonableness Standard 
The reasonableness standard is concerned with the presence of justification, transparency 
and intelligibility within the decision-making process and “whether the decision falls 
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the 
facts and law.”20 Reasonableness is a deferential standard of review that recognizes that 
certain questions and issues “do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result.”21 
Under the reasonableness standard, reviewing courts are to give due consideration to the 
original decision makers’ determinations.22 The policy of deference espoused by the 
reasonableness standard “recognizes the reality that, in many instances, those working 
day to day in the implementation of frequently complex administrative schemes have or 
will develop a considerable degree of expertise or field sensitivity to the imperatives and 
nuances of the legislative regime” that the reviewing courts simply do not possess.23  
Prior to the presumption of the application of reasonableness standard, prescribed in 
Vavilov, the standard of review analysis involved the examination of various factors. The 
reasonableness standard typically applied to questions of fact, discretion and policy as 
well as questions of mixed fact and law, where the legal issues cannot be readily isolated 
from the factual issues.24 Although questions of law generally attract the correctness 
standard, issues of general law within the original decision maker’s area of expertise fell 
under the standard of reasonableness.25 The presence of a privative clause in an 
administrative tribunal’s enabling statute, a provision that eliminates or restricts the scope 
of judicial review, also suggested the need to apply deference.26 
 
20
 Dunsmuir, supra note 16 at para 47. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid at para 49. 
23
 Ibid, quoting D J Mullan, “Establishing the Standard of Review: The Struggle for Complexity?” (2004) 
17 Can J Admin L & Prac 59 at 93.  
24
 Ibid at para 53. 
25
 Ibid at para 55. 
26
 Ibid. 
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In Vavilov, the SCC addressed two fundamental flaws that make a decision unreasonable: 
internally incoherent reasoning and not being justified in light of the relevant legal and 
factual constraints.27 In order to be reasonable, a decision must be based on rational and 
logical reasoning.28 A decision is “unreasonable if the reasons for it, read holistically, fail 
to reveal a rational chain of analysis or if they reveal that the decision was based on an 
irrational chain of analysis.”29 The use of logical fallacies, such as circular reasoning, 
false dilemmas, unfounded generalizations or an absurd premise, may also call into 
question the internal rationality of a decision.30 Ultimately, the reviewing court must be 
satisfied that the reasoning “adds up.”31 Furthermore, a reasonable decision must be 
justified with respect to the legal and factual constraints relevant to the decision.32 The 
SCC listed a number of factors that are generally relevant in evaluating the 
reasonableness of a decision: the governing statutory scheme, other relevant statutory or 
common law, the principles of statutory interpretation, the evidence before the decision 
maker and facts the decision maker may consider, the submissions of the parties, the past 
practices and decisions of the administrative body and the potential impact of the 
decision on the individual to whom it applies.33 
4.1.2 Correctness Standard 
The correctness standard, on the other hand, does not require the reviewing court to apply 
deference to the decision maker’s determinations and reasoning process. Rather, a 
reviewing court will undertake its own legal analysis of the issue and determine whether 
the original decision was correct.34 If the reviewing court disagrees with the decision, it 
 
27
 Supra note 18 at para 101. 
28
 Ibid at para 102. 
29
 Ibid at para 103. 
30
 Ibid at para 104. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid at para 105. 
33
 Ibid at para 106. 
34
 Dunsmuir, supra note 16 at para 50. 
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will substitute the previous determination with its own opinion of the correct answer to 
the question.35  
The standard of correctness typically applies to questions of law. A question of general 
law “that is both of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the 
adjudicator’s specialized area of expertise” attracts the correctness standard; given “their 
impact on the administration of justice as a whole, such questions require uniform and 
consistent answers.”36 Accordingly, constitutional issues and questions directly related to 
the administrative bodies’ jurisdiction and the scope of its powers are held to the standard 
of correctness.37  
4.2 British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v. British 
Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union  
This case concerned the termination of Brian Gooding, a long-time manager of a rural 
provincial liquor store, who began stealing alcohol from the store upon developing an 
addiction to alcohol. He stole alcohol several times a week for approximately one year 
and, when the employer confronted Gooding about the thefts, he admitted to stealing 
alcohol from work and advised the employer that he struggled with an alcohol addiction. 
In response, the employer informed Gooding of the Employee Assistance Program. He 
subsequently entered into a rehabilitation program and remained abstinent. The employer 
terminated Gooding for “wilfully” committing the thefts and fundamentally breaching the 
employer’s trust.38 The union grieved his termination.  
Gooding’s termination was originally upheld at arbitration. The arbitrator accepted the 
expert evidence indicating that individuals struggling with addiction act involuntarily in 
the theft of their substance of choice but Gooding ultimately knew it was wrong to steal 
 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid at para 60; Toronto (City) v CUPE, 2003 SCC 63 at para 62.   
37
 Dunsmuir, supra note 16 at paras 58-59. 
38
 Supra note 3 at para 26. 
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from his employer.39 Accordingly, the arbitrator found Gooding’s behavior to be culpable 
and applied the traditional disciplinary approach to the case, as opposed to the human 
rights approach. The arbitrator considered Gooding’s alcohol addiction to be a mitigating 
factor but concluded that the addiction did not overcome the seriousness of the 
misconduct and upheld his termination.40 The union sought a judicial review of this 
decision.  
The British Columbia Labour Relations Board overturned the arbitration award and 
remitted the case back to the arbitrator, directing him to apply the new hybrid legal 
analysis, developed in the 2002 Fraser Lake Sawmills Ltd. v. IWA-Canada, Local 1-424 
decision,41 for addressing the culpable and non-culpable elements of addiction-related 
misconduct.42 This analysis required the arbitrator to apply a disciplinary, or just cause 
analysis, to the culpable aspects of the misconduct and a human rights analysis to the 
non-culpable aspects.43 Applying the hybrid approach, the arbitrator found a connection 
between Gooding’s addiction and the thefts and determined that the employer had not 
fulfilled its duty to accommodate.44 Accordingly, the arbitrator ordered the employer to 
reinstate Gooding to a non-supervisory position. The employer appealed the decision to 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA). 
On appeal, the employer argued that the arbitrator erred in finding prima facie 
discrimination, asserting that: 
[H]uman rights law should not allow an employee to rely on his addiction 
as a legal defence to termination and as a shield to any form of discipline, 
 
39
 British Columbia v British Columbia Government and Service Employees' Union, [2000] BCCAAA No 
164 at paras 53-54 (Lanyon). 
40
 Ibid at para 65. 
41
 [2002] BCLRBD No 390 [Fraser Lake]. 
42
 Government of the Province of British Columbia v British Columbia Government and Service 
Employees' Union, [2002] BCLRBD No 210 (Watters). 
43
 Fraser Lake, supra note 41. 
44
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simply because there is some connection between the misconduct and the 
disability. The employer would limit the protection offered by 
discrimination laws to addicted employees who engage in misconduct to 
cases where the discipline imposed was based on stereotypical or 
prejudicial beliefs, or cases where the addiction rendered the employee 
entirely unable to control his or her own behaviour.45  
However, requiring an individual to be entirely unable to control his or her behavior 
would set an extremely high bar and effectively limit human rights protections to only 
those with the most severe cases of addiction. The union argued that the employer’s 
restrictive definition of prima facie discrimination did not account for instances of 
indirect discrimination, which must be considered.46 Furthermore, the employer claimed 
that the arbitrator erred in his assessment of the duty to accommodate by not giving 
weight to “the irreparable breach of the employment relationship constituted by Mr. 
Gooding’s theft,” and that requiring the employer to maintain the employment 
relationship would amount to undue hardship.47 
On behalf of the BCCA majority, Justice Huddart, with Justice Tysoe concurring, held 
that the Human Rights Code48 did not require the employer to accommodate an employee 
who has committed theft at work, because he suffered from an alcohol dependency, 
stating that: 
I can find no suggestion that Mr. Gooding’s alcohol dependency played 
any role in the employer’s decision to terminate him or in its refusal to 
accede to his subsequent request for the imposition of a lesser penalty. He 
was terminated, like any other employee would have been on the same 
facts, for theft. The fact that alcohol dependent persons may demonstrate 
“deterioration in ethical or moral behaviour”, and may have a greater 
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 Gooding, supra note 3 at para 48. 
46
 Ibid at para 49. 
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 Ibid at para 63. 
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 RSBC 1996, c 210. Section 13 states that, “(1) A person must not (a) refuse to employ or refuse to 
continue to employ a person, or  (b) discriminate against a person regarding employment or any term or 
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because that person has been convicted of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated to the 
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temptation to steal alcohol from their workplace if exposed to it, does not 
permit an inference that the employer’s conduct in terminating the 
employee was based on or influenced by his alcohol dependency.49  
The majority relied on three SCC decisions indicating the importance of demonstrating 
the stereotypical or arbitrary nature of the discriminatory conduct:50 McGill University 
Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital 
général de Montréal,51 Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays52 and Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des 
employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 
2000 (SCFP-FTQ).53 Justice Huddart found no evidence of stereotypical or arbitrary 
decision-making to substantiate Gooding’s claim of discriminatory conduct54 and, thus, 
found no prima facie discrimination. She acknowledged that, “his conduct may have been 
influenced by his alcohol dependency” but ultimately concluded that this connection was 
“irrelevant if that admitted dependency played no part in the employer’s decision to 
terminate his employment and he suffered no impact for his misconduct greater than that 
another employee would have suffered for the same misconduct.”55 The BCCA majority 
allowed the employer’s appeal and remitted the matter of whether Mr. Gooding’s 
dismissal was excessive to the original arbitrator.56 Gooding appealed the BCCA 
decision to the SCC but the SCC refused leave to appeal.57 
The majority decision disregarded the clear connection between Gooding’s alcohol 
addiction and the reason for his termination: theft of alcohol. Although the Moore test 
had not yet been established, the prevailing discrimination analysis resembled the 
approach later adopted in Moore and simply required the disability to be a factor in the 
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termination, not a causal or direct factor.58 Furthermore, the determination that any other 
employee would have been terminated for the same misconduct appears to accept the 
antiquated concept of formal equality, which prescribes equal treatment for those in 
similar situations; this is contrary to the SCC’s rejection of formal equality, in favor of 
substantive equality—the notion that differential treatment may be necessary for certain 
groups of people to achieve equal status in society.59 According to human rights laws and 
principles, Gooding should not have been terminated for the theft of alcohol, as it was 
clearly fueled by his addiction disability, unless the employer could establish it 
accommodated him to the point of undue hardship. Despite these flaws, the approach of 
the BCCA majority in Gooding has been applied in subsequent cases, including Wright, 
Bish v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.60 and Cambridge Memorial Hospital v. Ontario Nurses’ 
Association,61 which are examined in this thesis. 
In dissent, Justice Kirkpatrick affirmed that, given the evidence establishing a connection 
between Gooding’s addiction and the theft of alcohol, it was reasonable to infer that his 
addiction was related to his termination for theft—the stated reason for his termination; 
therefore, Gooding established prima facie discrimination.62 Justice Kirkpatrick also 
concluded that the arbitrator did not err in finding the employer failed to satisfy its duty 
to accommodate to the point of undue hardship, considering Gooding’s rehabilitation 
efforts and positive prognosis and the fact that the employer made no effort to 
accommodate him, aside from merely informing him of the employee assistance 
program.63 
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The majority remitted the issue of whether Gooding’s termination was excessive under 
the circumstances to the arbitrator. In light of the BCCA’s finding of no prima facie 
discrimination, the arbitrator did not apply the human rights approach. The arbitrator 
determined that Gooding engaged in particularly egregious misconduct, as he frequently 
committed theft over a long period of time, the thefts were premeditated and, as a store 
manager, he occupied a position of trust. The arbitrator concluded that Gooding’s alcohol 
addiction and his subsequent recovery were not sufficient factors to mitigate his 
dismissal, given the seriousness of his misconduct.64 The arbitrator held that Gooding’s 
termination was not excessive in the circumstances and dismissed the grievance.  
4.3 New Flyer Industries Ltd. v. National Automobile, 
Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union 
of Canada, Local 3003 
Jose Salvador, a machine operator for New Flyer Industries Ltd., experienced attendance 
and disciplinary problems related to his drug and alcohol addiction throughout much of 
his employment with the company. The employer’s Merit/Demerit Plan provided that, 
“An employee who accumulates a minimum of one hundred (100) demerit points shall be 
discharged and deemed to have been discharged for just cause.”65 In 2003, Salvador 
committed multiple infractions and informed the employer that he struggled with an 
addiction. He attended a rehabilitation day program under accommodation by the 
employer. In December 2005 and February 2008, Salvador committed various 
infractions—refusal of an order, reporting to work under the influence and absenteeism in 
2005 and refusal of an order and failure to comply with the rules in 2008—which put him 
over the 100 demerit threshold for automatic termination under the Plan. However, the 
employer accommodated Salvador by providing him with addiction rehabilitation 
treatment in 2006 and a last chance agreement—an agreement between the employer, 
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union and grievor, extending the grievor’s employment based on specific terms and 
conditions—in 2008. 
Salvador continued to experience attendance issues in 2008 and 2009. In the meetings 
addressing his excessive absenteeism, Salvador acknowledged the problem but did not 
mention his addiction to the employer. The attendance issues continued and, in December 
2009, the employer issued Salvador a written warning for failure to attend work. He came 
to work the next day but appeared to be intoxicated and subsequently tested positive for 
cocaine. This incident put Salvador over 100 demerit points and the employer terminated 
his employment. The union grieved the termination, claiming that it was unjust and the 
employer had not fulfilled its duty to accommodate. 
The union asserted that the employer “failed to take sufficient initiative and interest in the 
grievor’s medical condition, contrary to its human rights law obligation” and could have 
helped him avoid termination.66 Knowing that Salvador had a history of addiction, the 
employer should have made regular inquiries with respect to his addiction and provided 
ongoing offers of support.67 The union claimed that the employer had not sufficiently 
accommodated Salvador and that he should be reinstated with conditions. The employer 
contended that it accommodated Salvador to the point of undue hardship and was now 
legally entitled to terminate the employment relationship, given work scheduling and 
safety concerns. The employer also pointed to evidence suggesting a poor prospect for 
improvement. 
The arbitrator assessed whether the employer met its obligation to accommodate 
Salvador to the point of undue hardship and whether he met his obligation as an 
employee to participate in the accommodation process. The arbitrator accepted that, 
although the employer knew he struggled with addiction and previously required 
accommodation for his disability, Salvador “was not forthcoming about his needs at the 
material times” and, therefore, the employer, treating the 2008 attendance infractions as a 
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regular attendance management problem, was restricted in the types of accommodation it 
could offer.68 However, given the employer’s knowledge of Salvador’s lengthy addiction 
history and related workplace misconduct, the employer should have at least inquired 
about his health when he began missing work again. The arbitrator noted that, although 
the employer failed to fulfill its obligation to inquire in this instance, it had 
accommodated Salvador on various occasions and gave him another chance after his 
excessive absenteeism in 2008.  
The arbitrator found no medical evidence to support the grievor’s assertion that he was 
able to return to work. Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded that he was unable to make 
a positive conclusion about the grievor’s health and ability to return to work: 
The grievor in the present case was emotionally distraught during part 
of his testimony and did not present a picture of good health. He lacks 
a support network and has been estranged from his family. His 
testimony denying a cocaine problem was unconvincing and troubling. 
He stopped attending AA in May 2010 and has not engaged in any 
addiction program since that time. He is not involved in work or other 
regular productive activity. His pattern of denial and inability to take 
personal responsibility for his illness continued right up to the final 
workplace incident on December 18, 2009. His promise to do better if 
reinstated is no doubt heartfelt but I find that objectively there is no 
reasonable prospect of a successful return to work at this time 
[emphasis added].69  
The arbitrator held that the employer fulfilled its accommodation duty, by protecting 
Salvador’s employment on multiple occasions and facilitating his addiction treatment, 
and that any further accommodation would constitute undue hardship.70 He denied the 
grievance and did not interfere with the deemed just cause termination of the grievor. 
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4.4 Wright v. College and Association of Registered Nurses 
of Alberta (Appeals Committee) 
Wright concerned the discipline of two nurses, Genevieve Wright and Mona Helmer, by 
the College and Association of Registered Nurses of Alberta for stealing narcotics from 
work and falsifying records to cover up the thefts. Both nurses had been diagnosed with 
an opioid addiction and there was no indication that it impaired their ability to perform 
their nursing duties. Wright and Helmer appealed the College’s decision to charge them 
with unprofessional conduct and claimed that, in light of their addiction disability, their 
conduct was not and should not be deemed “unprofessional.”71 The nurses asserted that 
the medical evidence established a connection between their addiction and conduct and, 
thus, the disciplinary proceedings were discriminatory. The College asserted that the 
nurses were not being disciplined for their addiction, but for their criminal conduct,72 and 
that they were treated as any nurse who stole drugs from work.73 
Helmer was initially caught forging narcotic prescriptions in 1997 and, following 
treatment for her addiction, she returned to work under supervision. In 2008, Helmer 
relapsed and began stealing narcotics from the hospital again. The Hearing Tribunal 
accepted the addictions specialist’s conclusion that there was “a plausible connection 
between the opioid dependence and the behavior of the member.”74 Nevertheless, the 
Hearing Tribunal applied the disciplinary approach of the BCCA majority in Gooding 
and asserted that, while the “conduct may have been influenced by her drug 
dependency… the prosecution was for the theft and fraud just as is the case in the 
Gooding decision.”75 The Tribunal found the nexus between Helmer’s addiction and her 
behavior to be insufficient, stating: “There was volition, planning and choices made by 
Ms. Helmer. While there is some connection no doubt, it is not the mental or physical 
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disability that is the issue in Ms. Helmer’s case, it is the theft and fraud.”76 The Tribunal 
found Helmer guilty of professional misconduct, imposed a reprimand and suspended her 
nursing registration, pending compliance with rehabilitative treatment. The Hearing 
Tribunal also ordered Helmer to pay $39,000 for costs incurred by the College for the 
disciplinary proceedings. Helmer appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Appeals 
Committee. The Appeals Committee agreed that there was an insufficient link between 
the disability and misconduct and, thus, found no discrimination. In the alternative, even 
if there was prima facie discrimination, the duty to accommodate did not extend to 
tolerating theft.77 The Appeals Committee affirmed the Tribunal’s finding of professional 
misconduct, imposed sanctions and cost award; it also awarded an additional $16,000 for 
costs of the appeal. 
Wright acknowledged consuming large quantities of Percocet to cope with pain related to 
a medical condition. An opinion letter from an addictions specialist, attached to the 
agreed statement of facts, asserted that her “uncharacteristic behaviour of stealing opioids 
was entirely due to her untreated Opioid Dependence, at the time, in the context of 
chronic pain.”78 Nevertheless, the Hearing Tribunal concluded that Wright had sufficient 
mental capacity to control her actions and recognize that what she was doing was wrong: 
The member had control of her situation, and even though satisfying a 
drug addiction may have been a cause of the thefts of drugs and 
falsification of records, continuance of this thievery and falsification of 
records was not the only answer to the member’s addiction. It is not as 
if the member had ceased to function rationally and lost the ability to 
think and organize her practice, as evidenced by her exemplary 
employee evaluation. …This Tribunal does accept that the Human 
Rights Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act applies to CARNA as it is 
governed by the Health Professions Act but does not agree that this 
member was discriminated against due to her illness by this process. 
She has been treated the same as any other nurse who steals drugs. 79 
 
76
 Ibid at para 12. 
77
 Ibid at para 18. 
78
 Ibid at para 20. 
79
 Ibid at para 23. 
 
 
103 
The Hearing Tribunal asserted that her addiction disability would be considered in 
determining the appropriate sanction.80 The Tribunal concluded that Wright was guilty of 
professional misconduct, ordered a reprimand and suspended her license until she 
provided medical proof that her addiction was sufficiently controlled; conditions were 
also placed on her future employment.  
Wright appealed the decision to the Appeals Committee, arguing that the medical opinion 
that her conduct was entirely caused by her addiction was uncontradicted and should 
have been accepted by the Tribunal. The Appeals Committee concluded that the Hearing 
Tribunal implicitly rejected the evidence that the addiction was the sole cause of her 
conduct, as there was evidence demonstrating that she knew what she was doing and 
acted, at least partly, with volition.81 The Appeals Committee concluded that, in order to 
be discriminatory, the treatment must be arbitrary, and disciplining a member for criminal 
conduct is not arbitrary.82 Following the Gooding approach, the Appeals Committee 
found no discrimination and asserted that Wright’s addiction was to be considered in 
determining the appropriate discipline.83 The Appeals Committee found the Tribunal’s 
decision to be reasonable and ordered Wright to pay $10,000 for costs of the appeal.  
Wright and Helmer appealed the findings of the Appeals Committee directly to the Court 
of Appeal of Alberta (ABCA). They claimed that the Committee erred in its application 
of human rights principles and challenged the cost awards. On appeal, the ABCA 
analyzed whether: the College was required to use alternative procedures, as opposed to 
its disciplinary procedures; the College correctly applied the human rights legislation; the 
College discriminated against the appellants and, if so, were its actions reasonable and 
justifiable; and the costs awards were reasonable.84 The ABCA applied the standard of 
correctness to the application of the human rights legislation, as it was “a question of law 
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of general importance to the legal system” and the College had no expertise in human 
rights law,85 and applied the standard of reasonableness to the issue of costs.86  
The appellants argued that, in light of their addiction, the College should not have taken 
disciplinary action, as more appropriate procedures were available—namely, the 
College’s Alternative Complaints Resolution procedure and its ability to deal with 
“incapacity” under section 118 of the Health Professions Act, which enables the 
complaints director to suspend the disciplinary proceedings of an incapacitated 
member.87 The College responded that the appellants were ineligible for the alternative 
process due to the criminal nature of the complaints, the medical evidence indicated that 
the nurses were not incapacitated with respect to their ability to perform their job and the 
complaints director had wide discretion in choosing the remedial process.88 The ABCA 
majority, composed of Justices Slatter and Ritter, asserted that the professional 
organization’s decision to apply its disciplinary process was not reviewable for mere 
unreasonableness; in order to elicit judicial intervention, the error “must likely approach 
an abuse of process.”89 The majority concluded that it was not unreasonable, let alone an 
abuse of process, for the complaints director to decline to use the Alternative Complaints 
Resolution Process because the appellants were not eligible for the process, as the 
regulations specifically excluded criminal complaints.90 The majority indicated that the 
extent to which the human rights issues might demand the use of alternative procedures 
should be considered separately, under the duty to accommodate.91 
The majority found it was reasonable for the Hearing Tribunal and Appeals Committee to 
conclude that the decision to invoke the disciplinary proceedings was not prima facie 
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discriminatory, given that: the criminal conduct underlying the discipline was distinct 
from any personal characteristic of the appellants; although “the conduct of the appellants 
was caused by their addiction, and without that addiction they would not have stolen 
drugs,” there was no indication that “theft is predominantly caused by addictions, nor that 
addictions generally result in theft;” the College had no discriminatory intent or 
motivation in laying the charges; the objective standard of criminal behaviour was not 
based on stereotypical thinking or attributed characteristics; and criminal standards are 
not arbitrary, they are objectively based on social norms.92 The majority concluded that: 
It was the theft and forgery that were the subject of the disciplinary 
charges; how those acts came to be committed was irrelevant to the 
College. The College would have laid disciplinary charges as a result 
of theft of narcotics, whether the member was an addict or not. On this 
point the appellants’ argument falters at a factual level. Both of the 
Hearing Tribunals found as a fact that the appellants were not being 
disciplined for their disability, but rather for their conduct. The finding 
was that the appellants’ disability did not play any role in the decision 
to proceed with the prosecutions. Further, the Hearing Tribunals 
rejected any argument that the thefts were solely caused by addiction. 
Those findings were upheld by the Appeals Committee, and they 
demonstrate no reviewable error [emphasis added].93  
It is evident the majority accepted the notion of formal equality based on equal treatment 
and erroneously required the addiction to be the sole cause of the misconduct as well as 
discriminatory intent. Furthermore, the majority emphasized that discipline for criminal 
conduct was not arbitrary or based on stereotypical thinking;94 however, these elements 
are not required for establishing prima facie discrimination. Reflecting floodgates 
reasoning, the majority also opined that the potential consequences of excusing criminal 
behaviour on the basis of addiction would be “far-reaching.”95 Despite acknowledging a 
connection between the addiction and thefts—the legal threshold for demonstrating prima 
facie discrimination—the majority found no discrimination: “The fact that the appellants’ 
 
92
 Ibid at para 58. 
93
 Ibid at para 62. 
94
 Ibid at para 64. 
95
 Ibid at para 66. 
 
 
106 
conduct was motivated or caused at some level by the addiction does not raise the 
College’s proceedings to the level of discrimination in law.”96 
With respect to the issue of accommodation, the majority stated that the imposed 
sanctions “were clearly sensitive to the appellants’ circumstances” and indicated that, “To 
the extent that accommodation was called for, it was adequately represented in these 
sanctions. Even if there was a duty to accommodate that does not entitle the appellants to 
a complete exemption from the disciplinary process.”97 Eliminating access to disciplinary 
procedures in the case of stolen drugs and forged records “would likely amount to undue 
hardship.”98 The majority also found the cost awards to be reasonable under the 
circumstances and dismissed the appeals. Wright and Helmer appealed the BCCA 
decision to the SCC but the SCC dismissed the application for leave to appeal.99 
Justice Berger dissented from the majority decision and found many errors in the Appeals 
Committee’s decision. Citing the SCC’s rejection of identical treatment as a means to 
achieving equality, Justice Berger rejected the finding that the discipline did not 
constitute discrimination because all nurses who steal were treated alike, regardless of 
their addiction.100 He also rejected the view that the test for prima facie discrimination 
required arbitrariness or stereotyping in order to find discrimination.101 Justice Berger 
held that both the Tribunal and Appeals Committee erred by requiring the addiction to be 
the sole reason for the misconduct, as the protected ground only needs to be a factor, not 
a sole or overriding factor, in the adverse treatment, in order to constitute prima facie 
discrimination.102 Justice Berger concluded that:  
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Because Ms. Wright and Ms. Helmer have a disability and the medical 
evidence proves a nexus between that disability and their theft of 
narcotics, both tribunals erred in not conducting a human rights analysis. 
They failed to appreciate the nature of adverse effect discrimination, 
failed to appreciate that the prohibited ground does not have to be the sole 
ground for the adverse treatment before a human rights analysis is 
engaged and failed to treat the Appellants’ addiction as a disability. 
Properly applied, a human rights analysis demonstrates that proceeding 
on a culpable basis under the HPA is prima facie discriminatory 
[emphasis added].103  
Justice Berger rejected the College’s claim that accommodation occurred in the discipline 
phase of the process, as this was too late and failed to remedy the discrimination: “The 
imposition of a lesser sanction on the basis of the Appellants’ disability does not as a 
matter of law mitigate the discipline of the Appellants on a prohibited ground. Mere 
acknowledgment of the Appellants’ addiction disability is insufficient.”104 The Tribunal 
and Appeals Committee failed to conduct a proper human rights analysis and did not 
fully consider the possibility of accommodation.105 Justice Berger indicated that he 
would have quashed the Appeal Committee’s decision, remitted the matter to the 
Committee “for resolution in a manner consistent with this judgment” and set aside the 
cost awards.106  
4.5 Seaspan ULC v. International Longshore & Warehouse 
Union, Local 400 
The grievor worked as a deckhand at Seaspan and had a long history of drug and alcohol 
addiction. In 2006, the grievor experienced a relapse after approximately 14 years of 
sobriety. He disclosed his addiction to the employer and entered into a residential 
addiction treatment program. Upon returning to work, he signed a Return to Work 
Agreement and Contingency Monitored Recovery Agreement, which required him to 
abstain from drugs and alcohol for two years, submit to testing and continue treatment. 
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The grievor successfully completed the two-year program but relapsed in May 2009 and 
February 2010. He was accommodated on both occasions and returned to his safety 
sensitive position, subject to continued abstinence, monitoring and treatment. The grievor 
relapsed again in January 2011 and subsequently entered into a last chance agreement, 
which provided that “any positive alcohol or drug test, or substantive breach of the 
monitoring agreement or treatment recommendations, will result in the immediate 
termination of [GH]’s employment” and that the agreement satisfied the employer’s duty 
to accommodate.107 While off work for a knee injury, the grievor tested positive for 
alcohol in a random drug test in August 2013. The employer terminated him following 
the positive test result, pursuant to the last chance agreement. The union grieved the 
termination, claiming that it amounted to discrimination and the employer failed to 
accommodate the grievor to the point of undue hardship. The employer argued that the 
last chance agreement provided for immediate termination and the agreement fulfilled its 
duty to accommodate. 
The arbitrator—notably, the same arbitrator that heard the Gooding grievance—relied on 
the jurisprudence establishing that last chance agreements cannot nullify the employer’s 
duty to accommodate and are thus unenforceable in this respect.108 The arbitrator 
accordingly applied a human rights analysis to the grievance. He concluded that prima 
facie discrimination had been established, as the employer clearly stated that the grievor’s 
termination flowed directly from the last chance agreement, which provided that a 
positive alcohol or drug test would result in immediate termination; therefore, his “drug 
and alcohol addiction was not only a factor but the primary factor in the termination.”109 
The arbitrator found that Seaspan’s Substance Use Policy, aimed at providing a drug and 
alcohol free workplace and help to employees with addiction, was adopted for a purpose 
 
107
 Supra note 8 at para 20. 
108
 Ibid at para 68: Milazzo v Autocar Connaisseur Inc, [2005] CHRD No 3 at para 34; Black v Gaines Pet 
Foods, [1993] OJ No 2973; Re Canadian Pacific Railway Company and Canadian Counsel of Railway 
Operating Unions (United Transportation Union) (2002), CROA Decisions No 3269; and Etobicoke 
(Borough) v Ontario (Human Right Commission), [1982] 1 SCR 2002 at 213.  
109
 Supra note 8 at para 74. 
 
 
109 
rationally connected to the performance of the job and in an honest and good faith belief 
that it was necessary to fulfill the legitimate purpose.  
The last chance agreement stated that the employer had satisfied its duty to accommodate 
the grievor to the point of undue hardship. However, the arbitrator recognized that “under 
the law, this claim, standing alone, does not satisfy the duty to accommodate”110 and 
determined that assessing the duty to accommodate requires a global examination of the 
grievor’s circumstances, including past accommodation efforts as well as the grievor’s 
prognosis. The arbitrator emphasized the following factors: the grievor self-disclosed all 
instances of relapse; he never reported to work while impaired; there was no evidence he 
used drugs at work; there was no evidence the grievor committed any workplace 
misconduct as a result of his alcohol or drug use or that he posed a safety risk; and the 
grievor’s doctor indicated that the new comprehensive treatment plan, which also treated 
his other mental health conditions, increased the likelihood of prolonged abstinence and 
determined that he could satisfy the demands of his safety sensitive position.111  
The arbitrator found that accommodating the grievor’s four relapses in four years, while 
in a safety-sensitive position, satisfied the employer’s duty to accommodate. He then 
went on to consider the prospect of reinstatement in a non-safety sensitive position: 
It is at this point in respect to the duty to accommodate that I give 
significant weight to the circumstances of his past relapses — that he self-
disclosed, that he never reported to work impaired, that there is no 
evidence of the use of alcohol or drugs at the workplace, and that there has 
been no workplace incident arising from drugs or alcohol… Thus, in view 
of these off-duty relapses, which have not resulted in any workplace 
misconduct, I have determined that the Grievor is to be reinstated to a 
position that is not safety sensitive.112  
The arbitrator concluded that the employer had fulfilled its duty to accommodate to the 
point of undue hardship with respect to safety-sensitive work but not with respect to non-
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safety sensitive work. The arbitrator ordered the grievor’s reinstatement, subject to the 
previously imposed return to work conditions. However, he held that the grievor was not 
entitled to reimbursement for lost wages, in accordance with the last chance agreement. 
4.6 Canadian National Railway v. Teamsters Canada Rail 
Conference 
Canadian National Railway concerned the termination of a long-serving locomotive 
engineer with a history of addiction. In July 2014, the grievor operated a train from 
Manitoba to Minnesota and was subject to random alcohol testing by the U.S. Federal 
Railroad Administration and tested positive for alcohol, contrary to both the Canadian 
Rail Operating Rules and the CN Drug and Alcohol Policy. Rule G of the Operating 
Rules provided that, “The use of intoxicants or narcotics by employees subject to duty, or 
their possession or use while on duty is prohibited” and the Policy stated that, “Any 
employee whose breath alcohol concentration is over 0.04 or who tests positive for illegal 
drugs would be considered in violation of this policy.”113 The grievor admitted to 
consuming alcohol while on duty and the employer consequently terminated him for 
violating Rule G.  
The employer claimed that the grievor’s termination was warranted because he consumed 
alcohol while on duty in a safety sensitive position, which threatened the safety of 
himself, his crew and the public. The employer also raised the fact that the grievor did not 
report his alcohol addiction or seek assistance through the employer’s support services 
until his termination; the employer suggested that disclosing his addiction after violating 
the policy was a self-serving tactic. The union, on the other hand, contended that the 
employer discriminated against the grievor due to his addiction disability. The union 
pointed to the grievor’s history of alcohol addiction and rehabilitative treatment during 
his employment with CN: in 2006, the grievor contacted the company’s employee 
assistance program with respect to his addiction and completed a residential treatment 
program, attended Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings for the next two years and 
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suffered a relapse in 2009, at which time he took himself out of service for two months 
and resumed attending AA meetings. The grievor confirmed that the 2014 incident was a 
relapse and acknowledged the seriousness of his behavior. Upon his termination, the 
grievor attended AA meetings and maintained his sobriety. 
The arbitrator acknowledged the seriousness of the grievor’s misconduct, given the safety 
critical work environment, but also considered the substantial and ongoing evidence of 
the grievor’s rehabilitation efforts as well as the letter from his rehabilitation counselor, 
confirming his participation in and commitment to recovery.114 Adopting a broad human 
rights approach, the arbitrator examined all the evidence and, despite the safety 
sensitivity of the workplace, gave considerable weight to the grievor’s 37-year 
employment record and his successful rehabilitative efforts, notwithstanding the relapses. 
The arbitrator concluded that, “In view of the grievor’s long service, the requirements to 
accommodate the grievor to the point of undue hardship under the Canadian Human 
Rights Act,115 the grievor’s continuing and ongoing rehabilitation efforts and the relevant 
CROA&DR jurisprudence,116 reinstatement with conditions is appropriate.”117 The 
arbitrator ordered the grievor’s reinstatement, subject to conditions, including continued 
abstinence, random drug and alcohol testing and regular attendance of AA meetings, with 
no loss of seniority but without compensation for any lost wages or benefits. The 
arbitrator affirmed that noncompliance with the conditions would result in termination. 
4.7 Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Saskatchewan 
Gaming Corp. 
Saskatchewan Gaming concerned the termination of Ms. AB, a casino dealer with a drug 
addiction. In 2008, Ms. AB developed an addiction to crack cocaine. She obtained 
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rehabilitative treatment for her cocaine addiction in the summer of 2008 and remained 
sober for several months but experienced a relapse and continued to use crack cocaine 
until the termination of her employment. As a result of her drug use, Ms. A.B.’s 
absenteeism from work far surpassed the average absenteeism rate of employees at the 
Saskatchewan Gaming Corporation. She used drugs on payday and would typically be 
absent from work for the shift she expected to receive her pay as well as the next day to 
recover from the previous day’s drug use. The employer issued several warnings 
indicating that her employment could be terminated as a result of her continued, 
excessive absenteeism. Ms. AB disclosed her drug addiction to the employer on several 
occasions and stated that it impacted her ability to improve her attendance. The employer 
indicated that it required further medical information from her physician with respect to 
her disability. Ms. AB’s family physician indicated that she did not have a disability; 
however, the physician testified that she never treated Ms. AB for addiction and thought 
the question was in reference to her shoulder injury.118 With no substantive improvement 
in her work attendance and the absence of medical documentation indicating she suffered 
from a medical disability, the employer decided to terminate Ms. AB’s employment in 
October 2013. The union grieved her dismissal. Following her termination, Ms. AB 
stopped using cocaine, attended a recovery program and maintained perfect attendance at 
her subsequent job. 
The employer contended that it had terminated Ms. AB for frustration of the employment 
contract, due to her excessive absenteeism, and, therefore, her termination should be 
upheld. The employer claimed it sufficiently warned Ms. AB that her job would be in 
jeopardy if she did not improve her attendance and argued that it had fulfilled its duty to 
accommodate by seeking a physician’s diagnosis. The union claimed that the employer 
discriminated against Ms. AB by terminating her employment due to addiction-related 
absences and by failing to accommodate her to the point of undue hardship. The union 
asserted that the warnings given to Ms. AB did not clearly communicate attendance goals 
and the employer failed to provide a final warning that she would be terminated if her 
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attendance did not improve.119 Furthermore, Ms. AB was able to maintain regular work 
attendance after receiving treatment. The union contended that Ms. AB’s employment 
should be reinstated. 
The arbitrator concluded that the employer’s repeated warnings concerning Ms. AB’s 
attendance record did not constitute a final warning: “Ms. AB was told over and over 
again only that she ‘could’ be terminated, but there was never any real and final warning 
that she ‘would’ be terminated if her absenteeism did not improve.”120 Had the employer 
given a clear and effective final warning of an imminent termination, Ms. AB might have 
consulted with the union and raised the question of her drug addiction and whether an 
accommodation would be considered.121 Accepting the evidence provided by Ms. AB 
and an addiction expert, the arbitrator concluded that Ms. AB’s excessive absenteeism 
was a result of her drug addiction. Thus, the employer discriminated against Ms. AB by 
terminating her due to absences caused by an addiction disability.  
The arbitrator acknowledged the realities of addiction, including denial and relapse, and 
the impact it can have on an employee’s ability to identify the need for accommodation: 
In summary, an employee suffering from a drug addiction that is not in 
recovery or has relapsed may, as a symptom of his or her disease and 
therefore beyond his or her control, lie to his or her employer about the 
status of their recovery, deny the existence of any drug problem, and 
continue to do or say anything necessary to maintain the flow of 
employment income that supports the addiction…  
Accordingly, if the employee is suffering from the disability of addiction, 
and is either not in recovery or has relapsed, and the evidence shows that 
such employee has failed to disclose this fact to the employer, then that 
employee cannot necessarily be expected to cooperate any further with the 
employer in identifying the need for accommodation. The duty of an 
employee to assist in the identification of the need for accommodation will 
be exhausted in these circumstances.122 
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The arbitrator concluded that Ms. AB fully satisfied her duty to assist and cooperate in 
the identification of her addiction disability by raising the matter with her employer. She 
disclosed her addiction and, under the circumstances, the employer knew or, at the very 
least, should have known she had a drug addiction.123 The employer did not further 
investigate Ms. AB’s condition and consequently failed to fulfill its duty to 
accommodate. The arbitrator held that the termination was invalid and ordered Ms. AB’s 
reinstatement, subject to conditions, including random drug testing and attendance 
performance, the breach of which would result in immediate termination. 
4.8 Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Sunnybrook Health 
Sciences Centre 
Sunnybrook addressed the termination of a nurse who stole narcotic drugs from the 
hospital she worked at, in order to support her drug addiction, and falsified medical 
records to conceal the thefts. Upon being confronted by the hospital with evidence of 
discrepancies in the narcotic records, the nurse denied stealing any hospital drugs. The 
employer terminated the grievor for the theft of narcotics and gross misconduct relating 
to nursing protocols. The union grieved the dismissal. On the first day of the arbitration 
hearing, the grievor admitted to the thefts, acknowledged that she had an addiction and 
apologized to the hospital for her misconduct. Following her termination, the grievor 
sought treatment for her drug addiction and maintained abstinence. Her physicians 
indicated she could return to work under certain conditions and restrictions regarding her 
access to drugs in the hospital.  
The employer’s medical expert perceived addiction as a choice and asserted that the 
addiction did not cause the grievor to steal drugs.124 On the other hand, the grievor’s 
treating addictions specialist stated that the cravings associated with addiction are “very 
strong” and “persons who otherwise have no inclination toward criminal behaviour may 
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commit such behaviour in order to feed their addiction.”125 The employer argued that the 
thefts constituted a fundamental breach of trust, destroying the employment relationship. 
Furthermore, the employer claimed that no position within the hospital could meet the 
conditions imposed by the College of Nurses of Ontario because narcotics were readily 
available, even in units where drugs were not administered to patients, and the possibility 
of relapse constituted undue hardship on the employer.126 The union contended that the 
grievor’s termination for theft constituted indirect discrimination based on her addiction 
disability and argued for her reinstatement, relying on the evidence that she 
acknowledged her addiction, was working hard to maintain sobriety, fully cooperated 
with the treatment program and was capable of returning to work.127  
The arbitrator acknowledged that having an addiction does not fully shield an employee 
from discipline for misconduct; a “causal link” between the addiction and misconduct in 
question triggers the employer’s duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship.128 
Adopting a generous medical-human rights approach, the arbitrator accepted that 
addiction is in fact a disease, the nurse’s addiction was directly connected to the thefts, 
and, in such circumstances, employers have a duty to accommodate.129 He also 
acknowledged that the impaired ability to control cravings, theft, dishonesty, denial and 
shame are all features of addiction.130 The arbitrator concluded that, in cases like this one, 
“where the evidence establishes that an employee suffers from an addiction to drugs and 
the employee not only is unable to resist use of drugs while at work, but is also unable to 
resist the urge to divert those drugs from the Employer, the employee must be treated as 
any other employee suffering from a disability;” the employer must accommodate the 
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employee to the point of undue hardship.131 In this case, the termination of the grievor’s 
employment constituted discrimination. 
The arbitrator provided insightful guidance for assessing addiction cases in light of the 
employer’s duty to accommodate: “[W]here the addicted employee is in remission, is 
fully cooperative in accepting recommended treatment and acknowledges the extent of 
addiction and the improper behaviours that have occurred as a result, efforts can then be 
made to determine whether accommodation of the employee’s disability can be 
accommodated.”132 Fully appreciating the grievor’s individual circumstances and 
prognosis, the arbitrator placed importance on the fact that the grievor eventually 
acknowledged the extent of her addiction and related misconduct, was in remission and 
continued the recommended treatment.133 The arbitrator directed the employer to 
reinstate the nurse, subject to conditions recommended by the doctor and imposed by the 
College of Nurses. Compensation was not requested nor awarded.  
Although the grievor in this case was reinstated, it is important to note that similar 
grievances, involving the termination of a nurse with a drug addiction for stealing drugs 
from her employer, have resulted in starkly different outcomes. In Royal Victoria 
Regional Health Centre v. Ontario Nurses’ Association134 and Cambridge Memorial 
Hospital v. Ontario Nurses’ Association135 the arbitrators found no discrimination and 
dismissed the grievances. However, both these cases have since been judicially reviewed 
by the Ontario Divisional Court and overturned.136 The Court’s decision in Cambridge 
Memorial Hospital v. Ontario Nurses’ Association is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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4.9 McNulty v. Canada Revenue Agency 
Mary Ann McNulty began working at the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) in 1989 as a 
clerk and advanced to senior programs officer in 2010. In 2014, the employer terminated 
her employment for submitting forged medical certificates, resulting in an irreparable 
breach of trust. McNulty filed a grievance, alleging the employer discriminated against 
her, and sought reinstatement. The employer denied the grievance and it was referred to 
the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board. 
McNulty often missed work and failed to notify the employer of her absences. The 
manager provided the grievor with a letter to remind her of the administrative conditions 
and mechanisms related to requests and authorization for leaves, including the 
requirement to notify her immediate supervisor and provide a medical certificate and that 
the failure to comply with these measures could result in progressive discipline, up to and 
including termination. The manager asked McNulty whether there was anything the 
employer could do to help but she stated that there were no issues and she would be back 
at work. Nevertheless, McNulty continued to be absent from work and often called in 
sick. She generally did not have a medical certificate and submitted the documentation 
much later, sometimes weeks later. The employer directed the grievor to undergo a 
fitness to work evaluation in order to determine the cause of her absences and provide 
some insight into possible accommodation. The physician’s report indicated that the 
grievor was fit to work on a full-time basis and did not specify any limitations, aside from 
the stipulation that she be allowed to take breaks.  
McNulty submitted 16 medical certificates from May 2013 to March 2014 from ten 
different doctors and a physiotherapy clinic. The manager became suspicious when she 
received two undated certificates from the physiotherapy clinic in March 2014. The CRA 
determined that the certificates were falsified and initiated an investigation. In April, the 
grievor told her employer that she suffered from alcoholism and forged the certificates 
because she had been too drunk to go to the doctor. She revealed that she had been 
treated for alcohol abuse in the past and had been sober for years but relapsed about two 
years prior, when members of her family became ill. The grievor told the employer that 
she wanted to stop drinking and sought treatment. She admitted to the investigator that 
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she had been sick as a result of her drinking and forged the 16 medical certificates 
because she was not sober enough to go to the doctor’s office to obtain them legitimately. 
The employer determined that these 16 medical certificates were used to claim 216 hours 
of sick leave with pay, worth roughly $9,300 before deductions, and 218.5 hours of sick 
leave without pay.137 The investigation report indicated that McNulty expressed remorse 
and a desire to regain the trust of her managers and colleagues. 
At the disciplinary meeting, the grievor indicated that she had not realized the seriousness 
of her actions when she forged the notes and did not consider it to be fraud. The CRA 
Director General testified that the grievor revealed that she was not under the influence of 
alcohol when she forged the certificates but was sometimes hungover and had always 
been sober when submitting the notes to her manager.138 The grievor stated that she 
forged the medical certificates while intoxicated, hungover and sober.139 Weeks later, the 
employer decided to terminate the grievor’s employment. The employer contended that 
the grievor had not apologized for her behaviour, failed to show remorse or accept 
responsibility for her actions and instead blamed management as well as her personal 
circumstances. In making its decision, the employer considered the seriousness and 
repetitive nature of the grievor’s misconduct, her performance and length of employment 
with the CRA as well as the agency’s values, including integrity, professionalism and 
respect, and ultimately concluded that McNulty had irreparably breached its confidence 
and trust.140  
McNulty stated that she was diagnosed with an alcohol dependency following her arrest 
for impaired driving in 2004. In February 2005, she completed a 28-day outpatient 
rehabilitation program and continued to be monitored by medical professionals. The 
grievor remained sober until she relapsed in late 2011; during this time, multiple 
members of the grievor’s family had passed away and experienced serious health issues. 
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She continued to be monitored by medical professionals until the fall of 2012. McNulty 
indicated that she abstained from drinking when her daughter visited; she would drink all 
day from Monday to Friday and abstain over the weekend to recover. Following her 
termination, McNulty attended an outpatient program for over a month but stopped, as 
her mother’s health declined and she needed to care for her. The grievor sought medical 
assistance, maintained her sobriety and attended Alcoholics Anonymous twice a week. 
The CRA argued that McNulty’s repeated misconduct warranted termination. The 
employer asserted that it did not matter whether the hybrid or human rights approach was 
applied, as the nexus between the misconduct and disability remained the focus.141 
Relying on Gooding, Wright and Bish v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.,142 the employer 
contended that, “not just any nexus or cause is sufficient.”143 The CRA terminated 
McNulty’s employment because she forged medical certificates to obtain sick leave, not 
because of her disability.144 The employer accepted that the grievor had a disability but 
asserted that there was no nexus between her disability and the misconduct: “There was 
only a bald assertion that they are connected. The grievor said she stayed at home 
because she was intoxicated and that she did not obtain a legitimate medical certificate 
because she could not drive;”145 the grievor had other options available to her, other than 
forging a medical certificate, such as speaking to a doctor or her manager.146 The 
employer asserted that alcohol did not cause McNulty to forge and submit the medical 
certificates, as she had not forged medical certificates in 2004 when she drank heavily.147 
The CRA submitted that the grievor provided insufficient medical evidence to establish a 
medical defense and failed to seek treatment. 
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McNulty argued that the CRA discriminated against her on the basis of her disability and 
failed to accommodate her. The grievor contended that the investigation was flawed, as it 
did not consider the medical information related to her disability. Although some form of 
discipline was warranted, termination was excessive under the circumstances. McNulty 
cooperated with the employer’s investigation, she admitted to her misconduct and the 
investigation report indicated that she showed remorse for her actions. Furthermore, 
McNulty had 25 years of service with the CRA and sought medical treatment following 
her termination. She requested reinstatement, subject to conditions regarding her 
continued treatment. 
The arbitrator began his analysis by outlining “the usual basis for adjudicating issues of 
discipline,” as set out in William Scott & Co. v. C.F.A.W., Local P-162,148 which 
involves determining: whether the grievor committed misconduct; if so, whether the 
discipline imposed by the employer was appropriate in the circumstances; and, if not, 
what alternative penalty would be just and equitable.149 The arbitrator found that 
McNulty’s actions amounted to serious misconduct and went on to examine her addiction 
disability as a mitigating factor. He asserted that the grievor had the burden to prove that 
“her disability was a factor in the employer’s decision to terminate her employment”150 
and the addiction disability was a causal factor in her misconduct.151 However, requiring 
the grievor to demonstrate that the employer considered her disability in its decision to 
terminate effectively imported the requirement of direct discrimination into the prima 
facie discrimination analysis, contrary to human rights law. The arbitrator determined 
that the employer terminated McNulty for forging the medical certificates, not for her 
addiction disability,152 and found insufficient evidence to support the argument that the 
grievor’s addiction should mitigate the penalty imposed: 
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I have no expert evidence that alcohol dependency would remove any 
inhibitions or control that the grievor should otherwise have had with 
respect to the actions she undertook to acquire the leave by fraudulent 
means. Indeed, while the grievor suggested that sometimes she had been 
intoxicated or hung-over when she typed the forged medical certificates, 
she had been sober when she handed them to her supervisor.153  
Although she forged the medical certificates for her addiction-related absences, the 
arbitrator concluded that McNulty failed to establish that her misconduct was causally 
related to her disability and did not demonstrate prima facie discrimination.154 Despite 
finding no discrimination, the arbitrator went on to comment on the duty to accommodate 
and indicated that, “It is both hard to envision and difficult to comprehend the grievor’s 
suggestion that the CRA should have accommodated her when it appears from the 
evidence before me that she had been resolute in concealing her disability and in 
thwarting any attempt at accommodation from the CRA.”155  
In assessing the conflicting evidence regarding the grievor’s remorsefulness, the 
arbitrator utilized the grievor’s past deceptive behaviour related to her disability—
namely, lying to the employer about being sick, seeing a medical professional and 
obtaining medical certificates, misleading her family physician about her drinking 
problem and lying to her supervisor by indicating that everything was fine—to 
characterize the grievor as untruthful.156 The arbitrator failed to recognize that denial and 
deception are common features of addiction and assessed McNulty’s behaviour in 
isolation from her disability: 
I find particularly troubling the grievor’s excuse for not obtaining 
legitimate medical certificates, which was that she was either too 
intoxicated or too hung-over to drive. At first blush, one might consider 
that a somewhat commendable action, within an otherwise dreadful 
situation; however, when looked at a little closer, it is really meaningless 
and self-serving and is a way of avoiding responsibility for her actions. 
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Had she not been intoxicated or severely hung-over, she would not have 
missed work; ergo, she would not have required a medical note and would 
not have had to see a doctor. I have never seen or heard of a situation in 
which an employee has shown up at a doctor's office and asked for a note 
to excuse him or her from work because he or she was too intoxicated or 
was hung-over. What is particularly disquieting about this in the grievor's 
situation is that if she really needed to see her family doctor, she had a 
sister who lived close by and who could drive; but more troubling is that 
the grievor’s family physician's office was within walking distance of her 
home [emphasis added].157  
Contrary to the human rights approach, the arbitrator’s assessment of the grievor’s 
drinking and related misconduct was devoid of any appreciation of the impact an alcohol 
addiction may have on an individual and their behaviour. 
Considering the grievor’s testimony and the employer’s evidence, the arbitrator 
concluded that, “while the grievor might have said that she is sorry and remorseful for her 
conduct, her past behaviour suggests that she is not always truthful and that she tends to 
blame others and not accept responsibility for her actions” and accepted the employer’s 
evidence on this point.158 The arbitrator found the grievor’s evidence regarding her 
rehabilitative efforts indicated that she “ha[d] not pursued rehabilitation in a meaningful 
way”159 and also concluded that her work performance, length of service and cooperation 
with the investigation were not sufficient to convince him to alter the penalty. He held 
that McNulty’s misconduct warranted termination and dismissed the grievance. 
4.10 Conclusion 
Historically, in Canadian labour law, the competing approaches towards workplace 
misconduct arising from drug and alcohol addiction have been the traditional disciplinary 
approach, rooted in the long-standing arbitral approach to culpable misconduct, and the 
human rights approach, originating from human rights legislation and the subsequent 
statutory grant of power incorporated in labour relations legislation enabling arbitrators to 
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interpret and apply human rights statutes. Under the disciplinary approach, the arbitrator 
determines whether the employer had just cause to discipline or terminate the employee 
and whether the disciplinary action was excessive under the circumstances. The duty to 
accommodate is typically regarded as a mitigating factor once the grievor’s culpability 
has been determined.160 Consequently, under this approach, the employee’s addiction 
disability is treated as a mitigating factor in determining the appropriate discipline, as 
opposed to a trigger for the application of the prima facie discrimination analysis and the 
duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. In contrast, the human rights 
approach strives to determine whether there is a connection between the employee’s 
misconduct and their addiction disability. If a compelling connection can be established, 
the human rights analysis centres on whether the employer fulfilled its duty to 
accommodate the employee to the point of undue hardship, rather than the employee’s 
culpability.  
The hybrid disciplinary approach developed as a middle ground between the disciplinary 
and human rights approaches, integrating the traditional disciplinary analysis with 
accommodation principles. This approach arose from concerns about abandoning the 
application of culpability to workplace misconduct, particularly in addiction cases where 
there appears to be a quasi-voluntary aspect.161 Under the hybrid analysis, the legal 
decision maker applies a disciplinary or just cause analysis to the voluntary, culpable 
aspects of the employee’s misconduct and applies a human rights analysis to the 
involuntary, non-culpable components that are causally connected to the employee’s 
disability.162 
The SCC has repeatedly affirmed that human rights statutes must be interpreted in a 
liberal, contextual and purposive fashion163 and human rights are to be given a broad 
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interpretation. To establish prima facie discrimination, the employee must simply 
demonstrate that they have an addiction, they experienced an adverse impact and the 
addiction was in some way a factor in the adverse impact.164 Regardless of whether or not 
it intended to discriminate against the employee, the employer has the onus of 
demonstrating that it cannot accommodate the employee without giving rise to undue 
hardship.165 The employer must present convincing objective evidence to substantiate its 
undue hardship claim and justify limiting the employee’s right to be free from 
discrimination and accommodated in their workplace. The human rights approach to 
addiction disability—illustrated in New Flyer, Seaspan, Canadian National Railway, 
Sunnybrook and Saskatchewan Gaming—is most in line with these human rights laws 
and principles.  
The traditional disciplinary approach has largely fallen out of favor in the past ten years, 
as it has no regard for human rights; however, elements of this approach have remained 
in the addiction jurisprudence. The tension in the addiction case law during this period 
has been between the human rights approach and the hybrid approach. The development 
of the hybrid model provided an alternative to the full-bore human rights analysis, 
maintaining elements of the traditional labour relations approach. Nevertheless, this 
approach is premised on principles that are both contrary to human rights law and the 
sociopolitical model of disability. 
Contrary to the sociopolitical model of disability, endorsed by the SCC, the hybrid model 
espouses a biomedical concept of disability by focusing on individual pathology, as 
opposed to the social and built environment. Emphasizing the culpability of one’s 
behaviour, the hybrid model seeks to derive a finding of legal fault from the medical 
principle that the capacity to control addiction-related compulsions varies amongst 
individuals,166 thus focusing on the element of choice in their behaviour.167 The 
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examination of an individual’s culpability under this model introduces the consideration 
of factors, such as choice and control, that are irrelevant to the human rights analysis and 
creates a stricter, narrower test for individuals with addiction disability. This 
consequently detracts attention from the effects of the addiction on the individual and 
emphasizes concepts of legal responsibility and fault, ultimately eclipsing the duty to 
accommodate.168 The hybrid model has failed to provide a principled and consistent 
approach towards the accommodation standards reflected in the human rights 
jurisprudence, namely Meiorin and British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights).169  
In an attempt to blend the disciplinary and human rights approaches, the hybrid model 
ultimately subordinates fundamental human rights law to labour law principles: 
Employers are understandably concerned to maintain their ability to 
discharge problem employees. The conceptual difficulty with the hybrid 
approach, and the root of all of its weaknesses — analytical and legal — is 
the attempt to address those concerns by interpolating the idea of degrees 
of culpability within a human rights context, and by attempting to balance 
labour law against human rights law without regard to the established 
legal hierarchy. It is not a matter of molding human rights law to the 
employment context, but of ensuring that the employment context 
complies with human rights law. That is the legal requirement in Canada 
and not a matter of predilection. 
 
The answer to the problem of addicted employees who commit 
employment offenses does not lie in bypassing or diminishing human 
rights law, but in applying that law properly and consistently, utilizing the 
concepts and tools provided by the courts within the human rights 
paradigm, especially undue hardship.170  
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Unfortunately, Canadian legal decision makers have opted to adopt this flawed approach, 
contrary to human rights laws and principles. The dilution and misinterpretation of 
fundamental human rights law is evident in the addiction disability jurisprudence.  
Under Canadian human rights law, prior to terminating the employment of an individual 
with an addiction, the employer “must prove that their condition adversely affects their 
work, has not responded to efforts to accommodate and is not, in the foreseeable future, 
likely to improve.” 171 Where the workplace misconduct is attributable to the individual’s 
addiction and the evidence demonstrates that they are committed to rehabilitation and a 
positive employment relationship can be re-established, most arbitrators are inclined to 
give another chance.172 However, this is not always the case. The flexible, liberal human 
rights approach, consistent with well-established human rights laws and principles, is not 
always applied. Some Canadian legal decision makers continue to diverge from this 
approach and impose a narrower standard in cases of alleged discrimination on the basis 
of addiction disability and accept a low standard of direct objective evidence of 
employers’ undue hardship defense, contrary to human rights jurisprudence and 
principles. Placing the focus on blame and culpability, either consciously or 
subconsciously, distorts the human rights analysis and elicits the imposition of additional 
factors and stricter standards. 
As evidenced in Gooding, Wright and McNulty, some decisions fail to regard addiction as 
a disability garnering human rights protections, resulting in the misapplication—
specifically, an inappropriately narrow interpretation—of the Moore and Meiorin tests, in 
favour of a disciplinary approach. Certainly, there are cases, like Seaspan, Canadian 
National Railway, Sunnybrook and Saskatchewan Gaming, that reflect a broad and 
generous human rights approach and uphold the employer’s duty to accommodate to the 
point of undue hardship. The New Flyer decision also reflects the difficult balancing of 
the grievor’s human rights with the likelihood of successful remission and return to work; 
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although the arbitrator ultimately decided not to reinstate the grievor’s employment, this 
conclusion arose from the particular circumstances of the case—namely, the employer’s 
multiple attempts at accommodation and the grievor’s poor prognosis for recovery and 
return to work—and not a rejection of the human rights approach. Wright and 
Sunnybrook, two cases involving a nurse stealing narcotics from her employer, illustrate 
how similar facts and circumstances can lead to starkly different outcomes. The 
difference appears to lie in the approach adopted by the legal decision maker: “Running 
like a constant thread through these reinstatement rulings is the application of a more 
liberal and generous approach towards the definition of disability in human rights law, 
and the acceptance of some of the current medical thinking regarding addictions.”173  
A segment of the addiction case law departs from the Moore and Meiorin tests and 
fundamental human rights principles. As evidenced in this chapter, some legal decision 
makers require the employee to establish more than a simple connection between the 
addiction and imposed discipline, contrary to Moore, and do not properly assess the 
accommodation duty in compliance with Meiorin and based on objective evidence. 
Furthermore, some decisions incorrectly accept formal equality, as opposed to 
substantive equality, and require direct discrimination as well as discriminatory intent, 
stereotyping and arbitrary decision-making on behalf of the employer, thus making it 
more difficult to establish prima facie discrimination. Although addiction disability is 
recognized as a protected human rights ground, claims of discrimination have been 
dismissed on the basis that the addiction did not reach a level of compulsiveness 
rendering the individual completely unable to make decisions and recognize their 
wrongdoing, importing elements of the disciplinary approach. 
Prior to Elk Valley, there was no common approach amongst legal decision makers to 
assessing issues of discrimination and accommodation with respect to addiction 
disability. Of course, addictions are complex and present unique features and 
characteristics that are not shared by most disabilities and these differences appear to 
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have contributed to the apparent difficulty in establishing a standard approach towards 
addiction disability: 
… addiction is a disease; diseases and the manifestation of disease are by 
definition not culpable, and by law must be accommodated; but negative 
workplace behaviour is normally considered culpable and subject to 
discipline. Furthermore, there are elements of the disease of addiction 
which legitimately differentiate addiction from most other disabilities, 
including components of denial and relapse, both of which may be 
affected by the manner in which the suffering employee is dealt with. In 
addition, there is a widespread perception that an element of choice and 
self-control is involved in addiction that is not present in other disabilities, 
which legitimately pits the excuse of compulsion against the effect of 
enabling, and more controversially, against the concepts of personal 
responsibility and blame. All of this contributes to the challenge of 
reconciling the clash between traditional labour law and contemporary 
human rights.174  
Individuals are also expected to have some degree of awareness of their addiction 
disability and be committed to recovery. Consequently, arbitrators have had difficulty 
reconciling accommodation principles with the traditional workplace and arbitral 
approaches towards an employee’s personal responsibility for their misconduct and 
recovery.175 In some cases, this difficulty resulted in the adoption of an approach that 
failed to adhere to human rights laws and principles, in favor of a disciplinary-focused 
approach. In the pre-Elk Valley era, the addiction disability jurisprudence was 
inconsistent, creating uncertainty in the law, and Elk Valley provided the SCC with the 
opportunity to offer clear guidance and affirm the proper approach to be applied in such 
cases. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. 
Ian Stewart, an employee of Elk Valley Coal Corporation’s (Elk Valley) coalmine near 
Hinton, Alberta, had an accident at work while operating a truck. Pursuant to the 
company’s drug and alcohol policy, Stewart underwent a urine test, which indicated he 
had cocaine in his system at the time. Elk Valley’s subsequent investigation revealed that 
Stewart suffered from a drug addiction. Nevertheless, the company decided to terminate 
his employment. Brent Bish, Vice President of the United Mine Workers of America, 
Local 1656, filed a complaint with the Human Rights Tribunals of Alberta (Tribunal), on 
behalf of Stewart, claiming that Elk Valley discriminated against Stewart on the basis of 
his addiction, contrary to the Alberta Human Rights Act.1  
The Tribunal concluded that Elk Valley terminated Stewart for violating the company’s 
drug and alcohol policy, and not for his drug addiction.2  Although Stewart’s addiction 
impaired his ability to comply with the workplace policy, the Tribunal held that the 
addiction was not a factor in his termination and, therefore, Elk Valley did not 
discriminate against Stewart. Stewart appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Court of 
Queen’s Bench of Alberta (ABQB). The ABQB agreed that Elk Valley did not prima 
facie discriminate against Stewart on the basis of his addiction but found that the 
employer failed to accommodate him to the point of undue hardship.3 Both Stewart and 
Elk Valley appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal of Alberta (ABCA), which held 
that Elk Valley did not discriminate against Stewart and had fulfilled its accommodation 
duty.4 
Stewart appealed the ABCA decision to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), requesting 
the Court to review the Tribunal’s judgment. The SCC granted leave to appeal, making 
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Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. the first addiction disability accommodation case to be 
heard by the highest court in the country.5 Elk Valley provided the SCC with the 
opportunity to address the apparent inconsistencies in the legal approach applied to 
addiction disability cases and provide much needed clarification with respect to the 
appropriate approach. 
The SCC affirmed the prima facie discrimination test articulated in Moore v. British 
Columbia (Education)6 and asserted that stereotypical or arbitrary decision-making is not 
a requirement for establishing prima facie discrimination and that the protected human 
rights ground must merely be a factor in the adverse impact. The majority of the Court 
found sufficient evidence supporting the Tribunal’s decision that Stewart was not 
terminated for his addiction, but for breaching the drug policy, and concluded that it was 
reasonable for the Tribunal to find no prima facie discrimination. 
This chapter provides a summary of the facts in Elk Valley and analyzes the various 
levels of decisions respecting this case, with a particular emphasis on the SCC 
decisions—the majority, partial dissent and dissent. It examines the decisions from a 
human rights perspective and with a biopsychosocial understanding of addiction, 
grounded in human rights principles, legislation and jurisprudence, and explores the 
implications of the SCC majority decision. The legal reasoning in the SCC majority 
decision is faulty; in finding that Mr. Stewart’s termination was not discriminatory, based 
on the superficial distinction that Elk Valley terminated him for breaching the employer’s 
drug policy, and not for his addiction disability, the majority departed from fundamental 
human rights laws and principles as well as the modern scientific understanding of 
addiction. 
5.1 Facts 
Ian Stewart began working for Cardinal River Operations Limited (Cardinal River), the 
predecessor of Elk Valley Coal Corporation, in September 1996. Stewart operated trucks 
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and wheel loaders in the course of his employment at the coalmine and, from July to 
November 2005, he worked as a plant loader operator. Stewart was a member of the 
United Mine Workers of America, Local 1656 (Union) and covered by the collective 
agreement between Elk Valley and the Union. 
In 2000, the Union and the predecessor employer jointly agreed to an alcohol and drug 
policy. This policy was subject to review and modification. In May 2005, Elk Valley 
unilaterally implemented an amended “Alcohol, Illegal Drugs & Medications Policy” 
(Policy), which committed Elk Valley to “providing a safe work environment.”7 Stewart 
and other employees attended a training session, where Elk Valley officials explained the 
new Policy, and the employees signed a form indicating receipt and understanding of the 
Policy. The Policy stated that the use or possession of an illegal drug is prohibited while 
on duty or at the operation and, “[w]here an act or omission by an employee who is On 
Duty or at one of the Mining Operations causes or contributes to a Significant Event, the 
Company as part of the investigation of the cause of the Significant Event may require 
the employee to undergo testing.”8 The Policy indicated that it did not apply to off duty 
conduct, “where the circumstances do not reasonably support an inference that the 
employee’s work performance has been or may be adversely affected.”9 
The new Policy affirmed that Elk Valley would assist employees struggling with drug 
and alcohol abuse, dependency or addiction, with the goal of prevention and providing 
access to treatment resources. The Policy asserted that employees “with a dependency or 
addiction” could seek rehabilitative assistance without fear of discipline or termination 
before the occurrence of a “Significant Event,” such as a work related incident.10 
However, “[i]nvolvement in a rehabilitative effort or seeking rehabilitative help for an 
abuse, dependency or addiction problem after a Significant Event has occurred, or after a 
demand is made for the employee to undergo testing for reasonable cause under this 
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Policy, will not prevent an employee from being disciplined or terminated.”11 
Nevertheless, the Policy indicated that Elk Valley would not automatically terminate an 
employee who did not reveal a dependency or addiction until after an incident. The 
Policy provided that, if an employee violated the Rules of Conduct or tested positive for 
drugs or alcohol in a test administered under the policy, Elk Valley would decide whether 
or not the employee should be terminated by considering all the relevant circumstances, 
including the employee’s employment record, the circumstances surrounding the positive 
test result, the pattern of usage, the likelihood that work performance has or may be 
negatively affected and the importance of deterring this behaviour by other employees.12 
If Elk Valley determined that the conduct warranted discipline, the company would place 
“primary importance upon deterring similar behaviour by other employees” and terminate 
the employee unless it would be unjust given the circumstances.13 If Elk Valley decided 
to continue employment, the employee would be required to take the necessary and 
appropriate steps to avoid the risk of future workplace impairment and, if reasonable 
under the particular circumstances, Elk Valley could require the employee to undergo 
periodic or random testing.14 
On October 18, 2005, while operating a loader truck at the worksite, Stewart hit a 
stationary 170-ton truck, consequently breaking its mirror. Elk Valley considered the 
incident to be a Significant Event under the Policy and required Stewart to undergo drug 
testing. The preliminary test revealed the presence of cocaine type drugs. Elk Valley 
suspended Stewart, pending confirmation of the test result. The subsequent test 
confirmed the presence of cocaine. Elk Valley conducted an investigative meeting where 
Stewart was asked about the incident, the drug test and his results. Stewart admitted to 
using crack cocaine on his days off work and admitted to using crystal methamphetamine 
and marijuana months before the incident. Stewart indicated that he did not think he had a 
drug problem prior to the accident but, after talking to a psychologist, he came to realize 
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that he did have a problem and thought he was addicted. Stewart did not approach anyone 
at Elk Valley or the Union about his drug use or addiction prior to the incident. 
On November 3, Elk Valley terminated Stewart effective immediately. The termination 
letter stressed the importance of complying with the Policy and disclosing a drug or 
alcohol dependency before a violation, in order to ensure mine site safety. The letter 
reiterated the Policy, stating that, “in responding to a violation of the policy the Company 
will place primary importance upon deterring similar behaviour by other employees and 
will terminate the employee unless termination could be unjust in all of the 
circumstances.”15 In the letter, Elk Valley indicated that it would consider an application 
for new employment from Stewart after 6 months, given the availability of a suitable 
vacancy and if he successfully completed a rehabilitation program and agreed to a 24 
month “Recovery Maintenance Agreement,” including terms and conditions to monitor 
and ensure his commitment to sobriety; Elk Valley also stated that it would reimburse 
50% of Stewart’s rehabilitation program costs, if he successfully complied with the 
“Recovery Maintenance Agreement.”16 The next day, Elk Valley received a letter from 
Stewart dated November 1, 2005—two days before his termination—stating that he had a 
problem and was seeking professional help. He indicated that he could not afford the cost 
of the recommended addiction rehabilitation center and asked for the company’s 
assistance. While Elk Valley refused to pay the $5,000, the Union offered to pay but 
Stewart ultimately decided not to pursue the treatment. 
The Union grieved Stewart’s termination and Brent Bish, Vice President of the Union, 
also filed a complaint with the Alberta Human Rights Commission, alleging that Elk 
Valley discriminated against Stewart on the grounds of physical and mental disability, 
contrary to sections 7(1)(a) and (b) of the Alberta Human Rights Act:  
No employer shall (a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ 
any person, or (b) discriminate against any person with regard to 
employment or any term or  condition of employment, because of the 
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race, religious beliefs, colour, gender, physical disability,17 mental 
disability,18 age, ancestry, place of origin, marital status, source of income, 
family status or sexual orientation of that person or of any other person.19  
Of course, there is an exception where the refusal, limitation, specification or preference 
is based on a bona fide occupational requirement.20  
5.2 Summary of Previous Decisions  
5.2.1 Arbitration and Judicial Review 
Arbitrator Lucas, appointed under the terms of the collective agreement, heard the 
grievance and suspended Stewart for 24 months and imposed conditions for his 
reinstatement.21 Both the Union and Elk Valley applied for a judicial review of the 
decision on the grounds that the arbitrator erred in law by assuming, without deciding, 
that Stewart’s termination pursuant to the Policy constituted prima facie discrimination. 
The ABQB held that the arbitrator made a legal error and set aside the arbitration 
decision and remitted the case to a different arbitrator for a rehearing.22 Elk Valley 
appealed the decision and the ABCA upheld the ABQB decision, concluding that 
remitting the arbitration to a new arbitrator satisfied the standard of reasonableness due to 
the reasonable apprehension of bias.23 The Union decided to proceed to the Alberta 
Human Rights Tribunal, instead of conducting another arbitration hearing. 
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5.2.2 Alberta Human Rights Tribunal  
5.2.2.1 Position of the Parties 
The human rights complaint proceeded to the Tribunal. On behalf of Stewart, Brent Bish 
claimed discrimination on the grounds of “physical and/or mental disability,” contrary to 
the Alberta Human Rights Act.24 Bish submitted that Stewart’s drug addiction was a 
factor in Elk Valley’s decision to terminate his employment, therefore, the termination 
constituted prima facie discrimination. Furthermore, Elk Valley did not accommodate 
Stewart to the point of undue hardship; it failed to conduct a medical assessment and 
consider other viable options, such as a last chance or rehabilitation agreement.  
Elk Valley claimed that terminating Stewart for breaching the Policy did not contravene 
the Act, as the safety sensitivity of the mine site required the company to take every 
reasonable step to ensure a safe workplace and prevent its employees from using illegal 
drugs.25 The employer contended that it terminated Stewart, not because he was a drug 
addict, but because he did not stop using drugs before he had a workplace accident, 
despite being aware of the Policy.26 Elk Valley claimed that neither Stewart’s termination 
nor the Policy amounted to prima facie discrimination; thus, it had no duty to 
accommodate Stewart. In the alternative, Elk Valley claimed that, if the termination 
constituted prima facie discrimination, it satisfied the duty to accommodate because 
placing Stewart on its disability plan and paying for his treatment after the accident 
would have sent a message to the other employees in this safety sensitive workplace that 
they could continue using drugs until they had an accident.27  
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5.2.2.2 Medical Evidence 
5.2.2.2.1 Dr. Charl Els 
Ian Stewart’s counsel called upon Dr. Charl Els, a psychiatrist and addictions specialist, 
to conduct a medical evaluation of Stewart in November 2010 and testify at the Tribunal 
hearing on his findings. Dr. Els concluded that, at the time of his termination, Stewart 
suffered from “moderate cocaine dependence”28 but was “in full remission” at the time of 
the medical assessment.29 Dr. Els described addiction as a chronic brain disease, 
characterized by a loss of control,30 and confirmed that denial and cravings—defined as 
“‘a strong subjective drive to use the substance’ or ‘a psychological state characterized by 
obsessive thoughts and compulsive behaviour’”31—are common elements of addiction.32  
In response to the question of whether Stewart was aware of his substance issues, Dr. Els 
replied, “I believe that prior to the termination, Mr. Stewart was not aware, and he was 
likely to be in the equivalent of the precontemplation stage with elements of denial 
explaining it. I do not believe he was aware of the extent of the problem, nor of the 
impact it had on his physical use and physical fitness for duty at the mine.”33 Dr. Els 
explained that, like most people struggling with substance dependence, Stewart did not 
perceive any need for treatment, as he did not believe he had a drug problem.34 Thus, he 
did not see the need to access Elk Valley’s assistance program. Dr. Els agreed that Elk 
Valley’s policy of terminating employees for a positive drug test after a workplace 
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accident deterred drug use but suggested that other consequences, such as the prospect of 
having to enter a rehabilitation program, could serve as an equally sufficient deterrent.35  
5.2.2.2.2 Dr. Mace Beckson 
Elk Valley requested the medical opinion of Dr. Mace Beckson, a psychiatrist and 
addictions specialist. Dr. Beckson concluded that Stewart had a mild to moderate case of 
cocaine dependence at the time of the accident; he demonstrated a maladaptive pattern of 
drug use, resulting in “clinically significant impairment.”36 Stewart acknowledged that he 
was sleepy at the time of the incident due to his cocaine use the night before and Dr. 
Beckson agreed that the drug consumption impaired his ability to handle the vehicle.37 
According to Dr. Beckson, Stewart met three of the seven substance dependence criteria 
in the DSM-IV: he spent a substantial amount of time obtaining, using and recovering 
from the effects of cocaine; discontinued important social and recreational activities due 
to his use; and experienced withdrawal symptoms when he stopped using cocaine.38  
Nevertheless, Dr. Beckson concluded that, even though Stewart was addicted to cocaine, 
he “did not lack the capacity to change his behavior if he so chose.”39 Adopting the moral 
model of addiction, Dr. Beckson opined that, “Addicted individuals have not lost the 
capacity to control their behavior; they do not lack the capacity to choose to discontinue 
drug use; and they do respond to negative consequences and change their behavior in the 
face of potential punishment.”40 The doctor asserted that, despite his addiction, Stewart 
was capable of complying with the Policy but simply chose not to,41 pointing to the 
choices he made with respect to his cocaine use, such as abstaining while at work, not 
going to work in an intoxicated state and limiting the amount he used when he did not 
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have enough money. However, this ostensible display of self-control is arguably eclipsed 
by the fact that Stewart obtained a second job in order to finance his addiction.42 
Stewart’s ability to limit his cocaine use before and during work does not mean he was in 
full control of his addiction or addictive behaviours; it may, however, speak to the 
severity of his addiction and suggest he was able to restrict his cocaine use in certain 
circumstances. Furthermore, Stewart’s efforts to limit his use to when he was off-duty 
illustrate his attempts to comply with the workplace policy. 
Dr. Beckson also asserted that Stewart’s denial of his addiction did not impair his 
decision-making abilities43 and determined that, “[g]iven his capacity for awareness, 
decision-making, and follow-through,” he was not disabled from complying with the 
Policy.44 While Dr. Beckson emphasized the notion of choice and evidently adopted the 
antiquated moral model of addiction, Dr. Charl Els presented a more nuanced 
understanding of addiction disability, reflecting the medical model, which should have 
been weighed more favorably by the Tribunal. 
5.2.2.3 Tribunal Decision 
The Tribunal held that Elk Valley did not prima facie discriminate against Stewart. It 
determined that Elk Valley terminated Stewart for failing to comply with Elk Valley’s 
drug policy and that his addiction was not a factor in the termination.45 The Tribunal also 
concluded that the Policy did not adversely impact Stewart because he had the capacity to 
comply with its terms.46 
The Moore decision, which established the current test for prima facie discrimination, 
had not yet been released. Nevertheless, relying on human rights jurisprudence up to that 
point, the Tribunal adopted an approach identical to the Moore test and asserted that, in 
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order to establish prima facie discrimination, the claimant must demonstrate that: 1) they 
had a disability protected under the Act; 2) the respondent terminated their employment 
or treated them adversely; and 3) it is reasonable to infer that their disability was a 
factor in their termination or adverse treatment.47   
The Tribunal contemplated an additional element applied by the SCC minority in McGill 
University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de 
l’Hôpital général de Montréal48 and seemingly applied by the majority in Honda Canada 
Inc. v. Keays:49 “examining whether the adverse action of the employer based on a 
prohibited ground is stereotypical or arbitrary.”50 Nonetheless, the Tribunal affirmed that 
“proof of prejudice or stereotyping are not additional evidentiary requirements for the 
Complainant in proving prima facie discrimination. Once adverse treatment is shown on 
the basis of a prohibited ground, an inference of stereotyping, arbitrariness or 
perpetuation of disadvantage will usually be drawn.”51  
The Tribunal acknowledged that Stewart had a cocaine addiction at the time of the 
incident, constituting a disability under the Act, and that Elk Valley terminated his 
employment but determined that his addiction was not a factor in the termination. Similar 
to British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v. British Columbia Government and 
Service Employees’ Union,52 the evidence indicated that “Mr. Stewart was not fired 
because of his disability, but rather because of his failure to stop using drugs, failure to 
stop being impaired in the workplace and failing to disclose his drug use” prior to the 
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workplace accident.53 Firstly, it is apparent the Tribunal applied the incorrect prima facie 
discrimination test. The prima facie discrimination test—correctly stated by the Tribunal 
at the outset of the decision—does not demand a causal relationship; it merely requires 
the disability to be a factor in the termination. However, the Tribunal inappropriately 
imposed the onerous requirement of a causal connection between the termination and 
addiction. The Tribunal asserted that, “While any adverse effect of an employer’s 
treatment towards an employee, whether intended or not, is part of the discrimination 
analysis, the adverse effect must be causally linked, in some fashion, to the disability. In 
this case the adverse effect was due to the failure of Mr. Stewart to stop using drugs and 
failing to disclose his use prior to the accident.”54 In finding no such causal connection, 
the Tribunal ultimately determined that there was no connection between Stewart’s 
addiction and his termination. The Tribunal’s decision disregarded the fact that Stewart’s 
cocaine addiction impacted his ability to abstain from drugs, in accordance with the 
workplace policy, thus, demonstrating the absence of a rudimentary understanding of the 
primary manifestations of addiction. 
Although the SCC rejected the notion that a claimant’s choices can undermine their 
human rights claim, the issue of choice continued to influence lower court decisions 
involving addictions, as evidenced in this Tribunal decision.55 In Canada (Attorney 
General) v. PHS Community Services Society, the SCC refuted the relevance of choice in 
the context of addiction.56 Nevertheless, the Tribunal heavily relied on Dr. Beckson’s 
evidence indicating that, although Stewart suffered from a cocaine addiction, he was “not 
‘disabled’ from making choices with respect to his compliance with the Policy”57 and 
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concluded that denial did not impair Stewart’s ability to comply with the drug policy.58 
The Tribunal also accepted Elk Valley’s evidence that Stewart would have been 
terminated, regardless of whether he had an addiction or was a casual drug user.59 The 
Tribunal incorrectly endorsed a formal notion of equality, as opposed to substantive 
equality, and failed to acknowledge the clear presence of indirect discrimination in this 
case. Relying on irrelevant factors, external to the legal test for prima facie 
discrimination, the Tribunal determined that the termination and Policy were “directed at 
accountability for an individual who had the capacity to make choices” and did not 
perpetuate stereotypes or disadvantages suffered by individuals with addiction.60 
Further, the Tribunal determined that, even if the termination did constitute prima facie 
discrimination, it was a bona fide occupational requirement due to the safety-sensitive 
work environment and Elk Valley accommodated Stewart to the point of undue hardship, 
particularly through the pre-incident assistance plan, the opportunity for future 
reemployment and offering to assist with rehabilitation costs.61 However, the pre-incident 
assistance plan was effectively inaccessible to Stewart since he did not realize he had a 
problem to disclose before the accident occurred and the two other measures do not 
constitute accommodation. The fundamental purpose of workplace accommodation is to 
enable an individual’s continued employment with the employer; offering to pay for 
Stewart’s rehabilitation program and suggesting he can later re-apply for employment, 
after termination, does nothing to further the goal of maintaining his current employment. 
The Tribunal acknowledged the employer’s duty to inquire about medical information 
but concluded that Stewart had the capacity to fulfill his duty to request 
accommodation.62 Although Elk Valley did not provide direct objective evidence with 
respect to undue hardship, the Tribunal held that, if Elk Valley had to provide an 
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individual assessment—required both under human rights law and the company’s own 
policy—or impose a lesser punishment, the deterrent effect of the Policy would be 
significantly reduced and constitute an undue hardship to the company, given its safety 
responsibilities.63 The Tribunal dismissed the complaint and the Union appealed the 
decision to the ABQB. 
5.2.3 Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta 
On behalf of Ian Stewart, Brent Bish objected to the Tribunal’s decision on the basis that 
it: (1) applied the incorrect legal test to Stewart’s addiction disability; (2) failed to find a 
causal connection between Stewart’s disability and termination; (3) incorrectly inferred 
that the absence of Elk Valley’s intention to discriminate was relevant; (4) 
inappropriately considered safety risks at the prima facie discrimination stage; (5) failed 
to recognize the clear adverse effect discrimination; and (6) misapplied the third step of 
the Meiorin test64 in assessing the duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship.65 
Bish argued that the appropriate standard of review was correctness, while Elk Valley 
and the Alberta Human Rights Commission argued for the reasonableness standard.66  
5.2.3.1 Decision 
Justice Michalyshyn of the ABQB heard the appeal. Relying on a series of Alberta 
decisions endorsing the application of the correctness standard of review to human rights 
panels’ decisions on questions of law, he applied the correctness standard to the issue of 
prima facie discrimination.67 The jurisprudence supported the notion that “the nature of 
human rights issues are questions of law of general importance to the legal system,” thus 
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attracting the correctness standard.68 Justice Michalyshyn concluded that the issue of 
whether any existing discrimination was reasonable and justified in the circumstances 
was a question of mixed law and fact, subject to the reasonableness standard.69 
Justice Michalyshyn held that Stewart’s termination did not constitute prima facie 
discrimination and concluded that the Tribunal correctly rejected the notion that “any 
connection” between the disability and adverse treatment was sufficient to find prima 
facie discrimination.70 He concluded that, taken together, McGill University Health 
Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employes de l’Hopital General de 
Montreal,71 Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays,72 British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v. 
British Columbia Government and Service Employees Union73 and Wright v. College and 
Association of Registered Nurses of Alberta (Appeals Committee)74 confirmed that the 
test for prima facie discrimination included some consideration of whether stereotypical 
or arbitrary assumptions underlie the adverse treatment.75 Justice Michalyshyn asserted 
that, “Stewart was treated not as a drug addict but as a drug user” and, thus, the decision 
to terminate him was not based on arbitrary or stereotypical preconceived notions.76 He 
accepted the Tribunal’s conclusion that Stewart was in control of his drug use and Elk 
Valley terminated his employment because he failed to stop using drugs and disclose his 
drug use, and not because of his addiction.77 The ABQB decision concluded that there 
was no causal connection between Stewart’s disability and termination and found no 
prima facie discrimination. 
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Despite finding no prima facie discrimination, Justice Michalyshyn went on to examine 
the issue of accommodation. Bish argued that the Tribunal misapplied the third part of 
the Meiorin test and failed to demonstrate that the standard was reasonably necessary to 
accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose—namely, ensuring safety. Stewart did 
not recognize that he had an addiction disability at the time of the accident and the Policy 
only offered protection and confidential, individualized assistance to individuals with a 
dependency or addiction, not casual drug users or drug users who later realized they had 
an addiction after a workplace incident; thus, Elk Valley’s offer of no-risk self-reporting 
was inadequate in this case.78 The Tribunal erred in finding that termination was 
appropriate on the basis that Stewart could have reasonably complied with the Policy by 
seeking assistance before the accident, because he did not actually know he had an 
addiction at the time.79 Accordingly, the ABQB held that the Tribunal erred in finding 
that Elk Valley accommodated Stewart to the point of undue hardship. 
5.2.4 Court of Appeal of Alberta 
Bish, on behalf of Stewart, challenged the ABQB’s decision to dismiss the appeal on the 
ground that the Tribunal failed to apply the proper legal test for prima facie 
discrimination. Elk Valley, on the other hand, disputed the court’s decision on 
accommodation and contended that its Policy and practice established bona fide 
occupational requirements. The Alberta Human Rights Commission intervened to argue 
that it should receive deference on all legal issues under its authorizing statute.  
5.2.4.1 Majority Decision 
The ABCA examined whether Stewart’s termination amounted to discrimination on the 
basis of his addiction, whether the Tribunal applied the proper legal test for prima facie 
discrimination and whether Elk Valley accommodated Stewart to the point of undue 
hardship. The ABCA applied the standard of correctness to the legal interpretation of the 
Moore and Meiorin tests, as “these definitions are questions of law of fundamental 
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significance to the Canadian legal system,”80 and applied the reasonableness standard to 
fact findings and findings of mixed fact and law.81 The ABCA majority, comprised of 
Justices Picard and Watson, concluded that Stewart’s termination did not amount to 
discrimination and dismissed the appeal.82 The majority held that the Tribunal applied the 
proper test for prima facie discrimination, finding the legal analysis to be consistent with 
Moore and did not import a new requirement that the discrimination must be based on 
arbitrariness or the perpetuation of historical stereotypes.83  
The ABCA majority asserted that the Moore test requires the disability to be “a real 
factor in the adverse impact and not just part of the necessary background.”84 
Accordingly, the ABCA concluded that the Tribunal’s decision did not violate the Moore 
test because “the disability did not constitute a real factor in the adverse impact” and the 
Policy did not distinguish between people with a disability and people without a 
disability, it simply distinguished between people who complied with the Policy and 
those who did not.85 The ABCA put forward two possible interpretations of the 
Tribunal’s decision: firstly, the Tribunal considered arbitrariness and stereotypes as an 
alternative to its primary conclusion that Stewart’s disability was unrelated to the adverse 
impact—since his disability would have been addressed without discipline had he come 
forward prior to the incident and he was capable of complying with the Policy—or, 
secondly, the Tribunal effectively determined that the application of the Policy was not a 
pretext for discriminatory action against Stewart and there was no evidence of 
discrimination revealed by arbitrariness or stereotypical thinking.86 The ABCA did not 
find sufficient evidence indicating that arbitrariness or stereotypical thinking motivated 
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Elk Valley to terminate Stewart and concluded that the Tribunal did not err in 
determining that his disability was not a factor in the adverse impact.87 
The ABCA majority also found the Tribunal’s accommodation analysis to be consistent 
with the Meiorin test and concluded that the ABQB erred by finding the Tribunal’s 
decision to be unreasonable, as the Court’s inference regarding Stewart’s capacity to self-
report before the incident failed to show the required deference to the Tribunal’s factual 
findings.88 Emphasizing the objective of maintaining a safe work environment and 
deterring employees from neglecting to address or disclose their addiction, the ABCA 
held that Elk Valley’s Policy and practices addressed bona fide occupational 
requirements and constituted reasonable accommodation for employees with addiction.89  
5.2.4.2 Dissenting Decision 
In dissent, Justice O’Ferrall determined that the Tribunal and ABQB erred in finding that 
Stewart’s addiction was not connected to his dismissal and that he had not established a 
prima facie case of discrimination. Justice O’Ferrall asserted that the protected ground 
must simply be a part of the causal chain leading to the adverse impact in order to 
constitute a factor under the Moore test.90 The Moore test did not require evidence of 
arbitrariness or stereotypical behaviour to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
and placing such an obligation on the complainant, before the onus shifted to the 
respondent, would prevent most cases of unintentional discrimination from proceeding.91 
Justice O’Ferrall concluded that a complainant is simply required to demonstrate a 
connection between the protected characteristic and adverse effect.92 In response to the 
employer’s argument for the stricter approach applied in Wright and Gooding, Justice 
O’Ferrall distinguished the two cases on the basis that they were decided before Moore 
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and involved the culpable behavior of theft; he problematically suggested that, in such 
situations, there may be a greater onus to demonstrate how the protected characteristic is 
connected to the adverse effect.93  
Justice O’Ferrall determined that both the Tribunal and ABQB applied the wrong legal 
test for prima facie discrimination, stating: “The complainant’s addiction was not just a 
factor leading to his dismissal, it was the entire reason for it… the discrimination was 
‘because of’ the complainant’s conceded physical or mental disability.”94 Elk Valley 
terminated Stewart because it wanted to deter other employees from failing to disclose 
their addiction prior to a workplace incident and the Tribunal fundamentally erred by 
failing to consider the motive of deterrence in determining whether Stewart’s addiction 
was a factor in his termination.95  
Justice O’Ferrall also held that Elk Valley failed to accommodate Stewart to the point of 
undue hardship. He agreed with the ABQB that the Tribunal erred by finding that Elk 
Valley’s voluntary referral program sufficiently accommodated Stewart; the Policy did 
not accommodate employees, like Stewart, who were unaware of their addiction and 
unable to disclose before an incident.96 He asserted that the Tribunal erred by concluding 
that no other penalty besides termination could both accommodate Stewart’s disability 
and satisfy Elk Valley’s goal of deterrence, given the available alternatives, such as 
suspension without pay.97 The Tribunal also erred in finding that the need for deterrence 
superseded the requirement of conducting an individual assessment, prescribed by both 
Meiorin as a procedural duty as well as the company’s own policy.98 
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5.3 Supreme Court of Canada Decision 
Bish, on behalf of Stewart, appealed the ABCA decision to the SCC and raised three 
issues on appeal. First, Bish asserted that the correctness standard of review should be 
applied, as the legal tests for prima facie discrimination and the duty to accommodate 
“must be based on the same elements and the same degree of proof in every case, applied 
in an objectively principled way.”99 The respondents—Elk Valley, Cardinal River 
Operations and the Alberta Human Rights Commission—contended that issues related to 
findings of mixed fact and law, including the application of the Moore and Meiorin tests, 
were within the Tribunal’s expertise and subject to the reasonableness standard.100 
Second, Bish argued that the Tribunal erred in concluding that prima facie discrimination 
had not been established in this case. Third, the Tribunal erred in finding Elk Valley met 
its burden of establishing undue hardship.101  
5.3.1 Majority Decision 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, Brown and Rowe 
formed the majority in Elk Valley, with the Chief Justice articulating the majority’s 
reasoning. The majority applied deference to the Tribunal’s decision and found its 
conclusion, that Stewart’s addiction was not a factor in his termination, to be reasonable. 
The SCC accordingly upheld the termination and dismissed the appeal. 
5.3.1.1 Standard of Review 
The majority briefly addressed the issue of standard of review and determined that the 
Tribunal’s decision attracted deference. Although questions of law typically attract the 
standard of correctness and the SCC ultimately holds the responsibility of “assur[ing] 
uniformity, consistency and correctness in the articulation, development and 
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interpretation of legal principles throughout the Canadian judicial system,”102 the 
majority applied the reasonableness standard to all issues raised in the appeal, including 
the Tribunal’s application of the Moore and Meiorin tests. Chief Justice McLachlin, on 
behalf of the majority, asserted: 
In sum, this case involves the application of settled principles on 
workplace disability discrimination to a particular fact situation. The 
nature of the particular disability at issue — in this case addiction — does 
not change the legal principles to be applied. The debates here are not 
about the law, but about the facts and the inferences to be drawn from the 
facts. These issues were within the purview of the Tribunal, and attract 
deference. The only question is whether the Tribunal’s decision was 
reasonable.103  
However, the apparent differences in the interpretation of the prima facie discrimination 
test by the Tribunal and lower courts, including the issue of whether the individual must 
establish arbitrariness or stereotyping, suggested that the legal principles regarding 
workplace disability discrimination were not, in fact, settled.104 The conflicting 
application of the prima facie discrimination test by the SCC majority and dissenting 
justices also called into question whether the law was settled.105 Accordingly, the 
decision to apply deference to the interpretation of such fundamental legal principles was 
arguably inappropriate. 
5.3.1.2 Was the Tribunal’s Decision Unreasonable? 
In Elk Valley, the SCC majority reaffirmed the prima facie discrimination test originally 
established in Moore, and later affirmed in Quebec (Commission des droits de la 
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personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace 
Training Center):106  
To make a case of prima facie discrimination, “complainants are required 
to show that they have a characteristic protected from discrimination under 
the Code; that they experienced adverse impact with respect to the service; 
and that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact”: 
Moore, at para. 33. Discrimination can take many forms, including 
“‘indirect’ discrimination”, where otherwise neutral policies may have an 
adverse effect on certain groups: Quebec (Commission des droits de la 
personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier 
Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 789, at para. 
32. Discriminatory intent on behalf of an employer is not required to 
demonstrate prima facie discrimination: Bombardier, at para. 40.107  
The majority concluded that, “[t]he Tribunal cited the proper legal test and noted, at para. 
117, that it was ‘not necessary that discriminatory considerations be the sole reason for 
the impugned actions in order for there to be a contravention of the Act.’”108 However, 
although the Tribunal initially cited the correct prima facie discrimination test, it later 
deviated from this test, asserting that, “the adverse effect must be causally linked, in 
some fashion, to the disability.”109 The Tribunal ultimately imposed the requirement of a 
causal connection between Stewart’s addiction and his termination, contrary to the well-
established prima facie discrimination test. 
As the first two elements of the prima facie discrimination test were not contested by the 
parties, the SCC went on to examine the Tribunal’s finding that Stewart’s addiction was 
not a factor in his termination: “In the Tribunal’s view, Mr. Stewart was fired not because 
he was addicted, but because he had failed to comply with the terms of the Policy, and for 
no other reason. The Tribunal also concluded that Mr. Stewart was not adversely 
impacted by the Policy because he had the capacity to comply with its terms.”110 The 
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majority stated that the only question before the Court was whether the Tribunal’s 
conclusion was reasonable—essentially whether “the decision is within a ‘range of 
possible, acceptable outcomes’ which are defensible in respect of the evidence and the 
law”111—and ultimately found the decision that Stewart’s addiction was not a factor in 
his termination to be reasonable. However, the majority failed to recognize that the 
Tribunal applied the incorrect prima facie discrimination test and required more than a 
connection between the disability and termination. Imposing the requirement of a causal 
connection, the Tribunal found that Stewart’s addiction had not reached this threshold 
and erroneously concluded that it was not a factor at all. It is difficult to conceive how the 
adoption of incorrect legal principles amounted to the reasonable application of the prima 
facie discrimination test and a reasonable legal decision, as the majority found. 
In coming to its conclusion, the majority reviewed the evidence and summarized the 
Tribunal’s findings, as follows: 
The Tribunal found, based on the evidence before him, that Mr. Stewart 
was terminated “due to the failure of Mr. Stewart to stop using drugs and 
failing to disclose his use prior to the accident” (para. 120). It accepted 
that people with addictions may experience denial and that the distinction 
between termination due to disability and termination due to the failure to 
follow a policy may appear “superficial” given that the failure to follow a 
policy may be a symptom of an addiction or disability (para. 122). 
However, in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal found that the 
evidence established that the Policy adversely impacted Mr. Stewart not 
because of denial “but rather because he chose not to stop his drug use or 
disclose his drug use” (para. 122). 
… 
The Tribunal went on to consider whether the Policy itself adversely 
impacted Mr. Stewart because of his addiction. In that context, the 
Tribunal noted that “Mr. Stewart would have been fired whether or not he 
was an addict or a casual user” (para. 123) and that “[t]he Policy as 
applied to Mr. Stewart which resulted in Mr. Stewart’s termination was 
not applied due to his disability” (para. 125). The Tribunal concluded that 
Mr. Stewart had “the capacity to make choices” about his drug use (para. 
126). In the Tribunal’s view, the expert evidence in this case demonstrated 
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that Mr. Stewart’s addiction did not diminish his capacity to comply with 
the terms of the Policy. Accordingly, the Policy did not adversely impact 
Mr. Stewart [emphasis added].112  
The majority determined that there was sufficient evidence capable of supporting the 
Tribunal’s conclusion that Stewart was not terminated for his addiction, but rather the 
breach of the Policy, and accepted the Tribunal’s finding that he had the capacity to 
comply. Accordingly, the majority held it was reasonable for the Tribunal to find no 
prima facie discrimination.113  
The language used by the Tribunal, and cited by the SCC majority above, is revealing. 
The terms “due to” and “because of” indicate the Tribunal sought a causal relationship, 
not just a connection, between Stewart’s drug addiction and the termination of his 
employment. This inappropriately stringent application of the third step of the prima facie 
discrimination test is inconsistent with the Moore test, as clarified in Bombardier.114 
Furthermore, the majority accepted the Tribunal’s conclusion that the Policy only 
adversely impacted Stewart because he “chose” not to stop using drugs or disclose his use 
to the employer and that the Policy was not discriminatory because it applied to both 
casual drug users and individuals with addictions. The imposition of a causal connection 
requirement, relying on reasoning based on “choice” to defeat a discrimination claim, 
placing emphasis on the employer’s intent rather than the resulting discriminatory effect 
and the acceptance of a formal equality approach to discrimination are problematic and 
inconsistent with human rights law jurisprudence.115 It is unclear how this constituted a 
reasonable application of the prima facie discrimination test, as the majority 
concluded.116 To find a connection between the addiction and termination under the 
Moore test, Stewart’s addiction must have merely impacted his ability to stop using drugs 
and comply with the Policy in some way. The Tribunal disregarded the indirect 
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discrimination resulting from the application of the Policy and the majority failed to 
acknowledge this error. 
The majority rejected the Union’s claim that the Tribunal’s conclusion could be 
interpreted to mean that, although the breach of the Policy was the primary cause of the 
termination, Stewart’s addiction was still a factor in the termination, because the Tribunal 
“unequivocally and repeatedly stated that addiction was not a factor.”117 Certainly, the 
Tribunal came to this conclusion; however, that in itself does not make it true or even 
reasonable. The majority also dismissed the argument that Stewart’s denial prevented him 
from disclosing his addiction prior to the accident, in compliance with the Policy. The 
majority accepted the Tribunal’s determination that, although Stewart may have been in 
denial, “he knew he should not take drugs before working, and he had the ability to 
decide not to take them as well as the capacity to disclose his drug use to his employer” 
and held that denial was irrelevant in this case.118  
Chief Justice McLachlin stated that, “It cannot be assumed that Mr. Stewart’s addiction 
diminished his ability to comply with the terms of the Policy,”119 and went on to assert 
that the ability of an individual to control their addictive behaviours should be 
conceptualized and assessed on a spectrum: 
In some cases, a person with an addiction may be fully capable of 
complying with workplace rules. In others, the addiction may effectively 
deprive a person of the capacity to comply, and the breach of the rule will 
be inextricably connected with the addiction. Many cases may exist 
somewhere between these two extremes. Whether a protected 
characteristic is a factor in the adverse impact will depend on the facts 
and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The connection between an 
addiction and adverse treatment cannot be assumed and must be based on 
evidence: Health Employers Assn. of British Columbia v. B.C.N.U., 2006 
BCCA 57, 54 B.C.L.R. (4th) 113, at para. 41 [emphasis added].120  
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Although it is important to acknowledge that addictions range in severity, it cannot be 
forgotten that the very fact of being diagnosed with a drug or alcohol addiction means the 
individual is experiencing severe symptoms and difficulties controlling their substance 
use. It is difficult to imagine how a drug addiction would have absolutely no impact on an 
individual’s ability to comply with a workplace drug policy. Furthermore, Stewart’s state 
of denial, the presence of which was not refuted by the employer’s medical expert, 
impeded his ability to comply with the disclosure component of the Policy. Nevertheless, 
the Tribunal, applying more of an all-or-nothing approach, found Stewart completely 
capable of complying with the Policy, resulting in the unreasonable decision that his 
addiction disability was not a factor in his termination.  
The SCC majority found “ample evidence” to support the Tribunal’s conclusion that 
there was no prima facie discrimination and found no basis to overturn its decision.121 In 
accepting the Tribunal’s findings, the majority failed to acknowledge that Stewart’s 
addiction played any role in his termination, even though the addiction clearly impaired 
his ability to comply with the drug policy—an issue raised in Justice Gascon’s dissent.122 
In light of its determination on prima facie discrimination, the majority did not proceed to 
examine the issue of accommodation. 
The majority confirmed that stereotypical or arbitrary decision-making was not a stand-
alone requirement for demonstrating prima facie discrimination and should not be added 
as a fourth requirement.123 Chief Justice McLachlin affirmed the test for prima facie 
discrimination, stating: 
I see no need to alter the settled view that the protected ground or 
characteristic need only be “a factor” in the decision. It was suggested in 
argument that adjectives should be added: the ground should be a 
“significant” factor, or a “material” factor. Little is gained by adding 
adjectives to the requirement that the impugned ground be “a factor” in the 
adverse treatment. In each case, the Tribunal must decide on the factor or 
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factors that played a role in the adverse treatment. This is a matter of fact. 
If a protected ground contributed to the adverse treatment, then it must be 
material.124  
This approach is consistent with the Moore test and Bombardier, where the SCC 
confirmed that the prohibited ground must have simply contributed to the discriminatory 
conduct,125 aside from the suggestion that there must be a connection between the 
disability and the employer’s decision to terminate, rather than the termination itself. In 
light of the previous accurate restatement of the Moore test126 and the declaration that 
there was “no need to alter the settled view,” this was likely an oversight on the part of 
the majority. However, read literally, it drastically changes the nature of the prima facie 
discrimination test to require direct discrimination. 
The SCC jurisprudence has established that an individual must simply establish a 
connection, not a causal connection, between the prohibited ground of discrimination and 
the adverse treatment;127 requiring a causal connection would impose an inappropriately 
onerous obligation.128 Nevertheless, the decisions of the Tribunal, ABQB and ABCA 
majority in this case were inconsistent with this approach, as they appeared to suggest the 
requirement of a causal connection. Despite seemingly affirming the prima facie 
discrimination test established in Moore and clarified in Bombardier, the SCC majority 
neglected to acknowledge that the Tribunal did not actually apply this test. The Tribunal 
sought a causal connection between Stewart’s drug addiction and his termination, which 
is an inappropriately stringent application of the third step of the prima facie 
discrimination test. Consequently, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that Stewart’s 
addiction had no impact on his ability to comply with the employer’s drug policy, which, 
quite frankly, is contrary to the very nature of addiction. The apparent difficulty of the 
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SCC majority in recognizing the Tribunal’s unreasonable application of the prima facie 
discrimination test casts serious doubt on whether the test was actually settled law.129 
The majority’s extreme, and arguably unwarranted, deference to the Tribunal suggests 
there may have been underlying policy reasons for favoring such a strict approach to 
discrimination claims on the basis of addiction.130 Perhaps, the safety-sensitive nature of 
the energy industry implicitly impacted the outcome.131 In justifying the Tribunal’s 
decision, Chief Justice McLachlin appeared to espouse floodgates reasoning, stating: 
If an employee fails to comply with a workplace policy for a reason 
related to addiction, the employer would be unable to sanction him in any 
way, without potentially violating human rights legislation. Again, to take 
an example given by the majority of the Court of Appeal, if a nicotine-
addicted employee violates a workplace policy forbidding smoking in the 
workplace, no sanction would be possible without discrimination 
regardless of whether or not that employee had the capacity to comply 
with the policy [emphasis added].132  
This comment revealed the majority’s concern with opening the floodgates for addiction 
discrimination claims and problematically conflated the prima facie discrimination and 
accommodation analyses. The question of whether disciplinary action is appropriate in 
the particular circumstances must be assessed at the bona fide occupational requirement 
stage of the accommodation analysis, not by importing these considerations into the 
prima facie discrimination test.133 This would place a significantly greater burden on the 
employee and serve as a barrier to establishing a claim of prima facie discrimination.134 
Employers may have legitimate concerns and reasons for imposing discipline to deter 
 
129
 Koshan, “Majoritarian Blind Spot,” supra note 104. 
130
 Olivia Dixon, Colin Feasby & Jung Lee, “Recent Judicial Decisions Of Interest To Energy Lawyers” 
(2018) 56:2 Alta L Rev 479 at 495. 
131
 Ibid. 
132
 Supra note 5 at para 42. 
133
 Koshan, “Majoritarian Blind Spot,” supra note 104 at 6. 
134
 Koshan, “New Developments,” supra note 55 at 7. 
 
 
157 
substance use that could affect job performance or pose a safety risk.135 However, it is 
important to remember that these concerns are to be considered and assessed after prima 
facie discrimination has been established; they are not meant to defeat a claim of prima 
facie discrimination, as it arguably did in Elk Valley.  
5.3.2 The Partial Dissent: Justices Moldaver and Wagner 
Justices Moldaver and Wagner dissented from the majority in part. The justices held that 
prima facie discrimination had been established and found the Tribunal’s conclusion that 
Stewart’s cocaine addiction was not a factor in his termination to be unreasonable. 
However, Justices Moldaver and Wagner concluded that the Tribunal reasonably held 
that the employer fulfilled its obligation to accommodate Stewart to the point of undue 
hardship and, thus, did not discriminate against him on the basis of his addiction. 
Applying the Moore test, Justices Moldaver and Wagner found a connection between 
Stewart’s addiction and his termination: 
We accept the Tribunal’s finding that Mr. Stewart was not wholly 
incapacitated by his addiction and maintained some residual control over 
his drug use. But we fail to see how the Tribunal could reasonably 
conclude that because Mr. Stewart had a limited ability to make choices 
about his drug use, there was no connection between his dependency on 
cocaine and his termination on the basis of testing positive for cocaine 
after being involved in a workplace accident. 
To prove prima facie discrimination, Mr. Stewart is not required to show 
that his termination was caused solely or even primarily by his drug 
dependency. Rather, Mr. Stewart must only show that there is a 
“connection” between the protected ground — his drug dependency — 
and the adverse effect: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et 
des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace 
Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 789, at para. 52. We 
agree with Gascon J. that Mr. Stewart’s exercise of some control over his 
drug use merely reduced the extent to which his dependency contributed to 
his termination — it did not eliminate it as a “factor” in his termination 
(para. 120). Mr. Stewart’s impaired control over his cocaine use was 
obviously connected to his termination for testing positive for cocaine 
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after being involved in a workplace accident. In our view, the Tribunal 
unreasonably focused on Mr. Stewart’s limited capacity to control his 
choices and behaviour regarding his use of drugs and failed to consider the 
connection between his drug dependency and his employer’s decision to 
fire him.136  
Unlike the majority, Justices Moldaver and Wagner appreciated the impact Stewart’s 
addiction had on his drug use and capacity to abstain from drugs, in compliance with the 
workplace policy. Accordingly, the justices concluded that Stewart’s impaired control 
over his cocaine use was “obviously connected” to his termination.137  
Justices Moldaver and Wagner assessed Elk Valley’s accommodation duty and found it 
was reasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that Stewart’s termination was reasonably 
necessary to ensure that the deterrent effect of the Policy was not significantly 
reduced.138 Given the safety-sensitive nature of the workplace and Elk Valley’s safety 
obligations, it was important for the employer to deter other employees from using drugs 
in a manner that could impair their work performance or pose a safety risk. Justices 
Moldaver and Wagner asserted that subjecting Stewart to an individual assessment or 
imposing a temporary unpaid suspension, rather than termination, would have 
undermined the deterrent effect of the drug policy and its valid objective of preventing 
serious harm in the safety-sensitive workplace.139 Thus, it was reasonable for the 
Tribunal to conclude that incorporating aspects of individual accommodation within the 
workplace standard would constitute undue hardship.140  
Justices Moldaver and Wagner found that Elk Valley provided reasonable 
accommodation—namely, the opportunity to apply for re-employment after six months, 
upon the completion of a rehabilitation program, and the offer to pay for 50% of the cost 
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of the program, subject to certain conditions.141 However, as mentioned above, neither of 
these proposals actually constituted workplace accommodation, as they did not sustain 
Stewart’s continued employment with Elk Valley. Nevertheless, Justices Moldaver and 
Wagner concluded that it was reasonable for the Tribunal to find that Elk Valley fulfilled 
its duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship and did not discriminate against 
Stewart on the basis of his drug addiction. 
5.3.3 The Dissent: Justice Gascon 
Justice Gascon’s reasoning is most in line with the law on discrimination and reasonable 
accommodation, human rights principles and a broad, generous approach to interpreting 
human rights legislation. Departing from the majority decision and partial dissent, he 
found the Tribunal’s decision, with respect to both prima facie discrimination and the 
duty to accommodate, to be unreasonable.  
Notably, Justice Gascon proceeded by identifying the obstacles and challenges arising in 
addiction disability cases, stating: 
Still, stigmas surrounding drug dependence — like the belief that 
individuals suffering from it are the authors of their own misfortune or that 
their concerns are less credible than those of people suffering from other 
forms of disability — sometimes impair the ability of courts and society to 
objectively assess the merits of their discrimination claims. These stigmas 
contribute to the “uneasy fit of drug addiction and drug testing policies in 
the human rights arena” noted by the Alberta Human Rights Commission 
(the “Tribunal”) below (Tribunal reasons, 2012 AHRC 7, at para. 153 
(CanLII)).  
Yet, as drug-dependent persons represent one of the marginalized 
communities that could easily be caught in a majoritarian blind spot in the 
discrimination discourse, they of course require equal protection from the 
harmful effects of discrimination. In my view, improper considerations 
relied on by the Tribunal here — such as drug-dependent persons having 
some control over their choices and being treated “equally” to non-drug-
dependent persons under drug policies, and drug policies not necessarily 
 
141
 Ibid at para 56. 
 
 
160 
being arbitrary or stereotypical — effectively excluded Mr. Stewart, a 
drug-dependent person, from the scope of human rights protections.142  
Justice Gascon vehemently disagreed with the majority’s decision, stating that a 
workplace policy that, in application, automatically terminates an employee who uses 
drugs prima facie discriminates against individuals with addictions.143 Stewart’s 
addiction was very much a factor in his drug use, which was ultimately the basis for his 
termination. Furthermore, he concluded that Elk Valley failed to discharge its duty to 
accommodate Stewart to the point of undue hardship.144 Although the safety-sensitive 
nature of a workplace may prompt the implementation of strict drug policies, “such 
policies, even if well-intentioned, are not immune from human rights scrutiny.”145  
Justice Gascon agreed with the majority that, given the Court recently settled the tests for 
discrimination and the duty to accommodate, the Tribunal’s decision, “which at least 
noted these settled legal principles and merely purported to apply them to the facts at 
issue,” should be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness.146 Although the majority 
identified the correct prima facie discrimination test, it failed to recognize how the 
Tribunal applied the test unreasonably. Justice Gascon asserted that the majority decision 
deviated from the established approach by (1) failing to detect the Tribunal’s 
misunderstanding of the factor test for contribution, under the third step of the analysis; 
(2) implicitly affirming the erroneous legal principles the Tribunal relied upon in its 
reasoning; and (3) improperly importing justification considerations, belonging in the 
accommodation analysis, into the prima facie discrimination test.147  
 
142
 Ibid at paras 58-59. 
143
 Ibid at para 60. 
144
 Ibid at para 61. 
145
 Ibid at para 62. 
146
 Ibid at para 77. 
147
 Ibid at para 86. 
 
 
161 
The majority failed to recognize that the Tribunal’s reasoning was premised on incorrect 
legal principles. Justice Gascon contended that the Tribunal’s decision was not actually 
concerned with whether Stewart’s drug addiction contributed to his termination:  
Rather, the Tribunal was concerned with whether Mr. Stewart’s addiction 
was (1) an irrepressible factor in his termination, i.e. a factor which was 
completely beyond his control (an improper approach, as I explain below, 
and as the Chief Justice recognizes at para. 46); and (2) a factor in Elk 
Valley’s decision to terminate Mr. Stewart (i.e. the intent requirement 
rejected by this Court’s jurisprudence, as I explained above, and about 
which the Chief Justice also agrees at para. 24). In light of these errors, 
while the Tribunal may have repeatedly found that Mr. Stewart’s addiction 
was not a factor in his harm, that conclusion was based on 
misapprehensions of principle and is therefore undeserving of 
deference.148  
The Tribunal narrowed the prima facie discrimination analysis by essentially requiring 
direct discrimination and the addiction to be more than a factor in the adverse impact. 
The majority found the Tribunal’s conclusion to be reasonable on the basis that Stewart’s 
addiction purportedly did not diminish his capacity to comply with the employer’s policy. 
However, the Tribunal did not conclude that Stewart’s addiction did not impair his ability 
to comply with the policy, but rather that it did not eliminate his capacity to comply: 
… the Tribunal’s various choice-related findings — i.e. that Mr. Stewart 
“was able to make choices” about drug use (para. 121); “could, and in fact 
did make rational choices” about drug use (para. 122); and “had the 
capacity to make choices” about drug use (para. 126) — only mean that 
Mr. Stewart maintained some residual control over his choice to use 
drugs, not that he maintained complete unimpaired control over that 
choice. In my view, that is the only possible interpretation of these 
findings when the Tribunal found that Mr. Stewart was addicted to cocaine 
(para. 118) and interpreted “addiction” as meaning “impaired control” 
over drug use (para. 109). As a result, admitting that Mr. Stewart had 
impaired control regarding drug use is irreconcilable with that control 
being in no way diminished by his addiction [emphasis added].149  
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Addiction, by its very nature, entails a diminished ability to resist using the addictive 
substance. A person diagnosed with a drug addiction would experience, to some degree, a 
diminished capacity to control their choices and behaviours regarding drug use,150 thus 
establishing the necessary connection between the disability and discipline for violating 
the employer’s drug policy. 
By approvingly summarizing how the Tribunal limited its’ reasoning to discriminatory 
intent rather than effect, despite recognizing that intent is not required to establish prima 
facie discrimination, and relied on notions of choice and formal equality, the majority 
decision implicitly affirmed these erroneous legal principles.151 The majority also 
appeared to endorse a narrow interpretation of prima facie discrimination “to preserve the 
enforceability of drug and alcohol policies,”152 inappropriately importing justificatory 
considerations, such as the importance of the workplace policy, into the prima facie 
discrimination analysis and espousing a narrow understanding of the factor test.153   
Justice Gascon identified four conceptual errors in the Tribunal’s prima facie 
discrimination analysis: (1) requiring Stewart to make prudent choices to avoid 
discrimination; (2) limiting Stewart’s human rights protections to a sense of formal 
equality; (3) requiring Stewart to prove the employer treated him arbitrarily or 
stereotypically; and (4) requiring Stewart to establish a causal relationship between his 
addiction and termination.154 Importing considerations of choice into the prima facie 
discrimination test fundamentally alters the nature of the analysis, effectively requiring 
the protected ground to be a direct factor in the adverse impact, as opposed to just a 
factor.155 It problematically places the burden on employees to avoid discrimination, 
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rather than on employers to not discriminate,156 and places blame on marginalized 
communities for their choices, reinforcing stigma and stereotypes.157 Justice Gascon 
rejected the Tribunal’s conclusion that, because Stewart had the capacity to make some 
choices with respect to his drug use, his termination resulted from his choice to use drugs, 
and not his addiction. This reasoning “has the effect of denying human rights protections 
to a vast majority of drug-dependent people who, despite their addiction, most likely 
maintain some modicum of control over things as basic as ‘when and where’ they use 
drugs.”158 Furthermore, relying on principles of formal equality, the Tribunal disregarded 
the presence of indirect discrimination. The Tribunal asserted that the Policy’s equal 
treatment of individuals with and without addictions prevented it from being 
discriminatory; however, such “equal” treatment only relates to direct discrimination and 
does not exhaust the prima facie discrimination analysis.159 The Tribunal also improperly 
imported considerations of arbitrariness and stereotyping into the prima facie 
discrimination analysis.  
The Tribunal misinterpreted and misapplied the factor analysis by requiring a causal 
connection and assessing discriminatory intent, rather than effect. Justice Gascon 
interpreted the Tribunal’s assertion that Stewart’s addiction was not a factor in his 
termination to mean that the addiction was not a factor in Elk Valley’s decision to 
terminate his employment—in other words, Elk Valley did not intentionally discriminate 
against Stewart, but this is the incorrect legal test.160 The Tribunal “relied on Gooding for 
the proposition that a ground is not a factor in harm unless it plays a role ‘in the 
employer’s decision’ to terminate an employee,” narrowing the scope of prima facie 
discrimination to direct and intentional discrimination.161  
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The evidence established that Stewart’s addiction was at least one factor in his 
termination. Justice Gascon recognized that, “Mr. Stewart had an impaired ability to 
comply with the Policy in two respects: (1) it prohibited drug use, which he uniquely and 
inordinately craved; and (2) it provided accommodation to drug-addicted persons, which 
he appears to have denied being — a symptom of his addiction.” 162 This established the 
necessary connection between his disability and termination: 
It is true that Mr. Stewart was not wholly incapacitated by his addiction 
and maintained some residual control over his choices (paras. 121-22). But 
that merely diminishes the extent to which his dependence contributed to 
his harm, it does not eliminate it as “a factor”. To require complete 
incapacitation for addiction to ground a discrimination claim would 
effectively erase addiction from the scope of legal disability. This is 
because addiction, by definition, refers to impaired, not eliminated, 
control. According to the Chief Justice, the Tribunal “rejected this 
argument” based “on the facts” of this case (paras. 38-39). But, in reality, 
the Tribunal did not reject this argument; rather, it avoided it by 
interpreting the “factor” test as relating to discriminatory intent, not 
adverse effect, and by improperly requiring absolute incapacity to ground 
a claim relating to discrimination based on addiction [emphasis added].163  
With respect to accommodation, Justice Gascon concluded that the Tribunal identified 
the correct test but disagreed with its finding that Elk Valley fulfilled its duty to 
accommodate. The employer failed to conduct an individualized assessment of Stewart as 
part of its accommodation efforts to determine reasonable alternative measures, contrary 
to its own Policy and human rights principles. In fact, the employer did not provide him 
with any accommodation:  
A policy that “accommodates” employees through mechanisms which are 
either inaccessible by the employee due to their disability or only 
applicable to the employee post-termination cannot justify prima facie 
discrimination. Before his termination, Mr. Stewart was purportedly 
accommodated by the offer of lenient treatment if he voluntarily disclosed 
his drug dependence. But that accommodation was inaccessible by him 
because he, as the Tribunal found, appeared to have been unaware of his 
dependence, a symptom of his disability. After his termination, Mr. 
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Stewart was allegedly accommodated by being given the prospect of 
reapplying for his position. But, again, accommodation assists employees 
in their sustained employment, not former employees who may, or may 
not, successfully reapply for the position they lost as a result of a prima 
facie discriminatory termination.164 
Elk Valley failed to consider Stewart’s circumstances—for example, the extent of his 
addiction, employment history and capacity for rehabilitation—before terminating his 
employment. The Tribunal justified this omission partly on the basis that Stewart 
disregarded his duty to request accommodation, given his “capacity” to do so.165 
However, Stewart’s ability to make some choices about his drug use did not eliminate 
Elk Valley’s accommodation duty: “Complainants’ choices, imprudent or otherwise, do 
not weaken their human rights, either in law or in policy. Such an approach reverses the 
burden and requires that complainants avoid discrimination.”166 Justice Gascon 
concluded that neither the pre-incident nor post-incident accommodations offered by Elk 
Valley qualified as reasonable accommodation, as they were not accessible to Stewart 
during his employment. He opined that the Tribunal should have considered the deterrent 
effect of alternative penalties, such as suspension without pay.167  
5.4 Conclusion 
The majority SCC decision in Elk Valley exhibited an unfortunate disregard of the well-
established fundamental human rights laws and principles that are at the very heart of 
Canadian human rights law. The most problematic and disappointing aspect of the 
majority’s decision is its silence on the various flaws and departures from fundamental 
human rights law demonstrated in the Tribunal’s analysis—specifically, requiring a 
causal relationship between the employee’s addiction and adverse impact; importing 
additional requirements into the analysis, such as requiring the employee to make prudent 
choices to avoid discrimination, demonstrate a complete lack of self-control and establish 
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arbitrary or stereotypical treatment and discriminatory intent; limiting human rights 
protections to formal equality; and accepting insufficient evidence of accommodation. By 
not acknowledging the various flaws in reasoning and deviations from established human 
rights law, the majority appeared to accept these erroneous legal principles. Despite 
explicitly affirming the prima facie discrimination test articulated in Moore, the majority 
failed to acknowledge the Tribunal’s various departures from this test. In finding the 
Tribunal’s decision to be reasonable, in spite of these flaws, the SCC left many 
unanswered questions with respect to the legal and evidentiary requirements for 
satisfying the prima facie discrimination test, particularly, the third element—establishing 
a connection between the protected human rights characteristic and adverse impact.  
Affirming the approach in Moore and Bombardier, Elk Valley seemingly settled the test 
for establishing prima facie discrimination; however, it is clear from the decision that 
differences in opinion still remained with respect to the legal and evidentiary 
requirements for satisfying the test, particularly the factor element, in cases of indirect 
discrimination.168 Although Elk Valley purportedly involved “the application of settled 
principles on workplace disability discrimination,”169 as asserted by the majority, the 
SCC justices did not apply a unanimous approach to prima facie discrimination and 
accommodation—demonstrating disagreement regarding these ostensibly settled, 
fundamental legal principles. Justice Gascon’s approach to discrimination and workplace 
accommodation adhered to foundational, established human rights law, while the 
majority and partial dissent endorsed divergent legal tests and principles. The SCC 
justices’ apparent difficulty in recognizing the Tribunal’s unreasonable application of the 
legal tests seriously calls into question whether the law has actually been settled in this 
regard.170  
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Despite correctly identifying the relevant legal tests and principles, the majority failed to 
acknowledge the Tribunal’s clear departure from the very human rights analyses it 
endorsed. The majority’s acceptance of the Tribunal decision, despite being riddled with 
various legal errors and flaws, is concerning and reflects uncertainty in addiction law: 
[W]hile the majority claims that the test for discrimination is settled, its 
deference to the application of that test by the Tribunal, along with its own 
language and reasoning, indicate that several trouble spots remain: the 
application of the factor/contribution step and whether a causal link is 
required in practice; the reliance on “choice” as a means of defeating a 
discrimination claim, a particular concern in cases involving addictions; 
the focus on the employer’s intent rather than effects and corresponding 
erasure of adverse effects discrimination; and the endorsement of a formal 
equality approach to discrimination.171  
Furthermore, the Tribunal decision also indicated that an employee must demonstrate 
arbitrary or stereotypical treatment in order to establish discrimination—a principle 
rejected by the SCC. Arising from the application of the incorrect legal test and reliance 
on medical evidence based on the moral model of addiction, the Tribunal came to the 
unreasonable conclusion that Stewart’s drug addiction was not a factor in his termination. 
Making the superficial distinction that the employer terminated Stewart for violating the 
drug policy, as opposed to the drug addiction that led to this behaviour, should not 
preclude a finding of prima facie discrimination and evade an individual’s human rights 
protections. The Moore test merely requires a connection between the addiction and 
termination. It is inconceivable how a drug addiction, which by its very nature impacts an 
individual’s ability to control and limit their drug use, to some degree, has absolutely no 
connection to their termination for breaching the employer’s drug policy. Clearly, 
Stewart’s addiction impaired his ability to fully comply with the drug policy, which 
ultimately led to his termination. Had the Tribunal reasonably applied the legal test it 
identified, it would have found prima facie discrimination in this case; its decision to the 
contrary was absolutely unreasonable.172  
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The conclusion that the Tribunal’s decision was reasonable demonstrates a lack of 
rudimentary understanding of addiction and its primary symptoms. The majority’s 
decision was internally inconsistent and failed to correspond with its findings regarding 
the existence and nature of Stewart’s addiction. Astutely articulated in his dissent, Justice 
Gascon asserted that: 
The Chief Justice accepts that “[t]he question, at base, is whether at least 
one of the reasons for the adverse treatment was the employee’s 
addiction” (para. 43). In my view, drug addiction was at least one, if not 
the central, factor in Mr. Stewart’s termination for drug use. The Tribunal 
found, and both parties’ experts opined, that addiction means “impaired 
control” over drug use (para. 109). The Tribunal also found that Mr. 
Stewart was drug-dependent with respect to cocaine (para. 118). Both 
experts agreed that Mr. Stewart was unaware of his drug dependence at 
the time of the incident (paras. 58, 61, 66 and 80). Accordingly, Mr. 
Stewart had an impaired ability to comply with the Policy in two respects: 
(1) it prohibited drug use, which he uniquely and inordinately craved; and 
(2) it provided accommodation to drug-addicted persons, which he appears 
to have denied being — a symptom of his addiction.173  
Given these findings, it is unclear how the majority came to the conclusion that it did, 
following the legal test it claimed to have applied. The majority clearly departed from the 
Moore test and fundamental human rights principles and, instead, applied a stricter, 
narrower standard that incorporated irrelevant and inappropriate considerations, contrary 
to the human rights framework and a biopsychosocial understanding of addiction. 
Legal decision makers must examine addiction cases through a human rights lens that 
views addiction as a disability garnering human rights protections and appreciates the 
realities of addiction disability. Compulsions and feeling a lack of control are common 
symptoms of drug and alcohol addiction disability. Naturally, addictions, and the 
intensity of addiction-related compulsions, vary in severity and individuals will vary in 
their capacity to resist these compulsions. Compulsion arising from addiction, regardless 
of its intensity, would not exist but for the addiction, and thus is a manifestation of the 
 
173
 Ibid at para 117. 
 
 
169 
disability.174 Accordingly, discipline for misconduct arising from the employee’s 
compulsive substance use constitutes a connection between the addiction and the adverse 
impact. In finding an insufficient connection between Stewart’s addiction and his 
termination for violating the employer’s drug policy, the Tribunal clearly applied a 
different standard from the one necessitated by the Moore test. Decisions in addiction 
disability cases, like Elk Valley, have diverged from the factor requirement of the prima 
facie discrimination analysis and placed the focus on the individual, examining the 
strength of their compulsions and ability to make choices. This approach problematically 
espouses a moralistic understanding of addiction and places the blame on individuals 
with addiction disability. It is important for legal decision makers to recognize that, “the 
concept of ‘compulsion’, and the varying ability of addicts to control compulsion, cannot 
be seen as equivalent to the concept of choice as it applies to non-addicts. Addicts are 
adversely affected by a disease, others are not.”175 The ability to make some choices 
about one’s drug use does not and should be used to eliminate an employer’s duty to 
accommodate: “Complainants’ choices, imprudent or otherwise, do not weaken their 
human rights, either in law or in policy. Such an approach reverses the burden and 
requires that complainants avoid discrimination.”176  
The importation of additional requirements beyond a simple connection between the 
addiction and termination—namely, a direct, causal connection and considerations of 
control and decision-making capacity—conflicts with the factor requirement under the 
Moore test for prima facie discrimination and inappropriately increases the evidentiary 
burden for employees with addiction disability, contrary to human rights law and 
principles. The prima facie discrimination analysis is not an assessment of the employer’s 
justification for termination. The sole purpose of the analysis is to determine whether the 
employee had a protected characteristic, they experienced an adverse impact and the 
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protected characteristic was, in some way, a factor in the adverse impact. These elements 
were present in Elk Valley. However, this would not have been the end of the analysis. A 
finding of prima facie discrimination does not in itself mean that the employee’s 
employment should be reinstated. These concerns are to be addressed in the next step, the 
duty to accommodate analysis, and not imported into the prima facie discrimination 
analysis. 
It is understandable that an employer in a safety-sensitive workplace would have 
legitimate concerns about reinstating an employee who had previously been impaired at 
work while in the thralls of their addiction. While employers have an obligation to 
maintain a safe work environment, this responsibility must be balanced with its duty to 
accommodate an employee with a disability to the point of undue hardship. In order to 
reach the threshold of undue hardship, the employer must provide objective evidence 
demonstrating the presence of an actual, serious safety risk. The employer in Elk Valley 
did not provide such evidence and failed to offer accommodation that was accessible to 
Stewart during his employment, yet the Tribunal found this to be sufficient. Post-
termination measures do not legally constitute accommodation and should not be treated 
as such. Unfortunately, the SCC majority opted not to comment on the Tribunal’s 
problematic accommodation analysis upon finding no prima facie discrimination.  
Elk Valley failed to consider Stewart’s individual circumstances, including the extent of 
his addiction, employment history and capacity for rehabilitation, before terminating his 
employment. The Tribunal justified this omission partly on the basis that Stewart 
disregarded his duty to request accommodation, given his “capacity” to do so.177 Elk 
Valley’s Policy provided pre-incident accommodation to employees with addictions; 
however, given that Stewart was unaware of his addiction at the time of the incident, as 
confirmed by the two medical experts, this pre-incident accommodation was inaccessible 
to him. Diminishing Elk Valley’s duty to accommodate on the basis that Stewart failed to 
request accommodation, which was symptomatic of his disability, was unreasonable: 
 
177
 Ibid at para 133. 
 
 
171 
Bearing in mind that those suffering from addiction are routinely unaware 
of their drug dependence, this amounts to, in effect, removing all human 
rights protections for such individuals. In other words, it says: you only 
get human rights protections if you ask, though we know, due to your 
disability, that you will not.  
This insensitivity arises disproportionately in the context of addictions, 
likely because of the stigma associated with them. We would never 
demand that an employee with a physical disability complete an 
unattainable physical activity to access accommodation. Still, that is 
precisely what Elk Valley, in a psychological context, did to Mr. Stewart 
here. He could never have sought accommodation for a disability he did 
not know he had.178  
It is true that both the employer and employee seeking accommodation must cooperate in 
the accommodation process. However, the employee’s inability to initiate or participate 
in the process, as a result of their denial, does not eliminate the employer’s obligations. 
Elk Valley still had a duty to accommodate Stewart to the point of undue hardship and 
failed to do so. The Tribunal’s analysis inappropriately placed the focus on the employee, 
rather than the employer, and disregarded key accommodation principles. The SCC 
majority should have taken the opportunity to comment on these apparent errors and the 
Tribunal’s unreasonable application of the accommodation analysis. 
Elk Valley provided the SCC with the opportunity to offer much needed clarity on 
disability law but it is clear that it was a missed opportunity. Unfortunately, the majority 
decision arguably created more confusion and left many unanswered questions regarding 
the application of the prima facie discrimination test and workplace accommodation 
analysis.  
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Chapter 6 
6 The Aftermath of Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. 
Following the release of Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.,1 the law on prima facie 
discrimination and the duty to accommodate employees with addiction appeared to be 
unclear and unsettled. While the majority decision in Elk Valley did not, on its face, 
change the legal framework for establishing discrimination, the majority’s application of 
the law did not reflect the well-established human rights principles underlying Canadian 
human rights law, described in Chapter 2. It was unclear what impact this Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC) decision would have on the subsequent addiction disability case law 
and which direction the jurisprudence would take.  
Some in the legal community feared that the majority decision would leave Canadian 
employees suffering from drug and alcohol addictions without human rights protections 
in their workplace.2 There was concern that Elk Valley “could have a chilling effect,” as 
the majority’s decision rested on a very narrow understanding of addiction disability, 
which ultimately led to the conclusion that Stewart’s addiction was not a factor in his 
termination.3 Although the SCC majority decision did not appear to change the legal 
framework for finding discrimination, the majority’s application of the law to the facts of 
the case is troubling: 
It placed emphasis on the individual “choice” of Mr. Stewart to use drugs, 
and accepted the Tribunal’s rather superficial distinction between 
termination for using drugs and termination for breaching a policy 
forbidding the use of drugs. As Justice Gascon noted in dissent, the 
majority also afforded too much deference to the Tribunal’s finding that 
 
1
 2017 SCC 30 [Elk Valley]. 
2
 Cristin Schmitz, “SCC okays zero tolerance drug policy for safety-sensitive workplaces” (15 June 2017), 
The Lawyer’s Daily, online: <https://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/3989/scc-okays-zero-tolerance-drug-
policy-for-safety-sensitive-workplaces>. 
3
 BakerLaw, “Stewart v Elk Valley Coal Corp. Summary: SCC Reaffirms Test for Discrimination but 
Gives a Narrow Understanding of Addiction” (27 June 2017), BakerLaw (blog), online: <https://www. 
bakerlaw.ca/blog/stewart-v-elk-valley-coal-corp-summary-scc-reaffirms-test-discrimination-gives-narrow-
understanding-addiction/>. 
 
 
173 
Mr. Stewart’s addiction was not a factor in the employer’s decision to 
terminate him. The correct question rather was whether Mr. Stewart’s 
addiction was a factor in his termination – including his breach of the 
policy.4 
It was uncertain whether or how the decision would affect addiction disability law in 
Canada. Would Elk Valley thwart or halt the progress towards a broad, liberal human 
rights approach to addiction in the workplace, or would legal decision makers distinguish 
the case in their decisions? If legal decision makers did consider or apply Elk Valley, 
would they adopt the law as stated in the decision or rely upon the SCC majority’s 
application of the law to successfully justify termination in safety-sensitive workplaces? 
The answer to these questions would soon be revealed with the release of legal decisions 
in the post-Elk Valley era. 
Since the release of Elk Valley in June 2017, numerous addiction disability cases have 
been decided5 and it is clear that the Elk Valley decision has shaped and developed the 
current addiction jurisprudence. The subsequent case law—especially, arising in the 
nursing sector in Ontario—has espoused the legal principles affirmed in Elk Valley and 
provided insightful commentary on the SCC decision. This chapter examines five 
decisions that are representative of the case law that has emerged in the wake of Elk 
Valley: Toronto District School Board v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 
4400,6 Humber River Hospital v. Ontario Nurses’ Association,7 Regional Municipality of 
 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 For example, Union of Northern Workers v Government of the Northwest Territories, 2019 CanLII 18391 
(NT LA) (the employer’s failure to obtain a medical prognosis regarding the grievor’s possible alcohol 
dependency prior to terminating her employment during the probationary period amounted to a breach of 
the employer’s duty to inquire and discrimination); Jasper (Municipality) v Canadian Union of Public 
Employees, Local 1458, [2017] AGAA No 44 (termination was found to be excessive under the 
circumstances); Nadeau v Deputy Head (Correctional Service of Canada), 2018 FPSLREB 28 
(reinstatement ordered); North American Palladium, Lac des Isles Mine v United Steelworkers, [2018] 
OLAA No 173 (reinstatement ordered); Interior Health Authority v Hospital Employees' Union, [2018] 
BCCAAA No 87 (several elements of the employer’s Substance Use Disorder Policy were found to be 
unreasonable, including overly broad employee search and testing provisions, the automatic imposition of 
Last Chance Agreements in cases of no self-disclosure, duplicative reporting requirements and failing to 
consider an employee’s individual circumstances prior to removing the employee from the workplace 
pending an independent medical evaluation). 
6
 [2018] OLAA No 119 (Burkett) [Toronto District School Board]. 
 
 
174 
Waterloo (Sunnyside Home) v. Ontario Nurses’ Association,8 Canadian Pacific Railway 
v. Teamsters Canada Rail Conference9 and Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Cambridge 
Memorial Hospital.10 These cases reflect the current trend towards a more liberal, broad 
human rights approach to addiction cases and the reliance on Elk Valley—namely, the 
law as stated, rather than applied, by the SCC—to support such an approach.  
6.1 Toronto District School Board v. Canadian Union of 
Public Employees, Local 4400 
Toronto District School Board concerned the termination of a school caretaker with 
approximately 22 years of service. The grievor started working for the Toronto District 
School Board in 1996 and had an unblemished employment record until 2015, when she 
entered into an abusive relationship and developed an alcohol addiction. She was absent 
for nearly 40% of her scheduled shifts in 2015, about 25% in 2016 and approximately 
87% in 2017.11 The grievor entered into but failed to complete addiction treatment 
programs and continued to be absent from work. She met with the employer in February 
2017 and agreed to enter a residential treatment program; the employer suspended her 
sick pay when it did not receive proof of treatment. In May 2017, the grievor entered into 
a last chance agreement, as a settlement for the grievance challenging the suspension of 
her sick pay. The last chance agreement required her to enter into a residential treatment 
program, submit to an assessment by an addictions specialist, remain abstinent, provide 
written proof of program completion with a prognosis for continued abstinence, enroll in 
an aftercare program and submit to random alcohol testing. The last chance agreement 
stated that any breach of the terms would result in her termination and that the employer 
fulfilled its duty to accommodate. 
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The grievor began a 20-day residential treatment program in early April 2017 but failed 
to provide the employer with proof of completion, apart from a generic doctor’s note in 
late May, indicating that she would be absent from work until the end of the month. 
When the grievor did not return to work, the employer requested further documentation 
and arranged for a meeting. When she failed to attend the meeting, the employer 
terminated her in June 2017. The termination letter provided that she had been terminated 
for breaching the last chance agreement, failing to cooperate with the employer’s 
accommodation efforts, being absent from work without leave, failing to comply with 
absence reporting procedures and frustration of contract.12 The grievor continued to 
struggle with her addiction and, in February 2018, she enrolled in a two-week community 
withdrawal management day program. Leading up to the arbitration hearing, the 
counselor from the treatment centre submitted a letter, indicating that clients present 
different levels of readiness and intention to change their substance use, the centre “does 
not provide diagnostic or prognostic information,” the grievor was expected to complete 
the program in late February and they would discuss next steps for her treatment.13 A 
subsequent letter from the treatment centre confirmed that the grievor completed the 
outpatient program and voluntarily joined a recovery group. 
The Toronto District School Board contended that: it had accommodated the grievor to 
the point of undue hardship, as confirmed by the parties in the last chance agreement; the 
grievor breached the last chance agreement; absent extraordinary circumstances, the last 
chance agreement should be given effect; and the post-treatment evidence did not provide 
a prognosis for recovery.14 The union asserted that the employer could not contract out of 
its statutory duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship and that the last chance 
agreement was not determinative.15 The union asserted that: 
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[I]n this case, the Employer’s duty to accommodate continued beyond the 
effective date of the “last chance” agreement; that the point of undue 
hardship has not yet been reached in the case of an employee with 20 
years of unblemished service who has ended an abusive relationship, 
stabilized her housing and taken steps to deal with her addiction; that the 
post-discharge evidence establishes that the grievor is capable of regular 
attendance going forward; and that given the nature of her disability, a 
relapse should not have resulted in the grievor’s termination.16  
The arbitrator, affirming human rights law principles and jurisprudence, confirmed that, 
“parties to a collective agreement cannot contract out of their statutory obligation to 
accommodate an employee disability to the point of undue hardship.”17 He correctly 
acknowledged that the existence of a last chance agreement does not in itself constitute 
accommodation to the point of undue hardship. Nevertheless, the arbitrator found that, 
given the particular circumstances, the employer accommodated the grievor to the point 
of undue hardship: 
[T]he evidence in this case is that prior to executing the “last chance” 
agreement, the grievor’s attendance was far below the minimally 
acceptable level of attendance even though the Employer had supported 
the grievor with changes in work location, leaves of absence and sick pay 
through various relapses. It is not surprising, therefore, that the parties and 
the grievor confirmed in the “last chance” agreement that the grievor had 
been accommodated to the point of undue hardship and that the “last 
chance” agreement itself constituted further accommodation. The evidence 
satisfies this arbitrator that the grievor had been accommodated to the 
point of undue hardship as of the time the “last chance” agreement was 
executed.18  
Last chance agreements are useful devices that enable employers to communicate the 
seriousness of the situation to the employee, without resorting to termination.19 Although 
such agreements are not determinative on the issue of accommodation, absent compelling 
evidence of rehabilitative potential, arbitrators have been hesitant to question last chance 
agreements, provided that the terms are reasonable in light of the underlying 
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circumstances, as this would ultimately inhibit their use.20 In this case, the employer 
made several attempts to accommodate the grievor and the arbitrator reasonably found no 
compelling evidence of rehabilitative potential. Despite the last chance agreement, the 
grievor continued to drink alcohol, failed to submit to an assessment by an addictions 
specialist, did not complete a residential treatment program and was resistant to the 
random drug and alcohol testing.21 She made no effort to comply with the agreement 
until the employer decided to terminate her. The arbitrator concluded that the medical 
evidence failed to demonstrate she had a positive prognosis for recovery that supported 
overriding the last chance agreement.22 He held that the employer had satisfied its duty to 
accommodate to the point of undue hardship and dismissed the grievance.  
Although the decision was not in the grievor’s favour, it was reasonable given the 
circumstances. Correctly acknowledging that a last chance agreement does not in itself 
constitute accommodation to the point of undue hardship, the arbitrator conducted an 
individualized assessment. He recognized the employer’s several previous attempts to 
accommodate the grievor and found no compelling evidence of rehabilitative potential. 
Ultimately, the absence of promising medical evidence, in light of the grievor’s previous 
relapses, led the arbitrator to reasonably conclude that the employer fulfilled its duty to 
accommodate the grievor to the point of undue hardship. 
6.2 Ontario Nurses' Association v. Humber River Hospital 
Humber River involved the termination of an emergency department nurse. After 
working there for four years, she was terminated following the employer’s discovery that 
she stole narcotics and other medications from the hospital. In late February 2016, a 
colleague saw the grievor put an ampule of morphine in her pocket and reported it to the 
team leader. When confronted with the allegation, she pulled multiple unopened vials of 
morphine from her pocket as well as various vial medications and tablets from her bag. 
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The grievor admitted that she obtained the medications from the hospital. She said that 
she suffered from headaches and stole the medication to fight her condition, not yet 
revealing that she had an addiction at the time. The grievor also admitted to consuming 
injectable drugs prior to her shift, which she stole from the hospital, and took Tylenol 
once it wore off. Following the investigation meeting, the grievor e-mailed the employer, 
indicating that she was ready to take responsibility, would seek medical assistance and 
“want[ed] to be clean.”23 The employer’s investigation confirmed that the grievor stole 
medication from the hospital and terminated her employment. The union filed a 
grievance on behalf of the grievor. 
The union asserted that the grievor’s termination constituted prima facie discrimination 
and the employer failed to take any steps to accommodate her. The union sought the 
grievor’s reinstatement with appropriate accommodation as well as compensation and 
damages. The employer claimed that it had just cause to terminate the grievor and, thus, 
the termination did not constitute discrimination. Alternatively, the employer argued it 
was not an appropriate case for reinstatement. The parties agreed to bifurcate the 
proceeding to first address the alleged discrimination and later address the issue of 
accommodation, following the determination of the discrimination issue. 
In the course of the hearing, the grievor testified that she began using narcotics in the fall 
of 2015, when she was prescribed Percocet for a running injury. When this prescription 
ran out, she went to a different doctor to get Percocet for her headaches. By the time the 
second prescription ran out, she did not need the drugs for her injury but felt like she was 
hooked. The grievor indicated that she stole narcotics from the hospital from December 
2015 until her termination in March 2016. She did not immediately reveal to the 
employer that she had an addiction because she was in denial and had not yet 
acknowledged that she had an addiction. Following the incident, the grievor quickly ran 
out of morphine and subsequently went through withdrawal. In April, she began seeing 
Dr. Bobrowski, an addictions specialist, and enrolled in an outpatient program in May. In 
July, the grievor relapsed and was subsequently discharged from the program. In cross-
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examination, it became clear that she failed to attend almost half of the sessions, missed 
drug testing and tried to manipulate tests. She claimed that she stopped using by 
September 2016 but then later indicated that she may have continued until October or 
November. The grievor enrolled in another outpatient program in November and 
continued regular drug testing. The following spring, she entered a day program and 
attended a caduceus group program—a recovery group for healthcare professionals. 
Dr. Bobrowski provided a medical report stating that the grievor had a severe opioid 
addiction and was in early remission at the time of the hearing. He stated that the 
diversion of drugs for personal use is a “hallmark of addiction in health professionals” 
and “[RI's] theft of drugs could reasonably have been driven by her addictive illness.”24 
The doctor also explained that the theft of non-narcotic drugs, which treat nausea, 
headaches and pain, could have been a means to self-medicate the effects of her 
addiction.25 Prior to giving his evidence, Dr. Bobrowski learned that the grievor tested 
positive for opioids in July 2017, which she claimed was the result of eating poppy seed 
cake. The doctor stated that it was impossible to determine whether or not the positive 
test resulted from poppy seeds and that this altered the conclusion in his report that the 
grievor was in remission. He also discovered that, at the time of the grievor’s termination, 
she had been using significantly more drugs than previously reported, underreported her 
symptoms of withdrawal and also acquired drugs from the street. Dr. Bobrowski 
acknowledged that much of the grievor’s self-reported information was unreliable but 
explained that denial and underreporting were symptoms of addiction. In light of this new 
information, Dr. Bobrowski testified that he had doubts about the accuracy of the 
timeline the grievor provided of her drug use, as it was unlikely she could have built up 
the tolerance necessary to reach that dosage over such a short period of time.  
As a result of the doctor’s testimony, the employer conducted a further investigation and 
discovered that the grievor’s running accident and initial Percocet prescription occurred 
in June 2014 and the subsequent prescription for her headaches occurred in June 2015. 
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The employer argued that the grievor deliberately lied about when she started using 
narcotics and likely stole drugs for longer than she admitted. When asked to explain these 
discrepancies, the grievor accepted that she first started using Percocet in 2014 and stated 
that working night shifts and her addiction affected her memory regarding the dates. She 
maintained that she had not started using morphine until November or December 2015. 
The union asserted that the medical evidence established the required nexus between the 
grievor’s addiction and misconduct to establish prima facie discrimination and trigger the 
employer’s duty to accommodate. The union relied on six Ontario arbitration decisions 
where the arbitrator found a nexus between the nurse’s addiction and theft of drugs from 
their employer and ordered their reinstatement.26 The union contended that the line of 
cases arising from British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v. British Columbia 
Government and Service Employees’ Union,27 relied upon by the employer, adopted a 
formalistic view of equality that has long been rejected in Canadian law and improperly 
focused on discriminatory attitude, as opposed to adverse affect, contrary to the human 
rights analysis endorsed in Elk Valley.28 With respect to the issue of accommodation, the 
union acknowledged that an employee must first accept and pursue treatment for their 
addiction before engaging the employer’s duty to accommodate, and contended that, 
although the grievor may not have been a “poster child” for recovery, she pursued 
treatment and persevered; the denial and relapse she experienced are common features of 
addiction.29 
The employer argued that the grievor’s addiction was not a factor in her termination and 
maintained that it neither knew nor ought to have known that she had an addiction at the 
 
26
Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre v Ontario Nurses' Association, [2016] OLAA No 361; Ontario 
Nurses’ Association v Collingwood General and Marine Hospital, [2010] OLAA No 196; William Osler 
Health Centre v Ontario Nurses’ Association, [2006] OLAA No 115; London Health Sciences Centre v 
Ontario Nurses’ Association, [2013] OLAA No 24; St Mary's General Hospital v Ontario Nurses’ 
Association, [2010] OLAA No 465; and Thunder Bay Health Sciences Centre v Ontario Nurses’ 
Association, [2010] 104 CLAS 263 [collectively cited as Six Ontario arbitration decisions]. 
27
 2008 BCCA 357 [Gooding]. 
28
 Supra note 7 at para 79. 
29
 Ibid at para 78. 
 
 
181 
time of her termination. Furthermore, the grievor suffered no greater impact than any 
other employee would have for the same conduct.30 The hospital argued that Gooding 
provided the correct approach, requiring a causal connection between the disability and 
decision to terminate. The employer also relied on Bellehumeur v. Windsor Factory 
Supply Ltd.,31 an Ontario Court of Appeal case that cited Gooding and concluded that the 
termination of an employee for making threats of violence in the workplace did not 
constitute discrimination because the employer was unaware of his mental disability, as 
well as two Ontario arbitration decisions in support of the Gooding approach—Royal 
Victoria Regional Health Centre v. Ontario Nurses’ Association,32 and Cambridge 
Memorial Hospital v. Ontario Nurses’ Association.33 It is important to note that both of 
these arbitration decisions have since been judicially reviewed and overturned.  
The employer argued that the line of cases relied upon by the union conflated the issues 
of discrimination and the duty to accommodate, effectively assuming a connection 
between the disability and termination.34 The employer argued that, even applying this 
approach, the arbitrator should dismiss the grievance because the grievor: stole more than 
just the drug she was addicted to; was not compelled to use, as she did not use drugs 
when they were unavailable; did not use drugs everyday; did not immediately detox; did 
not follow recommendations to attend inpatient treatment; was not a “poster child” for 
recovery; experienced a relapse; had subsequent positive drug test results; never admitted 
to the full extent of her addiction; and repeatedly failed to be honest and forthright.35 She 
continued to be dishonest about her drug use even while in remission, including in her 
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testimony under oath.36 The employer argued that, even if the union established prima 
facie discrimination, reinstating the grievor would constitute undue hardship.37 
The arbitrator categorically rejected the Gooding approach, asserting that it was 
inconsistent with the established human rights analysis, most recently affirmed in the Elk 
Valley decision.38 He went on to state that, “What is clear from the Court’s reasoning, 
and highly significant to my assessment of the Gooding approach, is that where it is 
established that an employee's addiction disability is a factor in their inability to comply 
with a workplace rule… the employee will have established a prima facie case of 
discrimination.39 Elk Valley also made clear that, in cases of indirect discrimination, the 
focus must be on the effect of the disability on the employee’s ability to comply with the 
workplace rule, and not the extent to which the employee’s disability was a factor in the 
employer’s decision to discipline the employee for their misconduct.40 Gooding did not 
follow these human rights principles; the decision focused on the employer’s decision to 
terminate the employee for theft, rather than whether his disability was a factor in the 
theft.41  
Elk Valley affirmed that the focus of the analysis must be on the discriminatory impact of 
the action, not the presence of a discriminatory attitude. The court in Gooding, however, 
concluded that, although the grievor’s addiction may have impacted his conduct and 
ability to comply with the workplace rule, it was “irrelevant” if the addiction “played no 
part in the employer's decision to terminate his employment and he suffered no impact 
for his misconduct greater than that another employee would have suffered for the same 
misconduct.”42 The arbitrator explicitly rejected this approach to discrimination, stating: 
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… This distinction, which goes so far as to deem “irrelevant” the effect of 
the employee’s ability to comply with a rule by virtue of having a 
characteristic protected from discrimination, is precisely what the 
Supreme of Canada rejects in cases such as Meiorin, as reinforced in Elk 
Valley. To adopt the Gooding approach would be to read adverse effect 
discrimination out of our human rights analysis and to embrace a 
superficial understanding of discrimination that the Supreme Court of 
Canada has rejected.43  
Furthermore, the arbitrator rejected the hospital’s argument that Bellehumeur endorsed 
the Gooding approach, as the court did not engage in a substantive analysis or assess the 
broader meaning of discrimination.44 He rejected the Royal Victoria and Cambridge 
Memorial arbitration decisions, to the extent that they endorsed Gooding and suggested 
that the compulsion to steal must be so powerful as to eliminate any notion of choice or 
intention and that there must more be than a connection between the addiction and 
adverse impact to establish prima facie discrimination.45 Elk Valley confirmed that the 
disability must simply be a factor in the adverse impact and rejected the notion of 
applying a higher standard. The arbitrator also rejected the employer’s claim that the 
cases relied upon by the union conflated the discrimination and accommodation analyses; 
decisions generally reflect the manner in which the cases were argued and the focus of 
the arguments, which in most cases is the nexus between the addiction and adverse 
impact.46  
The arbitrator acknowledged the seriousness of theft and the use of narcotics in a hospital 
setting as well as the resulting concerns for safety and patient care. He recognized that the 
employer’s desire to protect itself and others from potential harm was well grounded47 
and confirmed that such legitimate safety concerns do not eliminate the employer’s 
human rights obligations:  
 
43
 Supra note 7 at para 113. 
44
 Ibid at para 115. 
45
 Ibid at paras 117-120. 
46
 Ibid at para 121. 
47
 Ibid at para 124. 
 
 
184 
The question is not, therefore, whether an employer is entitled to take 
action to ensure the behaviour does not continue; clearly, it is. And the 
need to address effectively the problem behaviour is no less pressing 
simply because there is a nexus between the conduct and a disability. The 
question is rather whether the employer can take action that both addresses 
its legitimate interests and accommodates the employee's disability. And 
in this regard, arbitrators have been careful to emphasise that a finding of 
prima facie discrimination does not automatically entitle an employee to 
accommodated employment.48  
Upon finding prima facie discrimination, the arbitrator must then determine whether the 
employer can accommodate the employee to the point of undue hardship.  
The arbitrator applied the human rights approach to discrimination, relying on the human 
rights principles affirmed by the SCC in Elk Valley, and found that the grievor’s thefts 
were caused by her addiction and held that her termination constituted prima facie 
discrimination. In light of the bifurcation of the proceedings, the decision should have 
ended there. However, despite the parties not making submissions with respect to the 
duty to accommodate, the arbitrator ultimately went on to decide the issue of 
reinstatement. Acknowledging the realities of addiction disability, he affirmed that the 
failure to disclose the disability prior to termination cannot preclude the employer’s duty 
to accommodate, when the inability to disclose may be a feature of the disability.49 The 
arbitrator concluded that the employer either knew or ought to have known that the 
grievor’s conduct could have been related to an addiction disability. He found that the 
employer made no effort to inquire into the grievor’s disability or to determine whether 
she could be accommodated, thereby breaching its procedural duty to accommodate,50 
but ultimately accepted the employer’s argument that reinstatement was not an 
appropriate remedy in this case.51  
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The arbitrator shared the employer’s concerns with respect to the grievor’s honesty and 
forthrightness. In light of the evidence, he concluded that the grievor continued to lie 
about her addiction and workplace misconduct, despite claiming to be in remission with 
full insight into her disability, thus justifying the employer’s lack of trust:52 
... To be clear, my conclusion here is not about whether or not sufficient 
safeguards could be put in place to ensure that the grievor does not have 
access to drugs in the course of her employment. That is a question that, 
had it needed to be answered, would have been addressed in the second 
stage of this bifurcated proceeding. Rather, I find that the grievor’s 
ongoing lack of candour even while purporting to be clean and in 
remission has undermined the trust that is essential to the employment 
relationship [emphasis added].53  
Consequently, the arbitrator held that reinstatement was not an appropriate remedy; the 
employer’s duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship “does not require them 
to employ individuals where the necessary trust relationship between employer and 
employee has not been rehabilitated.”54 Finding that reinstatement was not an appropriate 
remedy, the arbitrator remitted the issue of remedy to the parties. 
While the arbitrator’s ruling on reinstatement, without hearing submissions on the duty to 
accommodate, was improper, the bulk of the decision was progressive and rich in its 
human rights analysis of prima facie discrimination. Following the law and principles 
stated in Elk Valley, the decision espoused the human rights approach to addiction 
disability and explicitly renounced the Gooding approach. The arbitrator reiterated that 
the focus of the analysis must be on the discriminatory effect, and not intent, in order to 
capture instances of indirect discrimination and firmly rejected the notion that the grievor 
must establish something more than a connection between the addiction and adverse 
impact, such as a compulsion eliminating any notion of choice or intention. In this case, 
the analysis should have ended there. Although making a determination regarding 
reinstatement would normally be within an arbitrator’s jurisdiction, the bifurcation of the 
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proceeding limited the scope of the hearing to prima facie discrimination and 
considerations of reinstatement are not part of the prima facie discrimination analysis. 
Clearly, trust and the viability of the employment relationship are important 
considerations in determining whether to reinstate the grievor. However, this is not an 
issue to be determined prior to examining the duty to accommodate; it should be 
addressed after the duty to accommodate analysis, which was bypassed in this case. 
6.3 Regional Municipality of Waterloo (Sunnyside Home) v. 
Ontario Nurses’ Association 
This decision was released just a month after Humber River. Prior to her termination, the 
grievor worked as a nurse and team leader at the Sunnyside Home Long Term Care 
Facility for nearly 14 years. For approximately two years, the grievor repeatedly 
misappropriated narcotics for her own use and falsified medical records to conceal the 
thefts, by charting that patients requested and received the narcotics she used. 
In July 2015, a nurse found an empty ampule of hydromorphone in the staff bathroom. 
The employer’s investigation revealed that the grievor regularly came into work early and 
was in the facility at the time of the incident. She denied any connection to the incident. 
From January to August 2016, other nurses noticed that the grievor often prepared 
medication in one unit and then administered them in another unit and sometimes took 
the medication to her office before administering it to residents. In August 2016, a 
colleague reported to the employer that she found the grievor in the washroom with an 
ampule of hydromorphone and that, two weeks prior, she witnessed the grievor slipping a 
syringe of hydromorphone into her pocket and did not administer it to the resident, 
contrary to the medical records. The employer conducted an investigation and put the 
grievor on paid leave. The grievor subsequently informed the employer that she had 
kidney stone surgery and would be off work. Days later, she revealed that she was being 
hospitalized for severe withdrawal from narcotics.  
The grievor suffered from a kidney condition, which resulted in the production of excess 
kidney stones. She had multiple surgeries to remove the kidney stones and her doctor 
prescribed Percocet to control the pain. In the fall of 2014, she started to use Percocet as a 
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means to cope with stress and exhausted her prescription. The grievor admitted to 
abusing drugs, including Tylenol 3s, Percocet, hydromorphone and morphine, and 
misappropriating drugs from the home over the past two years. She also admitted to 
falsifying medical records to indicate that she administered more pain medication than 
was actually given and did not always waste the unused remainder of narcotics so she 
could use them. The employer terminated her for the thefts, falsification of medical 
records and the resulting patient abuse, irreparable breach of trust and gross misconduct 
related to protocols.55 
The grievor testified that she started misappropriating drugs from the employer in 
October 2014 to control her pain. She indicated that she needed the drugs to get through 
work and was unable to stop. She would stockpile drugs in advance, when she knew she 
would be away from work, and supplemented them with over-the-counter medications. 
She also testified that she experienced withdrawal symptoms when she did not have a 
sufficient supply of drugs. The grievor admitted responsibility for the empty ampule of 
hydromorphone found in the staff bathroom in July 2015 and stated that she initially 
denied any involvement because she felt ashamed. She did not seek help prior to the 
August 2016 incident because she thought she could stop without help. Following her 
kidney stone surgery in August 2016, she exhausted her prescriptions and went into 
extreme withdrawal, which led to her hospitalization. In October, the grievor entered a 
35-day inpatient rehabilitation program, where she was diagnosed with severe opioid use 
disorder and mild to moderate sedative-hypnotic use disorder. Upon successfully 
completing the inpatient program, she enrolled in an aftercare program and continued to 
see an addictions specialist. She also went to caduceus group and twelve step meetings. 
Her doctor indicated that she strictly complied with the treatment plan and she testified 
that she had not used narcotics since September 2016. 
The employer reported the grievor’s misconduct to the College of Nurses of Ontario 
(CNO), the nursing regulatory body. The CNO prohibited the grievor from practicing 
nursing until June 2017, subject to conditions, including continuing treatment, monitoring 
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recommendations, no administration of or access to controlled substances, direct 
observation, a workplace monitor and supervisor agreement; any violation could result in 
significant sanctions, up to and including the revocation of her nursing license.56 The 
employer argued that it could not comply with many of the restrictions imposed by the 
CNO. The employer asserted that it could not eliminate all access to narcotics, it was not 
feasible to have other nurses administer narcotics for the grievor, it could not provide a 
setting where the grievor could be directly observed at all times, given that most of the 
team leader’s work was done independently, and the grievor violated the trust of the 
residents and their families. Furthermore, the employer argued that committing to a 
workplace supervisor agreement would be professionally irresponsible because the 
restrictions could not be satisfied, there were not enough registered nurses to fulfill the 
workplace monitor role and the manager stated that she would not risk her professional 
license by entering into such an agreement.57 
Both the union and employer called expert medical evidence. The employer called Dr. 
Lawrie Reznek, a psychiatrist and associate professor in psychiatry, and Dr. David 
Wolkoff, a psychiatrist and expert in addiction treatment. The union called Dr. Gerrit 
Veenman, the grievor’s addiction physician and expert in the treatment of addiction. Dr. 
Reznek espoused the view that addiction should not be classified as a mental disorder and 
likened addiction to a bad habit, which he acknowledged was the minority view in the 
psychiatric profession.58 In his opinion, the grievor had the capacity to disclose her 
addiction at an earlier time and comply with the workplace policies prohibiting the 
diversion of drugs and falsification of medical records.59 Dr. Wolkoff, on the other hand, 
indicated that, “the grievor had a significantly diminished capacity to resist the urges to 
engage in behaviours that supported her addiction.”60 Dr. Veenman testified that the 
grievor was in recovery, compliant with all aspects of her aftercare program and fit to 
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return to work under the conditions set by the CNO. Dr. Veenman believed that “the 
grievor had no capacity to make choices about whether or not she could prevent herself 
from diverting medications or disclosing her addiction.”61  
The union argued that the grievor’s termination constituted prima facie discrimination 
and the employer failed to demonstrate that it could not accommodate the grievor. The 
employer contended that prima facie discrimination had not been established; in the 
alternative, the grievor did not fulfill the bona fide occupational requirements of the 
position and, in the further alternative, she could not be accommodated without undue 
hardship. The employer argued that the grievor’s addiction was not a factor in the 
termination because she did not disclose her addiction until after the employer discovered 
her misconduct, her disability played no role in the employer’s decision to terminate and 
she suffered no greater impact than any other employee would have for the same 
conduct.62 The decision to terminate her employment stemmed from the grievor’s thefts 
and falsification of medical records, failing to admit to her wrongdoing and the resulting 
patient abuse, breach of trust and the risk to residents.63  
Like the employer in Humber River, Sunnyside Home primarily relied upon the decisions 
in Elk Valley, Gooding, Bellehumeur, Wright, Cambridge Memorial and Royal Victoria 
to support this argument.64 The employer asserted that the grievor could not fulfill the 
bona fide occupational requirements of the team leader position—particularly, having the 
trust of her employer, colleagues, residents and their families that she would not engage 
in further misconduct, having a positive therapeutic relationship with the residents and 
their families, having access to controlled drugs and working independently.65 
Furthermore, it could not satisfy some of the CNO’s conditions without undue 
hardship—namely, the requirement to have a workplace supervisor agreement and a 
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workplace monitor on every shift, the ability to directly observe the grievor at any time 
and the prohibition on administering or having access to controlled substances.66  
The union asserted that the addiction must only be a factor in the adverse impact to 
establish prima facie discrimination. It argued that the grievor’s misconduct was causally 
related to her addiction disability, as the medical evidence indicated she had no capacity, 
or at least diminished capacity, to make choices and control the urges with respect to her 
addictive behaviour, as a result of her addiction.67 The union relied on the line of arbitral 
cases finding that the presence of an addiction and its impact on a nurse’s ability to 
control or prevent the diversion of medication constituted a factor in her termination.68 
The employer argued that these decisions conflated the prima facie discrimination and 
accommodation analyses and should not be followed.69 The union asserted that Gooding 
was “premised on a flawed understanding of the law of discrimination” because it 
imported notions of intention into the prima facie discrimination analysis, contrary to Elk 
Valley.70 The union argued that the employer breached both its procedural and 
substantive duty to accommodate; the employer failed to consider the issue of 
accommodation, including the duty to inquire where there were reasonable concerns that 
she may be suffering from a disability, and failed to establish that it could not 
accommodate the grievor’s restrictions without undue hardship.71 
The arbitrator began by explicitly rejecting Dr. Reznek’s anomalous view that addiction 
is not a mental disorder. He concluded that the grievor had “a mental disorder 
characterized by, among other things, compulsive behaviour and either a complete 
inability or a diminished capacity to resist the urge to engage in behaviour supporting her 
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addiction.”72 The arbitrator determined that the grievor only engaged in misconduct when 
“her addiction had control of her and her urges and her choices were motivated by 
obtaining narcotics to satisfy her addiction,”73 consistent with the behaviour of a person 
suffering from substance use disorder. 
As the Humber River decision was released during the preparation of this arbitration 
award, the arbitrator gave the parties the opportunity to make submissions on the new 
decision. The employer argued that Humber River misconstrued the reasoning in Elk 
Valley, by removing any consideration of the employer’s reasons for imposing the 
discipline from the prima facie discrimination analysis.74 The arbitrator rejected this 
argument, as Elk Valley clarified that, in cases of indirect discrimination, discriminatory 
intent is not required to establish prima facie discrimination and the focus is to be on 
discriminatory impact, not whether the employee’s addiction played a role in the 
employer’s decision to terminate.75 Furthermore, the employer asserted that neither 
Humber River nor the present case presented evidence demonstrating the disproportionate 
impact of rules prohibiting the theft of drugs and falsification of patient records on people 
suffering from addiction. The arbitrator challenged this criticism, asserting that the 
Humber River decision explained how the law of indirect discrimination applied in cases 
where addiction constituted a factor in the violation of a valid workplace rule.76 
The arbitrator agreed with the assessment of the addiction case law in the Humber River 
decision. He affirmed that Bellehumeur was not a general endorsement of Gooding, as it 
“does not engage in any substantive analysis… of whether Gooding is consistent with Elk 
Valley or the myriad of other Supreme Court of Canada discrimination jurisprudence”77 
and rejected the employer’s argument that the arbitrator in Humber River erred by 
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refusing to follow Bellehumeur.78 The arbitrator asserted that Humber River provided a 
“carefully reasoned analysis of how Gooding departs from the settled principles of the 
Supreme Court of Canada.”79 Accordingly, he disagreed with the Royal Victoria and 
Cambridge Memorial arbitration decisions, to the extent that they endorsed the Gooding 
approach and suggested the requirement of additional factors in the prima facie 
discrimination analysis.80 He rejected the Wright decision, as it imported the requirement 
of stereotypical or arbitrary characteristics into the prima facie discrimination test, 
contrary to the fundamental principles affirmed in Elk Valley.81 He also rejected the 
employer’s claim that the cases relied upon by the union conflated the prima facie 
discrimination and accommodation analyses.82  
Adopting the human rights approach endorsed in Humber River, the arbitrator held that 
the union established prima facie discrimination, concluding that:  
The evidence shows beyond any doubt that there is a connection or nexus 
between the grievor's substance use disorder and the adverse effect of 
termination of employment for violation of admittedly valid workplace 
rules. Compulsive behaviour and impaired judgment are symptoms of the 
mental illness of substance use disorder. They were manifested in this 
case, according to the weight of medical evidence, by either no capacity or 
diminished capacity on the part of the grievor to comply with workplace 
rules prohibiting diversion of narcotics and falsification of medical 
records. Moreover, the grievor testified that she needed opioids “to get 
through this shift...get through the evening...get through the next day and I 
won't anymore; I am going to stop. But I couldn't stop”. There was no 
evidence that the grievor diverted the drugs for any reason other than to 
satisfy her substance use disorder. 83 
Applying the established prima facie discrimination analysis, the arbitrator found a clear 
connection between the grievor’s addiction and her termination for stealing narcotics and 
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falsifying medical records to cover up the thefts. He dismissed the employer’s argument 
that the grievor’s addiction was not a factor in her termination because it was not a factor 
in the employer’s decision to terminate her employment and correctly identified that the 
issue is not whether the grievor’s addiction was a factor in the decision to terminate, 
rather “[t]he focus at this stage is whether the application of valid workplace norms has a 
discriminatory effect on the grievor because her disability interferes with her ability to 
comply with those norms.”84 
The arbitrator also concluded that the employer failed to establish that the grievor could 
not fulfill the bona fide occupational requirements of the team leader position and that it 
could not satisfy the CNO’s requirements. The arbitrator went on to comment on the role 
of the CNO and the undertaking: 
The CNO has been granted the statutory authority and responsibility to 
determine whether RNs, like the grievor, who suffer from substance use 
disorder and who are in remission, can return to the practice of nursing 
and under what conditions. It is explicitly required to exercise its authority 
with the public interest as its main focus.  
Given its statutory role and its expertise in these matters, it can safely be 
assumed, as confirmed by the terms of the Undertaking, that the CNO is 
acutely aware of the significance and risks associated with issues such as 
relapse rates, trust issues and the like in returning nurses in remission to 
nursing practice and has designed the Undertaking accordingly.  
As a result, it is my view, that the opinion of the CNO, as expressed in the 
Undertaking, must be given significant weight in addressing some of the 
issues raised by the employer.85  
The arbitrator held that the employer violated its procedural duty to accommodate the 
grievor, as it did not consider accommodation issues and failed to take any steps or make 
any inquiries in response to troubling observations and reports about the grievor’s 
behaviour at work. The arbitrator found the employer’s evidence of undue hardship to be 
insufficient, as it was based on the current structure and performance of work; he 
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recognized that, “[t]hose opinions were formed and expressed without any analysis or 
thought about what changes in work organization or implementation might be required 
and might be possible to accommodate the grievor. Any assertion that it would be 
impossible to accommodate the grievor, or that doing so would cause undue hardship to 
the employer must be evaluated in that context.”86 The arbitrator ordered the employer to 
reinstate the grievor, accommodate her to the point of undue hardship and compensate 
her for losses, including general damages arising from the employer’s breach of the 
procedural duty to accommodate. He remitted the issues of accommodation and 
compensation to the parties.  
The Sunnyside Home award illustrates a progressive shift in addiction disability law. 
Continuing the momentum of Humber River, the arbitrator adopted the human rights 
principles endorsed in Elk Valley and rejected the Gooding approach. Upholding the 
well-established doctrine of indirect discrimination, the arbitrator correctly dismissed the 
notion that, in order to establish prima facie discrimination, the grievor’s disability must 
have been a factor in the employer’s decision to impose discipline. The arbitrator applied 
a strict approach to the employer’s duty to accommodate, critically assessing the steps 
taken by the employer in determining whether the grievor could be accommodated in the 
workplace; he found the employer’s evidence of undue hardship to be insufficient, as it 
was based on the current structure and performance of work—not satisfying the 
employer’s positive obligation to consider the reorganization of work to accommodate an 
employee’s restrictions. The award of monetary compensation in this case is also very 
significant, as monetary awards are extremely rare in addiction disability cases. 
Typically, in successful cases, legal decision makers order reinstatement without any 
compensation for lost wages or damages, reflecting a sense of condemnation and 
discipline for the misconduct arising from the addiction disability. Perhaps, this is the 
beginning of a new trend in remedies in the realm of addiction disability case law. 
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6.4 Canadian Pacific Railway v. Teamsters Canada Rail 
Conference 
Canadian Pacific Railway concerned the termination of Greg Paisley, a locomotive 
engineer, with 33 years of service. During his long service, he received minor discipline 
and had no disciplinary record at the time of his dismissal. In August 2017, Paisley’s 
train had an unavoidable collision with a vehicle on the track. No injuries were sustained. 
The grievor brought a bottle of whiskey on the train, which he indicated was a gift for 
someone else. After an inspection identified no defects with the train, he continued to 
operate the train and consumed some whiskey during this time. Upon interviewing the 
crew at the next stop, a CP Police constable detected alcohol on Paisley’s breath and 
other symptoms of intoxication and conducted a screening test. Paisley failed the 
screening test, which led to his arrest, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
then administrated a breathalyzer test. He had a blood alcohol concentration of over 0.08, 
which led to the RCMP laying criminal charges.  
During the employer’s investigation, Paisley admitted to consuming alcohol while 
operating the train and stated that he experienced a breakdown during his tour of duty, as 
a result of previous incidents in his career, including one that resulted in a death. Paisley 
revealed that he had “developed an issue with alcohol and possibly other mental health 
issues.” 87 He affirmed that this was the first time he consumed alcohol while on duty and 
the incident made him realize that his drinking was a bigger problem than he previously 
thought. Paisley disclosed some of the events that caused stress in his life, including the 
fact that both he and his wife battled cancer. He apologized for his conduct and disclosed 
that he had pursued treatment following the incident. The employer subsequently 
terminated Paisley for the use and possession of intoxicants while on duty and violating 
its alcohol and drug policy. The union grieved Paisley’s termination, raising the 
employer’s duty to accommodate. 
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Following his termination, Paisley was diagnosed with severe alcohol use disorder, along 
with post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic adjustment disorder and panic attacks. He 
attended counseling, completed a two-week residential addiction treatment program and 
continued with aftercare treatment. Paisley faced criminal charges for the workplace 
incident and pled guilty to one count of Impaired Operation over 0.08 of Railway 
Equipment. The court granted him a curative discharge—a sentence available to those 
who demonstrate that they needed curative treatment at the time of the offence—with one 
year of probation, which prevented him from operating a vehicle or rail equipment for a 
year. 
The union claimed that the employer failed to consider the mitigating circumstances 
Paisley disclosed during the investigation—namely, that he had experienced tragedies in 
his life, which led him to rely on alcohol as a coping mechanism. The union contended 
that termination was excessive under the circumstances and the employer failed to 
accommodate Paisley. The employer, on the other hand, asserted that the incident 
constituted just cause for dismissal and argued that, because Paisley did not disclose his 
addiction to the employer until after the incident and only provided medical 
documentation substantiating his disability after being terminated, he should not be 
afforded human rights protections.88 It also claimed that there was no causal connection 
between Paisley’s addiction and operating machinery under the influence of alcohol.89 
While the employer viewed the case as a disciplinary matter, the union contended that it 
was an issue of the duty to accommodate. The arbitrator stated that the resolution of this 
case ultimately depended on its characterization.90 As the union alleged the employer had 
a duty to accommodate Paisley, it had the burden to demonstrate prima facie 
discrimination. If the union failed to meet this burden, the employer could then treat the 
case as a regular disciplinary matter.91 However, a finding of prima facie discrimination 
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would shift the burden to the employer to establish that it could not have accommodated 
Paisley without undue hardship.  
Acknowledging the importance of substantive equality, the arbitrator confirmed that, 
“Under the applicable jurisprudence, it is no longer enough to show that the conduct, 
absent a protected ground under the CHRA being involved, would have attracted a severe 
disciplinary measure.”92 Applying the legal principles in Quebec (Commission des droits 
de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace 
Training Center)93 and Elk Valley, the arbitrator held that the union satisfied its burden of 
proving prima facie discrimination; the evidence revealed that Paisley had an alcohol 
addiction, he suffered an adverse impact through his termination and his addiction was a 
factor in this adverse impact. During the investigation, Paisley revealed that he had an 
issue with alcohol and there was no evidence suggesting that this was a ruse to obtain 
human rights protections.94  
The arbitrator firmly rejected the employer’s argument that Paisley’s failure to disclose 
his addiction prior to the workplace incident precluded human rights protections, stating 
that, “The case law does not support the suggestion that prima facie discrimination can 
never arise if an employee only raises his/her disability after an incident. The SCC 
examined this possible scenario in Elk Valley, but in different factual circumstances.”95 
The arbitrator also dismissed the employer’s argument regarding Paisley’s delay in 
providing medical evidence substantiating his addiction; although Paisley did not 
immediately provide medical evidence, he told the employer during the investigation that 
he had an issue with alcohol and sought treatment after the incident.96 The arbitrator 
concluded that the union established prima facie discrimination. 
 
92
 Ibid at para 30. 
93
 2015 SCC 39. 
94
 Supra note 9 at para 43. 
95
 Ibid. 
96
 Ibid at para 44. 
 
 
198 
Arguing that Paisley’s misconduct was a disciplinary matter, the employer decided not to 
directly address the matter of undue hardship and, instead, raised issues with respect to 
the use of a “medical condition as a shield,” the grievor’s culpability and the concept of a 
causal connection between the disability and misconduct. Following the human rights 
approach, the arbitrator affirmed that, “… once prima facie discrimination is shown, the 
jurisprudence requires an arbitrator to evaluate whether an employer could have 
accommodated an employee suffering from a disability without undue hardship.”97 He 
noted that the legal principles underlying the duty to accommodate remained unsettled, 
stating: “This area remains exceedingly complex for both parties and decision makers. 
Elk Valley showed that three judges on the SCC could not agree on how to apply these 
challenging principles.”98 As the employer’s submissions focused on discipline and did 
not directly address undue hardship, the arbitrator concluded that the employer failed to 
demonstrate undue hardship and ordered the reinstatement of Paisley’s employment, 
without loss of seniority but without compensation for any lost wages or benefits. The 
arbitration award imposed conditions on Paisley’s employment, including abstaining 
from drugs and alcohol and random drug and alcohol testing, and stated that a violation 
of any of the conditions could result in his termination.  
The decision in Canadian Pacific Railway reflects a broad, liberal human rights approach 
to addiction disability. The arbitrator applied the legal principles stated in Elk Valley and 
acknowledged that, although the SCC did not find prima facie discrimination, the 
decision in Elk Valley was made in light of the particular facts and did not create a 
universal bar to finding prima facie discrimination in cases where an employee fails to 
reveal the existence of a disability until after a workplace incident. This is especially 
important in the context of addiction disability, where individuals are commonly in denial 
and may not recognize that they have an addiction until they experience a significant 
negative consequence, like a workplace incident. Furthermore, although Paisley clearly 
held a safety-sensitive position and legitimate safety concerns could easily be inferred, 
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the arbitrator adhered to the established legal analyses and required the employer to 
demonstrate that it could not accommodate Paisley without undue hardship. 
6.5 Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Cambridge Memorial 
Hospital 
Like Humber River and Sunnyside Home, Cambridge Memorial involved the termination 
of a nurse for stealing drugs from her employer. The nurse had more than 28 years of 
discipline-free service at the hospital. An audit in August 2014 revealed that the grievor 
had been stealing Percocet from the hospital for several months. When confronted with 
the allegation, the grievor admitted to taking Percocet and indicated that she had “a 
problem.”99 She subsequently went on leave for a year and attended in-patient and 
aftercare treatment programs for her addiction. Further investigation revealed that the 
grievor had been stealing Percocet and Tylenol 3 for many years. At this point, the 
grievor admitted to stealing and diverting Percocet from patients since 2011. However, 
she denied stealing Percocet since 2006, as suggested by the employer’s investigation, 
and any misappropriation of Tylenol 3s. The hospital terminated the grievor’s 
employment for just cause, “solely due to [her] criminal conduct,”100 but decided not to 
press criminal charges. The union grieved her termination and the hospital’s failure to 
accommodate her addiction. The grievor stopped using narcotics in August 2014 and, 
since entering into an undertaking with the College of Nurses in January 2016, she had 
been authorized to resume nursing, subject to terms and conditions with respect to 
workplace monitoring.  
The grievor admitted that she knew what she was doing was wrong but was afraid to 
come forward because she was ashamed and feared the potential legal consequences. She 
testified that she never used Percocet at work nor came to work under the influence; she 
did not feel compelled to come to work on her days off to steal drugs and could go on 
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vacation without using drugs.101 The grievor’s addictions specialist stated that she had a 
severe opioid addiction;102 her drug use increased over time, she experienced constant 
cravings and was “entirely preoccupied with ensuring that she had enough of her drug of 
choice.”103 He explained that addiction impacts decision-making and leads to distorted 
thinking and uncharacteristic behaviour and, despite being aware of the negative 
consequences of their addiction, individuals are unable to stop using the substance.104 
The parties relied upon two different lines of legal authority. The union relied on the 
arbitral consensus in Ontario that a nurse with a drug addiction has a human rights 
defense for stealing that drug from the employer and patients in her care, if she has 
successfully completed rehabilitative treatment.105 The union emphasized the grievor’s 
successful rehabilitation and positive prognosis and asserted that she should be reinstated. 
The employer, on the other hand, adopted the Gooding approach, rejecting the notion of a 
human rights defense to criminal misconduct. The employer submitted that the grievor’s 
thefts constituted a fundamental breach of trust and the employment relationship, 
amounting to just cause for termination. The hospital claimed that the evidence failed to 
establish a connection between the grievor’s addiction and its decision to terminate her 
employment, as she had been treated in the same manner as any other employee accused 
of theft.106  
The arbitrator acknowledged that, “‘but for’ her addiction, she would not have engaged in 
the serious misconduct which led to her termination.”107 However, he decided to focus on 
issues in the grievor’s evidence instead—particularly, the fact that she did not own up to 
the full extent of her misconduct, including the theft of Tylenol 3s, and that her behavior 
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did not appear to be compulsive because she went on vacations without using drugs and 
was able to work without using drugs.108 Furthermore, the arbitrator indicated he had 
“little doubt that she will stay clean and that she could be accommodated by the Hospital 
with some hardship,” but revealed that his decision was “not based on either of those 
considerations.”109 He denied the grievance, stating that:  
In accord with Gooding, I don’t accept that pleading an addiction to the 
drug being stolen, which is to say, establishing a nexus between the 
addiction and the misconduct, is, in itself, a defense to termination.  Put 
differently, it is not prima facie evidence of discrimination.  There is not 
an iota of evidence before me of direct discrimination, to use old 
nomenclature, which is what the BCCA required in Gooding  
I have no doubt that SM would not have conducted herself in the fashion 
she did, ‘but for’ her drug dependence. Nor am I in a position to call into 
question Dr. Veenman’s opinion that the Grievor was addicted and not 
merely a ‘recreational user’. But in my view, which is consonant with the 
Doctor’s evidence, there are degrees of addiction. The Grievor’s 
addiction, based on her own evidence, was not compulsive. She did not 
use at work. She went on vacation for one or two weeks without using. 
She suffered little or no withdrawal when going off the Percocets. She did 
not provide a comprehensive narrative of her addiction that dovetailed 
with Dr. Veenman’s evidence [emphasis added].110 
The arbitrator inappropriately relied on extraneous factors and imposed additional 
requirements for establishing prima facie discrimination, clearly departing from the 
established human rights approach. 
The arbitrator’s reasoning demonstrated many flaws. The prima facie discrimination test 
requires a mere connection, not a causal connection, between the disability and 
termination. Although the arbitrator accepted that, “but for” her addiction, the grievor 
would not have engaged in the misconduct resulting in her termination,111 which clearly 
constitutes a connection between the addiction and termination, he found this connection 
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to be inadequate to establish prima facie discrimination. The arbitrator improperly 
required more than a simple connection, contrary to the proper analysis. Furthermore, his 
reasoning only referred to direct discrimination and disregarded the notion of indirect 
discrimination, suggesting an employee must satisfy the more onerous burden of 
demonstrating direct discrimination, contrary to well-established Canadian human rights 
law. The arbitrator also suggested that the human rights defense to misconduct only 
applies to “a full blown addiction,” characterized by compulsion and egregious 
workplace misconduct, like “shooting up at work.”112 This would problematically ignore 
the different manifestations of addiction disability and require the individual to go 
beyond simply establishing a disability. Diverting attention from the grievor’s disability 
and human rights, the arbitrator emphasized deterrence, stating that, “At a time when 
opioid addiction is rampant in the culture and a major issue for healthcare professionals, 
sending the message that pleading addiction, only after being caught stealing one’s drug 
of choice, should be strongly deterred”113 and essentially dismissed the grievor’s positive 
prognosis and likelihood of a successful return to work.  
The union sought a judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision.114 The Divisional Court 
applied the standard of reasonableness to the question of whether the arbitrator applied 
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Court found the arbitrator’s decision to be unreasonable, stating that: 
 
36  It is not disputed that P.S. intended to steal the drugs from the Hospital. However, the 
fact that P.S. had the necessary intention in stealing the drugs to establish mens rea does 
not exclude the possibility that her addiction caused her to take that action. The question 
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the correct test for prima facie discrimination: “Labour arbitrators, like human rights 
tribunals, have developed expertise in the area of human rights discrimination. While the 
question of what test to apply is of general importance, it is not outside their expertise. 
Thus, the presumption of reasonableness applies.”115 Both the hospital and union 
agreed that the SCC settled the test for prima facie discrimination in Elk Valley, which 
was released after the arbitration award. The union argued that the arbitrator’s conclusion 
that prima facie discrimination had not been established was unreasonable, given that he 
accepted that she had an addiction, suffered an adverse impact and that, but for her 
addiction, she would not have engaged in the conduct that resulted in her termination. 
The arbitrator erred by relying on factors not required by the prima facie discrimination 
analysis, like general deterrence and the absence of a compulsion to use drugs. The 
hospital, on the other hand, asserted that, although the arbitrator considered the Gooding 
line of cases, this jurisprudence did not drive his decision; rather, he came to the decision 
as a result of the grievor’s failure to admit to the full extent of her misconduct, her failure 
 
 
is whether, in the context of human rights jurisprudence, her addiction had reached the 
point where it “effectively deprive[d] the complainant of her capacity to comply with the 
Hospital's rules regarding the handling of drugs.” Capacity in the human rights law 
context is a very different concept from mens rea in the criminal law context.  
 
37  Moreover, in applying a standard of “culpable” versus “non-culpable” in a criminal 
law context, the Arbitrator appears to have required demonstration of an absence of 
control as the standard for a determination of whether a causal connection existed 
between P.S.'s actions and her termination. This is also an unreasonable determination. 
As the passage cited above from Elk Valley demonstrates, there is a spectrum along 
which most cases will be found. Whether a disability is a factor in the adverse impact 
suffered by a complainant will depend on the facts and must be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. Because he applied a higher standard of causation in the Decision, the 
Arbitrator failed to conduct such an analysis on the particular facts of this case.  
 
38  Given that the Arbitrator's finding of an absence of a causal connection between 
P.S.’s actions and her termination was based solely on his unreasonable determination 
that her actions were “voluntary”, the Decision was unreasonable. The Arbitrator either 
failed to address the issue of indirect discrimination or improperly took into consideration 
P.S.’s guilty plea in the criminal proceedings in implicitly finding that there was an 
absence of indirect discrimination…  
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to establish that her addiction developed before she engaged in any misconduct and her 
failure to establish that she could not control her addiction.116   
The Divisional Court ultimately found the arbitrator’s decision to be unreasonable, in 
light of his own findings. The Court affirmed the prima facie discrimination test set out in 
Elk Valley and determined that the grievor established the required elements: 
In the Award, the Arbitrator refused to accept that the Applicant had 
established prima facie discrimination. He did so after (1) finding that he 
was not “in a position to call into question Dr. Veenman’s opinion that the 
Grievor was addicted” (Award, at para. 81); (2) accepting that the Grievor 
suffered an adverse impact as a result of her addiction (termination); and 
(3) finding that “but for” her addiction she would not have engaged in the 
serious misconduct that led to her termination (Award, at paras. 77, 81 and 
82). The Applicant is right that these three findings are all that is necessary 
to establish prima facie discrimination under the governing test confirmed 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Elk Valley.117  
The Court concluded that, “it is clear that the Arbitrator did not accept that the Applicant 
had established prima facie discrimination because he was not applying the Elk Valley 
test, but the test in Gooding, which the Hospital agrees is no longer good law. As a result, 
he made a decision based on wrong principles and came to an unreasonable result.”118 
Applying the correct legal test, the grievor clearly established prima facie discrimination. 
The arbitrator inappropriately imported additional factors into the prima facie 
discrimination analysis and relied on extraneous issues to thwart a finding of 
discrimination. He relied on issues, such as the grievor’s failure to take responsibility for 
the full extent of her misconduct and the absence of evidence establishing compulsion, 
which are not part of the prima facie discrimination analysis, to justify his conclusion that 
the grievor had failed to establish prima facie discrimination. Elk Valley confirmed that 
no additional words or concepts should be added to the prima facie discrimination test 
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and establishing compulsion is not part of the test.119 The Court recognized that the 
arbitrator deviated from the established human rights approach and imposed onerous 
requirements, creating an inappropriate bar to demonstrating prima facie discrimination. 
Accordingly, the Court allowed the application for judicial review, set aside the 
arbitration award and remitted the grievance to a new mutually agreeable arbitrator for a 
new hearing and determination in accordance with the Court’s reasons.  
Cambridge Memorial reflected the sentiment that emerged in the post-Elk Valley arbitral 
jurisprudence: the endorsement and application of the human rights approach to addiction 
disability, as affirmed by the SCC in Elk Valley. The SCC’s confirmation of the 
fundamental, well-established human rights laws and principles resulted in the explicit 
rejection of Gooding by various legal decision makers. Notably, in this case, even the 
employer conceded that, in the wake of Elk Valley, Gooding was no longer good law, 
signifying the death of the Gooding approach to addiction disability. Following the 
SCC’s direction that no additional requirements are to be imported into the prima facie 
discrimination analysis, the Court declared that demonstrating compulsion is not 
necessary to establish prima facie discrimination. Recognizing the arbitrator’s clear 
departure from the proper prima facie discrimination analysis, the Divisional Court did 
what the SCC should have done in Elk Valley and found the arbitration decision to be 
unreasonable. Although Elk Valley did not change the law, the SCC’s reaffirmation of the 
law in the 2017 decision has led to stricter compliance with human rights principles by 
arbitrators and the courts. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In the three years since the release of Elk Valley, the addiction case law has shifted and 
evolved. The five cases discussed in this chapter reflect the general trend in the post-Elk 
Valley jurisprudence. Although Elk Valley appeared to leave many unanswered legal 
questions, arbitrators and judges across Canada have interpreted the decision as an 
affirmation of the well-established human rights principles developed in the previous 
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SCC jurisprudence. Legal decision makers have been applying the human rights 
principles stated in Elk Valley, as opposed to following the SCC’s questionable 
application of these principles in the decision.  
The post-Elk Valley addiction jurisprudence demonstrates a shift towards the broad, 
liberal human rights approach towards addiction disability. Notably, arbitrators and 
courts in Ontario finally denounced the Gooding approach. The Elk Valley decision has 
been relied upon to affirm that no further considerations or requirements are to be 
imported into the prima facie discrimination analysis. Applying fundamental human 
rights principles and the correct legal analysis, legal decision makers have recognized the 
clear connection between an employee’s addiction and their termination for violating the 
employer’s drug and alcohol policy and avoided making superficial distinctions between 
discipline for violating a workplace policy and misconduct related to the employee’s 
addiction disability, evident in many previous decisions. Legal decision makers have 
accepted that denial and relapse are common features of drug and alcohol addiction and 
affirmed that initially denying their addiction, failing to disclose their addiction until after 
a workplace incident and experiencing relapses cannot in itself preclude their human 
rights protections and the employer’s duty to accommodate to the point of undue 
hardship. Although legal decision makers acknowledge the legitimate safety concerns of 
employers, they have upheld the laws and principles regarding the duty to accommodate 
and require employers to take steps to accommodate the employee and demand objective 
evidence of the employer’s accommodation efforts and undue hardship claims. 
In all five cases, the legal decision maker acknowledged the connection between the 
employee’s addiction and termination for misconduct arising from their addiction and 
found prima facie discrimination. Both Humber River and Sunnyside Home explicitly 
rejected the Gooding approach, as it deviated from the established human rights analysis, 
affirmed in Elk Valley. The arbitrators endorsed various principles in the Elk Valley 
decision—namely that, the focus of the discrimination analysis must be on the 
discriminatory impact of an action, and not the presence of a discriminatory attitude; in 
cases of indirect discrimination, the emphasis must be on the effect of the disability on 
the individual’s ability to comply with the workplace rule, and not the extent to which the 
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disability was a factor in the employer’s decision to terminate; and the rejection of the 
notion that there needs to be something more than a connection between the addiction 
and termination in order to establish discrimination. The Court in Cambridge Memorial 
also affirmed that the Gooding approach was contrary to the human rights principles set 
out in Elk Valley. 
Although the emerging case law demonstrates a shift towards the human rights approach 
to addiction disability, the jurisprudence still does not reflect a biopsychosocial 
understanding of addiction, acknowledging the critical role of social factors in the 
development and manifestation of the disability, as described in Chapter 3. Legal 
decision makers have rejected the moral model of addiction, in favour of the medical 
perspective, affirming that drug and alcohol addictions are a serious mental disorder, 
constituting a disability warranting accommodation. The legal decision makers in these 
five cases unequivocally accepted addiction as a mental disorder. In Sunnyside Home, the 
arbitrator rejected medical expert opinion that an addiction is not a mental disorder, in 
favor of the medical evidence that addiction is an illness that severely impacts an 
individual’s ability to control their behavior related to the addiction. These decision 
makers also did not require the grievor to have a compulsion or complete lack of control, 
rendering them completely incapable of making decisions or controlling their behaviour 
with respect to their addiction. 
Of the five decisions examined, Toronto District School Board, Sunnyside Home and 
Canadian Pacific Railway addressed the issue of accommodation.120 In the latter two 
cases, the arbitrator held that the employer failed to fulfill its accommodation duty and 
ordered the employer to reinstate the grievor. Notably, the arbitrator in Sunnyside Home 
ordered the grievor’s reinstatement as well as monetary compensation for her losses, 
which is exceptionally rare in addiction cases. The arbitrator held that the employer had a 
responsibility to inquire into the presence of a disability and to take steps to 
accommodate the employee and demanded strict proof of the employer’s accommodation 
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efforts and alleged undue hardship. The arbitrator in Sunnyside Home held that simply 
determining whether it could accommodate the employee within its current 
organizational structure was insufficient; the employer had an obligation to consider 
making changes to its organization of work in order to fulfill its duty to accommodate to 
the point of undue hardship. In Canadian Pacific Railway, the arbitrator required the 
employer to demonstrate its accommodation efforts, despite acknowledging the safety-
sensitive nature of the grievor’s position, and did not accept the inadequate evidence 
presented by the employer. Although the arbitrator in Toronto District School Board did 
not order reinstatement, his reasoning and conclusions were reasonable under the 
circumstances; the arbitrator went through the discrimination and accommodation 
analyses and found that the employer had satisfied its duty to accommodate to the point 
of undue hardship, given the employer’s previous accommodation attempts and the 
absence of compelling medical evidence indicating a positive prognosis for the grievor’s 
recovery. Unfortunately, as described above, the arbitrator in Humber River decided—
without going through the accommodation analysis—that, under the circumstances, it 
was not an appropriate case to order reinstatement.  
The case law emerging in the post-Elk Valley era reflects a movement towards the broad, 
liberal human rights approach to addiction disability. It is well established that drug and 
alcohol addiction constitutes a disability and the recent jurisprudence rejects the notion 
that the addiction must completely eliminate an individual’s self control and ability to 
make decisions. Relying on the SCC’s reasoning in Elk Valley, arbitrators and judges 
have rejected the notion that there must be more than a mere connection between the 
addiction and adverse impact and the imposition of additional factors and considerations 
in the prima facie discrimination analysis. Furthermore, even in the context of safety-
sensitive workplaces, legal decision makers have required employers to provide objective 
evidence of their accommodation efforts and alleged undue hardship. The legal decisions 
in the wake of Elk Valley have adhered to the well-established human rights approach to 
discrimination and workplace accommodation and signify a change in the landscape of 
addiction disability case law. 
 
 
209 
Chapter 7 
7 Conclusion 
Drug and alcohol addiction has been recognized and accepted as a form of disability 
under Canadian human rights law for decades. However, despite this recognition, 
addiction disability has had a tumultuous history in the realm of discrimination and 
accommodation law jurisprudence. Historically, the three primary legal approaches to 
addiction disability have been the traditional disciplinary, hybrid disciplinary and human 
rights approaches. Although the traditional disciplinary approach to addiction disability 
has largely fallen out of favour, principles underlying this approach have remained in the 
modern Canadian addiction disability jurisprudence. Legal decision makers have 
continued to apply approaches deviating from the well-established broad, liberal human 
rights approach to be applied to all protected human rights grounds. Prior to Stewart v. 
Elk Valley Coal Corp.,1 the jurisprudence was divided with respect to the approach to be 
applied to cases of discrimination and accommodation on the basis of drug and alcohol 
addiction. Canadian addiction disability law appeared to be confused and unsettled, 
requiring clarification and guidance from the court. 
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) reached a disappointing conclusion in Elk Valley. 
The Court’s application of the law to the particular facts of the case illustrated flawed 
reasoning and inadequate appreciation of the broad human rights analysis that should 
have been applied. Nevertheless, despite these flaws, the Elk Valley decision provided 
positive direction by affirming and endorsing the Moore test2 and the application of 
human rights principles in addiction disability cases. 
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7.1 Continuation of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
Disappointing Track Record 
Elk Valley provided the SCC with the opportunity to provide much needed clarity and 
confirm the correct approach to be applied to case of discrimination and accommodation 
on the basis of drug and alcohol addiction disability. Unfortunately, the majority issued 
an internally inconsistent decision that appeared to leave more unanswered questions than 
provide answers. Although the decision ostensibly espoused and confirmed the human 
rights approach to addiction disability, the SCC majority failed to actually apply this 
approach to the situation experienced by Ian Stewart and disregarded the well-established 
fundamental human rights laws and principles that form the foundation of Canadian 
human rights law. 
Despite explicitly affirming the prima facie discrimination test articulated in Moore and 
clarifying the principles to be applied, the majority failed to acknowledge the Tribunal’s 
obvious departures from this approach. The majority decision was silent on the various 
flaws and deviations from fundamental human rights law evident in the Tribunal’s 
analysis—specifically, requiring a causal relationship between the employee’s addiction 
and adverse impact; importing additional requirements into the analysis, such as requiring 
the employee to make prudent choices to avoid discrimination, demonstrate a complete 
lack of self-control and establish arbitrary or stereotypical treatment and discriminatory 
intent; limiting human rights protections to formal equality; and accepting insufficient 
evidence of accommodation. In finding the Tribunal’s decision to be reasonable, in spite 
of these serious flaws in reasoning and deviations from established human rights law, the 
majority appeared to accept these erroneous legal principles and left unanswered 
questions with respect to the legal and evidentiary requirements for satisfying the prima 
facie discrimination test, particularly, establishing a connection between the protected 
human rights characteristic and adverse impact.  
This, unfortunately, was not the first time the SCC issued a flawed decision. Elk Valley 
continued the Court’s disappointing track record with respect to disability 
accommodation cases, where the SCC offered a series of puzzling decisions that failed to 
clarify the prima facie discrimination and accommodation analyses and ultimately created 
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more uncertainty. Particularly, three SCC decisions released in 2007 and 2008 added to 
the confusion by suggesting the importation of additional factors into the prima facie 
discrimination analysis and an inconsistent approach to the employer’s duty to 
accommodate to the point of undue hardship: McGill University Health Centre (Montreal 
General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal,3 Honda 
Canada Inc. v. Keays4 and Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques 
professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ).5 
Notably, the British Columbia Court of Appeal in British Columbia (Public Service 
Agency) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees' Union relied on these 
three SCC decisions to establish the importance of demonstrating the stereotypical or 
arbitrary nature of the discriminatory conduct in order to prove prima facie 
discrimination.6 This remained a point of contention for approximately ten years, until 
Elk Valley confirmed that arbitrary and stereotypical thinking was not a requirement. 
McGill University concerned an employee who went on a leave of absence due to mental 
health concerns. For more than two years, she unsuccessfully attempted to return to work. 
The collective agreement provided that an employee’s employment would be terminated 
upon 36 months of absence by reason of illness or non-occupational accident. After the 
expiry of the rehabilitation period, provided for in the collective agreement and extended 
by the employer, the employee remained unable to return to work as a result of a car 
accident. The employer terminated the grievor’s employment due to her prolonged 
absence from work. The arbitrator dismissed the grievance on the basis that the employer 
had already accommodated the grievor by providing her with rehabilitation periods more 
generous than provided for in the collective agreement and she was still unfit for work at 
the end of the three-year period provided for in the agreement.  The Superior Court 
dismissed the union’s application for judicial review.  The Court of Appeal reversed the 
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decision and remitted the case to the arbitrator to assess the accommodation issue on an 
individualized basis and rule on appropriate compensation. The SCC allowed the appeal. 
The SCC majority7 determined that, although the automatic termination clause negotiated 
by the parties should be considered when assessing the duty to accommodate, it was not 
determinative of the issue of accommodation, as accommodation must be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis. The SCC found that the arbitrator looked beyond the collective 
agreement and correctly concluded that the employer could not continue to employ an 
individual who was unable to return to work in the foreseeable future.8 Given the 
particular circumstances, this was a reasonable decision. However, the majority then went 
on to suggest that, if the grievor felt that the accommodation measure provided for in the 
collective agreement was insufficient, and she could return to work within a reasonable 
period of time, she had an obligation to demonstrate her ability to return to work,9 thus 
inappropriately reversing the burden of proof with respect to the employer’s duty to 
accommodate to the point of undue hardship.  
In concurring reasons, the remaining justices10 disagreed with the majority’s conclusion 
that automatic termination clauses were prima facie discriminatory. They asserted that, 
accepting such clauses to be automatically prima facie discriminatory would render all 
time-limited legislated employment protections for absences due to illness, disability or 
pregnancy presumptively vulnerable, regardless of the reasonableness of their length, and 
would remove the incentive to negotiate mutually acceptable absences.11 Although the 
clauses provided protections for an arbitrary, limited period of time, “they are not 
arbitrary in the way we understand arbitrariness in the human rights context, that is, they 
do not unfairly disadvantage disabled employees because of stereotypical attributions of 
their ability” but rather “acknowledge that employees should not be at unpredictable risk 
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of losing their jobs when they are absent from work due to disability.”12 The justices 
appeared to import the additional requirement of arbitrariness into the prima facie 
discrimination analysis and conflated the prima facie discrimination and accommodation 
analyses, finding that: 
This does not target individuals arbitrarily and unfairly because they are 
disabled; it balances an employer’s legitimate expectation that employees 
will perform the work they are paid to do with the legitimate expectations 
of employees with disabilities that those disabilities will not cause 
arbitrary disadvantage.  If the employee is able to return to work, the same 
or an analogous job remains available.  If not, he or she lacks, and has 
lacked for three years, the ability to perform the job.  This, it seems to me, 
is precisely what is protected by s. 20 of the Quebec Charter which states, 
in part, that “[a] distinction, exclusion or preference based on the aptitudes 
or qualifications required for an employment . . . is deemed non-
discriminatory.”13 
The concurring justices conducted a fundamentally flawed analysis by relying upon 
occupational requirements, which are to be considered in the accommodation analysis, to 
conclude that the grievor failed to establish prima facie discrimination.  
The SCC perpetuated flawed reasoning in Honda Canada and Hydro-Québec, cases 
involving the termination of an employee due to their chronic, excessive absenteeism 
resulting from their disability. Honda Canada concerned the wrongful dismissal suit of a 
non-unionized employee. Honda placed the employee in a disability program that 
allowed employees to take time off work if they provided medical notes confirming that 
their absences were related to their disability. The employer became concerned with the 
frequency of his absences and questioned the legitimacy of the medical notes, particularly 
whether the doctor had independently evaluated whether the absences were related to his 
disability. Honda asked the employee to meet with an occupational medical specialist in 
order to determine how he could be accommodated. On the advise of legal counsel, he 
refused to meet with the specialist without an explanation of the purpose, methodology 
and parameters of the consultation. Following his continued refusal, the employer 
 
12
 Ibid at para 56. 
13
 Ibid at para 63. 
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terminated his employment. He sued for wrongful dismissal, claiming discrimination, 
harassment and misconduct on the part of the employer.  
Assessing the termination from a traditional wrongful dismissal lens, both the Superior 
Court and the Court of Appeal failed to apply the human rights approach to addressing 
the allegations of discrimination on the basis of disability and the issue of workplace 
accommodation. The decisions focused on the issue of damages, without first 
determining the issues of prima facie discrimination and accommodation, which were 
treated as supplemental issues to be considered at the remedies stage. Both courts 
determined that the employer’s discriminatory conduct amounted to an independent 
actionable wrong for the purposes of awarding punitive damages.  
The SCC had the opportunity to clarify the approach to disability discrimination and 
accommodation in wrongful dismissal cases. Unfortunately, the SCC also failed to apply 
the prima facie discrimination and accommodation analyses; the Court simply concluded 
that there was no evidence of discrimination and held that both courts erred in finding 
that the employer committed discriminatory conduct amounting to an independent 
actionable wrong.14 The SCC asserted that it found no arbitrariness or stereotyping and 
accepted that the need to monitor the absences of employees who are regularly absent 
constitutes a bona fide occupational requirement.15 In Hydro-Québec, the SCC once 
again inappropriately emphasized the presence of arbitrariness and stereotyping in cases 
of discrimination, asserting that the objective of human rights legislation is to “eliminate 
exclusion that is arbitrary and based on preconceived ideas concerning personal 
characteristics which, when the duty to accommodate is taken into account, do not affect 
a person’s ability to do a job.”16  
The SCC has had a disappointing track record when it comes to disability 
accommodation cases. The McGill University, Honda Canada and Hydro-Québec 
 
14
 Supra note 4 at para 67. 
15
 Ibid at para 71. 
16
 Supra note 5 at para 13, citing Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
jeunesse) v Montréal (City), 2000 SCC 27 at para 36. 
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decisions advanced flawed legal reasoning with respect to the prima facie discrimination 
and accommodation analyses, contrary to well-established human rights laws and 
principles, and created more confusion than it provided clarity. Consequently, many legal 
decision makers have disregarded and not applied these contradictory principles. 
Nevertheless, the flawed reasoning and principles espoused in these decisions persisted to 
a certain degree and remained in the workplace accommodation law discourse for many 
years, as evidenced in the addiction disability jurisprudence. Approximately ten years 
later, the SCC was called upon once again to clarify and confirm the correct legal 
approach to workplace discrimination and accommodation in Elk Valley. 
Unfortunately, Elk Valley was yet another disappointing decision. The SCC majority’s 
reasoning was internally inconsistent. The majority expressly affirmed the Moore test for 
prima facie discrimination, confirmed that the disability must merely be factor in the 
adverse impact, asserted that discrimination may be direct or indirect and rejected the 
requirement of establishing discriminatory intent and stereotypical or arbitrary decision 
making. Nevertheless, the SCC majority curiously did not apply this approach. It failed to 
acknowledge the Tribunal’s deviations from this approach, committing the very errors 
renounced by the Court, and upheld the Tribunal’s conclusion that Elk Valley fired 
Stewart for breaching the workplace rule, and not because of his disability, on the limited 
ground that it was a reasonable finding of fact. Frankly, Elk Valley was a case of the 
majority failing to practice what it preached. The silver lining of this disappointing 
decision is that, in the wake of Elk Valley, legal decision makers have accepted the law as 
expressly stated, and not as applied, by the SCC majority.  
7.2 The Legacy of Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. 
Despite the SCC majority’s disappointing judgment, the Court’s commentary in Elk 
Valley has ultimately helped clarify the principles to be applied in addiction disability 
cases involving workplace misconduct. The principles in Elk Valley have been considered 
and approvingly cited in subsequent addiction disability jurisprudence. In the wake of Elk 
Valley, labour arbitrators have looked to the positive features of the decision, rather than 
the SCC’s flawed analysis, and continue to appreciate that individuals struggling with 
drug and alcohol addiction disability must be accommodated in a broad and liberal 
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fashion, in accordance with Canadian human rights law. Legal decision makers across the 
country have applied the law as stated in the Elk Valley decision—paying little attention 
to the SCC majority’s problematic application of the law to the particular facts of the 
case—and cite Elk Valley as affirming the Moore test for prima facie discrimination and 
the fundamental, well-established human rights laws and principles. Elk Valley has 
ironically emerged as a landmark decision and triggered the much needed progress and 
rehabilitation of Canadian addiction disability law. The subsequent jurisprudence has 
reflected a change in the right direction, shifting towards the broad, liberal human rights 
approach towards addiction disability.  
The Elk Valley decision expressly affirmed the correct human rights analysis and 
principles to be applied with respect to determining the existence of prima facie 
discrimination. The SCC majority endorsed the prima facie discrimination analysis 
established in Moore and reiterated that discrimination can be direct or indirect; thus, 
discriminatory intent is not a requirement for establishing prima facie discrimination: 
To make a case of prima facie discrimination, “complainants are required 
to show that they have a characteristic protected from discrimination under 
the [Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210]; that they experienced an 
adverse impact with respect to the service; and that the protected 
characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact”: Moore, at para. 33. 
Discrimination can take many forms, including “‘indirect’ 
discrimination”, where otherwise neutral policies may have an adverse 
effect on certain groups: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et 
des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace 
Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 789, at para. 32. 
Discriminatory intent on behalf of an employer is not required to 
demonstrate prima facie discrimination: Bombardier, at para. 40.17 
The SCC affirmed that the focus is to be on the discriminatory impact of the employer’s 
action on the individual and not the employer’s discriminatory intent. Elk Valley makes 
clear that discriminatory intent is not required to establish prima facie discrimination.18 
 
17
 Supra note 1 at para 24. 
18
 Humber River Hospital v Ontario Nurses’ Association, [2018] OLAA No 416 at para 111 [Humber 
River]; and Regional Municipality of Waterloo (Sunnyside Home) v Ontario Nurses’ Association, [2019] 
OLAA No 16 at para 160 [Sunnyside Home]. 
 
 
217 
This is important because, as illustrated by the case law, most cases involve indirect 
discrimination and requiring evidence of discriminatory intent would, in effect, 
necessitate the existence of direct discrimination and place a more onerous burden on the 
employee to establish prima facie discrimination. The SCC in Elk Valley once again 
“mandated a much broader and robust understanding of discrimination and equality, and 
specifically one that accounts for the discriminatory effects of applying standards that 
may have been adopted with no discriminatory intent whatsoever.”19  
The Moore test provides that an employee must simply establish that the disability was a 
factor in the adverse impact, which, in most addiction cases, is a form of discipline. 
Nevertheless, the previous addiction disability jurisprudence reveals that legal decision 
makers have focused on whether the individual’s disability played a role in the 
employer’s decision to impose discipline. This is contrary to the Moore test, which only 
requires a nexus between the disability and discipline—not the decision to impose 
discipline, thereby altering the analysis to demand evidence of discriminatory intent. Elk 
Valley has clarified that, “in cases of indirect discrimination the focus of the analysis 
must be on the effect of the disability on the employee’s ability to comply with the rule, 
and not on the extent to which the employee’s disability was a factor in the employer's 
decision to take disciplinary action for breach of the rule.”20 Following the principles in 
Elk Valley, if there is a nexus between the addiction and the misconduct resulting in 
discipline, prima facie discrimination will be established, regardless of whether the 
employer claims that it would have imposed the same discipline on an employee without 
an addiction for the same misconduct.21  
Elk Valley further clarified that additional requirements are not to be imported into the 
prima facie discrimination analysis. The majority categorically rejected the notion that 
 
19
 Humber River, supra note 18 at para 109. 
20
 Ibid at para 107. 
21
 Raquel Chisholm and Sabina Veltri, “Addiction Disabilities and Misconduct in the Health Care Sector 
Understanding the Duty to Accommodate after Stewart v Elk Valley” in The Six-Minute Labour Lawyer 
2019 (delivered at the Law Society of Ontario, 20 June 2019) 6-1 at 6-7. 
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stereotypical or arbitrary decision making should be added as a requirement for 
establishing prima facie discrimination: 
First, I see no basis to alter the test for prima facie discrimination by 
adding a fourth requirement of a finding of stereotypical or arbitrary 
decision making.  The goal of protecting people from arbitrary or 
stereotypical treatment or treatment that creates disadvantage by 
perpetuating prejudice is accomplished by ensuring that there is a link or 
connection between the protected ground and adverse treatment. The 
existence of arbitrariness or stereotyping is not a stand-alone requirement 
for proving prima facie discrimination. Requiring otherwise would 
improperly focus on “whether a discriminatory attitude exists, not a 
discriminatory impact”, the focus of the discrimination inquiry: Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. A, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 327 
(emphasis in original). The Tribunal expressly noted that proof of 
arbitrariness and stereotyping was not required, at para. 117.22 
Elk Valley specifically “reject[ed] any notion of requiring complainants to prove that a 
decision was arbitrary or based on stereotypes precisely because to do so would 
improperly restrict the analysis from addressing the discriminatory impact of seemingly 
neutral policies and rules.”23 Although the SCC majority did not explicitly mention other 
additional factors that have been improperly imported into the prima facie discrimination 
analysis in addiction disability cases, such as compulsion and absence of control, Elk 
Valley has been cited as broadly rejecting the importation of any additional factors. The 
SCC in Elk Valley clearly stated that the disability must merely be a factor in the adverse 
impact and “explicitly reject[ed] the notion of applying a higher standard.”24 
Accordingly, Elk Valley does not support the suggestion that it is necessary to establish 
that the employee’s compulsion to steal drugs from their employer, as a result of their 
addiction, was so strong as to eliminate any sense of choice or intention.25 The Ontario 
Divisional Court asserted that, “As Elk Valley made clear, there are no additional words 
or concepts that should be added to the test for prima facie discrimination. Establishing 
 
22
 Supra note 1 at para 45. 
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 Humber River, supra note 18 at para 111. 
24
 Ibid at para 119. 
25
 Ibid; and Sunnyside Home, supra note 18 at para 168. 
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such things as ‘compulsion’ is not part of the test.”26 There is no need to demonstrate an 
absence of control to establish the necessary connection between the employee’s 
misconduct and termination; Elk Valley acknowledged that there is a spectrum of 
addiction disability and whether the disability is a factor in the adverse impact depends 
on the particular facts and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.27 
Elk Valley also confirmed that the protected ground must only be a factor in the adverse 
impact. The majority explicitly rejected the suggestion that a higher standard be imposed 
for establishing a connection between the disability and adverse impact in order to 
demonstrate prima facie discrimination: 
Second, I see no need to alter the settled view that the protected ground or 
characteristic need only be “a factor” in the decision.  It was suggested in 
argument that adjectives should be added: the ground should be a 
“significant” factor, or a “material” factor.  Little is gained by adding 
adjectives to the requirement that the impugned ground be “a factor” in the 
adverse treatment. In each case, the tribunal must decide on the factor or 
factors that played a role in the adverse treatment. This is a matter of 
fact.  If a protected ground contributed to the adverse treatment, then it 
must be material.28 
The SCC clearly stipulated that the disability must only be a factor, not a significant or 
causal factor, in the adverse impact. The majority’s statement indicating that the 
protected ground must be a factor in the decision, rather than the actual adverse impact, 
has been interpreted as an oversight and not an alteration of the prima facie 
discrimination analysis. Prima facie discrimination will be established where the 
employee’s addiction is a factor in their inability to comply with a workplace rule, 
regardless of whether the employer’s decision to discipline the employee was based on 
the misconduct, isolated from the disability that contributed to the misconduct.29 
 
26
 Ontario Nurses’ Association v Cambridge Memorial Hospital, 2019 ONSC 3951 at para 38. 
27
 Ontario Nurses’ Association v Royal Victoria Regional Health Centre, 2019 ONSC 1268 at para 37. 
28
 Supra note 1 at para 46. 
29
 Humber River, supra note 18 at para 106. 
 
 
220 
Elk Valley and the subsequent jurisprudence appear to have resolved the competing 
approaches to addiction disability, clearly signaling that addiction-related misconduct in 
the workplace must attract a human rights approach, as opposed to a disciplinary-focused 
approach.30 Although the SCC majority in Elk Valley did not make any mention of 
Gooding, the decision has prompted the explicit rejection of the Gooding approach to 
addiction disability cases. This hybrid disciplinary approach involved the application of a 
disciplinary or just cause analysis to the voluntary, culpable aspects of the employee’s 
misconduct and a human rights analysis to the involuntary, non-culpable components, 
causally connected to the disability. Recall, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held 
that Mr. Gooding’s alcohol dependency played no role in the employer’s decision to 
terminate him for stealing alcohol. The court problematically concluded that, although 
Mr. Gooding’s conduct may have been influenced by his alcohol dependency, it was 
irrelevant if the dependency played no role in the employer’s decision to terminate his 
employment and he suffered no greater impact than any other employee would have for 
the same misconduct.  
Although not widely adopted across Canada, the Gooding approach continued to be 
relied upon by employers and lingered in the addiction disability law landscape. 
Following the release of the Elk Valley decision, Ontario arbitrators and the Divisional 
Court have expressly denounced Gooding, recognizing that it is inconsistent with the 
established human rights analysis for workplace discrimination, most recently affirmed 
by the SCC in Elk Valley. The SCC made clear that discriminatory intent is not required 
to establish prima facie discrimination; the employee does not need to demonstrate that 
the employer treated him or her differently than it would have treated another employee 
accused of the same misconduct. As stated in Humber River, “To adopt the Gooding 
approach would be to read adverse effect discrimination out of our human rights analysis 
and to embrace a superficial understanding of discrimination that the Supreme Court of 
Canada has rejected.”31 The SCC’s confirmation of the prima facie discrimination 
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analysis and human rights principles in Elk Valley has elicited the consensual rejection of 
Gooding, at least in Ontario. 
Addiction disability law in Canada has developed over the past decade and continues to 
evolve. The Elk Valley decision, although flawed, provided clarification and guidance to 
legal decision makers with respect to the principles to be applied in addiction disability 
cases, resulting in a progressive movement towards the broad, liberal human rights 
approach to cases of workplace discrimination and accommodation on the basis of drug 
and alcohol addiction. Applying fundamental human rights principles and the correct 
prima facie discrimination analysis, unencumbered by extraneous considerations and 
inappropriately imposed requirements, legal decision makers have recognized the clear 
connection between an employee’s addiction and their termination for misconduct related 
to their disability, avoiding the superficial distinction between discipline for violating a 
workplace policy and discipline for misconduct related to the employee’s disability. It is 
accepted that employees are not required to establish compulsion or a complete lack of 
control, rendering them completely incapable of making decisions or controlling their 
behaviour with respect to their addiction. Accepting and adopting the medical model of 
addiction, legal decision makers recognize that denial, dishonesty and relapse are 
common features of addiction and cannot be relied upon to preclude the employer’s duty 
to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. While acknowledging the legitimate 
safety concerns of employers, legal decision makers have upheld the human rights laws 
and principles regarding the duty to accommodate and require employers to take steps to 
accommodate the employee and demand objective evidence of the employer’s 
accommodation efforts and resulting claims undue hardship.  
The guidance provided by the SCC in Elk Valley and the subsequent rejection and 
abandonment of disciplinary-centered approaches in the wake of Elk Valley has resulted 
in the more consistent application of the principled human rights approach to claims of 
discrimination on the basis of addiction disability. This is a very important step in 
rehabilitating Canadian addiction disability law and, hopefully, the momentum continues. 
As the post-Elk Valley addiction disability case law develops, I predict that the human 
rights approach, informed by the principles endorsed by the SCC in Elk Valley, will be 
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the predominant approach to addressing discrimination on the basis of addiction 
disability and the employer’s duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. Time 
will tell. 
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